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Abstract
The need for secure communication has prompted the development of security pro­
tocols—prescribed sequences of interaction designed to establish some security re­
lated goal (typically in a hostile environment). Security protocols are deceptively 
simple objects that often harbour subtle errors. As such, recent years have wit­
nessed the development of a large number of techniques for their formal analysis; 
some aim at the discovery of attacks, others at establishing correctness.
Schneider’s approach, based on rank functions, provided a framework within 
which the correctness of authentication protocols can be rigorously established. 
This work was subsequently carried forward by Heather and Evans who touched 
upon, but did not fully address, the use of the approach in establishing secrecy 
properties.
This thesis fills that gap by tailoring the central concept of a rank function for 
the verification of secrecy properties. We also describe how low-level properties of 
an underlying cryptosystem may be incorporated into analyses, yielding stronger 
proofs of correctness than those based on the perfect encryption assumption. In ad­
dition, we provide the first general approach for reasoning about forward secrecy; 
describe how the rank function approach fails when we attempt to reason about this 
property; and develop the concept of a temporal rank to address this problem.
For m y parents
Preface
A protocol is a prescribed series of steps, involving two or more parties, designed to achieve some goal. At the macroscopic scale, we engage in protocols to accomplish tasks ranging from the mundane (paying a utility 
bill) to the matrimonial (exchanging marriage vows); from the sublime (ordering 
wine from the sommelier) to the ridiculous (authenticating oneself as a society 
member by means of a ‘secret handshake’). Such protocols, involving interac­
tion between humans, have evolved over a number of years, and are trusted to the 
point where, for instance, few diners worry seriously about fraudulent wine down­
grades. 1
A protocol is designed to accomplish a task; by the end of the protocol each 
participant should be satisfied that this task has been completed.2  A protocol does 
not operate in a vacuum, but in the context of an environment that may be hostile or 
incompletely understood. As a result it will tend to be designed to operate correctly 
even in the presence of adverse behaviour arising from this context. In seeking to 
pay a utility bill, for instance, we may be subject to an unreliable mail service that 
can lose or delay our payment. The protocol achieves some resilience against this 
by having the company issue a reminder if payment is not received by a given date 
(and by urging customers not to send cash by post).
As a more complex example, consider the series of steps used to pay the bill in 
a restaurant. The Restaurant Protocol involves two parties, the diner and the waiter, 
and typically involves three rounds of interaction between the parties:
1. The diner requests the bill, and the waiter responds by calculating the bill 
and presenting it to the diner.
2. The diner presents a credit card to the waiter, who runs it through a (typi-
1 As remarked by Matt Blaze, in [14].
2As Schneier notes in glib, but not inaccurate terms, “Something that looks like a protocol but 
does not accomplish a task is not a protocol—it’s a waste of time.” [110].
cally online) device and presents the diner with a charge slip (or requests the 
diner’s PIN).
3. The diner signs the slip (or enters her PIN), and the waiter responds by pre­
senting the diner with a receipt.
The steps of this protocol are understood to the point of being social convention. 
However, the environment and goal (seldom considered by either participant) are 
more difficult to isolate.
One might think that the Restaurant Protocol assumes that each party adheres to 
the protocol rules. However, like the utility bill protocol, this protocol is designed 
to operate in a non-ideal environment. In particular, neither the diner nor the waiter 
is assumed to behave honestly. For instance, the diner is able to check that the 
waiter has calculated the bill correctly by inspecting it after round 1. A similar 
check can be carried out on the charge slip after round 2. In either case the protocol 
can be aborted if  the diner suspects foul play. Similarly, the waiter can verify that 
the diner is the owner of the credit card by checking the signature on the charge 
slip against the one that is present on the card. These checks are not foolproof, and 
there are undoubtedly others that could be made.
In terms of the protocol’s goals we could propose that, by the end of the proto­
col:
-  the diner believes that she has paid the cost of the bill to the waiter,
-  the waiter believes that he has received the cost of the bill from the diner.
However, this is just one of several reasonable views of the goal. More pessimisti­
cally we might propose that, by the end of the protocol:
-  the diner believes that she has paid at most the cost of the bill to the waiter,
-  the waiter believes that he has received at least the cost of the bill from the 
diner.
However, neither the diner nor the waiter may be concerned with who has paid the 
bill, but only with the fact that it has been paid. This observation leads us to claim 
the following goals. By the end of the protocol:
-  The diner believes that the bill has been paid,
-  The waiter believes that he has received payment for the bill.
We could go further. However, these three sets of goals are sufficient to highlight 
the difficulty of formalising the task which a protocol seeks to accomplish (or, 
equivalently, the goal that it seeks to attain). If the goals cannot be agreed upon, 
how can we hope to determine whether the protocol actually meets them?
So far we have assumed the existence of a single run of the protocol involving 
a single waiter and a single diner. In reality, the situation is likely to be more 
complicated; there will typically be a pool of waiters, each of which is responsible 
for a certain set of tables (and with access to a shared resource—the credit card 
payment machine). Given the inherent complexity of this highly concurrent system 
(with, for example, the opportunity for collusion amongst dishonest waiters), can 
we still be sure that the protocol is correct?
The Restaurant Protocol teaches several lessons which apply to protocols in 
general. Firstly we note the triumviral nature of a protocol as a combination of 
protocol description, operating environment and intended goal(s); before the cor­
rectness of a protocol can be established, each of these components must be unam­
biguously defined. In addition, we note that, for a given protocol, there may exist 
several reasonable combinations of environment and goal; choosing which is ap­
propriate may be subjective (and, therefore, open to criticism). More generally, the 
Restaurant Protocol demonstrates that even a simple protocol can exhibit subtleties 
which only become clear as a result of methodical analysis.
This thesis is not concerned with human-scale protocols, but with those per­
formed at a microscopic scale in the wires of computer networks. A communica­
tions protocol is a protocol in which the participants are not humans, but comput­
ers. Such a protocol may aim to deliver web content, validate a client’s identity 
before permitting access to a server, or establish a secure communications channel. 
For these last two, a protocol will typically make use of cryptography. We call 
such a protocol a cryptographic (or security) protocol. The importance of security 
protocols in enabling business communication cannot be overstated, a fact which 
underlines the need for such protocols to be correct. But how can we actually prove 
this correctness?
One would hope that the ambiguities of human-scale protocols disappear when 
we consider the correctness of security protocols. It is likely that the goal of the 
protocol (e.g., that the confidentiality of some data is preserved, or that some au­
thentication goal is reached) is unambiguously defined. By virtue of its implemen­
tation on a computer, a security protocol contains a precise statement of the pro­
tocol steps and the checks performed by the communicating parties at each stage. 
However, this implementation may itself be an interpretation of an informal, and 
possibly ambiguous, specification. Furthermore, the hostility of the environment 
in which the protocol operates may not be fully appreciated, or may change over 
time. The protocol may, for instance, assume that all parties are honest, and never 
deviate from the protocol steps or divulge any sensitive data. A more pessimistic 
protocol may seek to operate correctly in the presence of some malicious principal 
whose goal is to subvert the protocol. The computational abilities available to such 
an attacker (in terms of guessing passwords or breaking into encrypted messages) 
can only increase with time. Even if a protocol is deemed correct in the context 
of the first environment, how can we be sure that it also meets its goal in the more 
hostile environment?
Security protocols are deceptively simple objects that often harbour subtle er­
rors. This thesis promotes an approach to the verification of confidentiality (se­
crecy) properties of security protocols. For a given protocol we can explicitly state 
the protocol steps, and the operating environment, using the process algebra CSP, 
and then prove that a secrecy goal (for instance, that a session-key remains known 
only to certain parties) does actually hold. The framework we present is based on 
Schneider’s concept of a rank function, originally conceived to reason about au­
thentication properties. We carry forward the work by tailoring the approach for 
secrecy. We also describe how the low-level properties of an underlying cryptosys­
tem can be incorporated into an analysis, yielding a stronger proof of correctness 
than an analysis based on the assumption that encryption is perfect. In addition, 
we provide the first general approach for reasoning about the property offorward 
secrecy; describe how the rank function approach fails when we attempt to reason 
about this property; and develop the concept of a temporal rank to address this 
problem.
Structure of this thesis
This thesis has been written to be read in order. However, after reading Chapters 1 
and 2  the reader may, with reasonable confidence, proceed to tackle the later chap­
ters in any order. The main research contributions are contained in Chapters 3, 4 
and 7.
Chapter 1 starts by introducing some concepts and notation which are central to
v
this thesis. In particular we describe the process algebra CSP and explain the idea 
of a rank theorem and rank function. This is carried out in the context of a simple, 
but interesting, puzzle due to Douglas Hofstadter. Although the puzzle is super­
ficially different from the concept of a security protocol, we aim to demonstrate 
that they are fundamentally similar. Moreover, the themes explicated here (in the 
context of the puzzle) are returned to (in a security context) in subsequent chapters.
Chapter 2 starts as a tutorial introduction aimed at explaining how rank functions 
can be used to reason about properties of authentication and secrecy in security 
protocols. Basic protocol notation is introduced, and the non-trivial task of how to 
search for a rank function is addressed. The chapter closes with a consideration of 
several other techniques that may be used to reason about the correctness of secu­
rity protocols.
Chapter 3 is concerned with how low-level properties of a cryptographic mech­
anism can be incorporated into a rank function analysis. We focus primarily on 
the algebraic equivalences in Diffie-Hellman key agreement and propose a normal 
form for Diffie-Hellman messages that eases the task of finding a suitable rank 
function. We illustrate the utility of the approach by considering the correctness 
of the Cliques A-GDH.2 authenticated group key agreement protocol. We also 
discuss how properties of symmetric ciphers may be incorporated into a protocol 
verification.
Chapter 4 proposes a different approach to the verification of Diffie-Hellman pro­
tocols which operates more directly on the algebraic structure of Diffie-Hellman 
values. We derive an abstract model—called a message-template—which captures 
the knowledge attainable by an attacker under a given set of capabilities and show 
how secrecy of a session-key corresponds to the attacker’s inability to instantiate 
the message-template in a way that will realise that value. We demonstrate the ap­
proach by deriving the conditions under which the well-known MTI protocols can 
be considered correct.
Chapter 5 considers two different approaches to the modelling of security proto­
cols; one oriented in terms of the behaviour of the protocol participants, the other 
focused on the messages that the protocol can make public. We argue that this 
latter view is often most appropriate for reasoning about secrecy, and propose a
strategy, based on internalisation, for achieving such protocol models.
Chapter 6  conducts an overdue investigation into the question of what a rank func­
tion actually means. Progress towards an answer is achieved by reconsidering the 
puzzle of Chapter 1, and examining the properties of the rank function proposed in 
that chapter. Specifically, we examine the rank function properties of minimality, 
maximality and perfection, examine situations in which many rank functions exist 
to prove a particular property and suggest a situation in which a single rank func­
tion exists to fulfil the role. Although this discussion is largely conducted outside 
of the security domain, we end by suggesting its impact on protocol verification.
Chapter 7 considers the security goal of forward secrecy—where the compro­
mise of a long-term key does not compromise the secrecy of previously computed 
session-keys. We motivate the study of this property and explain why the standard 
rank approach is incapable of reasoning about its presence. This shortcoming mo­
tivates the introduction of a generalised proof technique based on a temporal rank 
function; if  a standard rank function is a statement about what an attacker can learn 
then a temporal rank function is a statement about when he can learn it. Tempo­
ral ranks enable us to reason about secrecy in a particularly fine-grained manner. 
We apply the approach to several protocols, one due to Colin Boyd, the Cliques 
A-GDH.2 protocol and Bellovin and Merritt’s Encrypted Key Exchange.
Chapter 8  concludes the thesis by tying together the strands of the previous chap­
ters and suggesting several directions for future work.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis is concerned with the use of rank functions in verifying secrecy properties of cryptographic protocols. However, computer security is just one area in which rank functions can be successfully applied. More gen­
erally, rank functions can be used to reason about invariant properties of state tran­
sition systems.
In this chapter we show how the concept of a rank function can be used to 
reason about the solvability of Douglas Hofstadter’s MU-Puzzle. Whilst the puz­
zle is primarily of recreational value, its consideration enables us to achieve several 
goals. Specifically, we introduce the process algebra CSP and its simplest semantic 
model, the traces model; propose a message-oriented approach to the representa­
tion of concurrent systems with CSP; describe the idea of a rank function, and show 
how a rank theorem can be defined and used to reason about the solvability of the 
MU-Puzzle. The ideas presented in this chapter are central to the whole thesis and 
are developed, in subsequent chapters, in the context of security protocol verifi­
cation. Here, the MU-Puzzle enables us to present these themes in a particularly 
clean way.
1.1 The MU-Puzzle
Originally proposed by Douglas Hofstadter in his seminal work Godel, Escher, 
Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid [65], the MU-Puzzle describes a formal system 
with a single axiom and four rules that may be used to derive new theorems. Theo­
rems of the system are sequences over the alphabet {M ,I , U} that can be generated 
from the axiom MI by (repeated) application of the following rewrite rules:
1
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1. If a string ends in I, you may append a JJ onto the end.
2. If a string is of the form Mx, you may rewrite it to Mxx.
3. If the string contains III, you may replace them with U.
4. If the string contains UU, you may remove it.
For example, MU1 is a theorem by virtue of the derivation: MI —> M il —> MIIII —> 
MUI. Rules cannot be applied in the opposite direction, so that, for instance, the 
string MIUUI cannot be derived from M il by reverse application of the fourth rule.
If we interpret the string as a sequence of symbols with the axiom as (MJ),  
then we can describe the rules formally as:
R1 xs ~  (I) b x s ~  (I:U)
R2 (M)'~'xs b ( M ) ' ' x s ' ' x s
R3 x s /_N (1,1,1) ^ y s  b x s ' '  (U) ' 'y s  
R4 x s ' '  (U, U) ' 'y s  h x s ^ y s
where ^  is the sequence catenation operator, and the ‘generates’ relation b captures 
the notion that a word ys can be immediately derived from xs whenever xs b jas. 
When we wish to talk about generation under a particular rule R we will write bs. 
For technical reasons, we extend b so that it is always the case that xs b xs.
The puzzle is to answer the following question: is (M, U) a theorem o f the 
system? (Can (M, U) be derived from (MJ)  using rules R1-R4?) In fact, the 
answer to this question turns out to be no, and an elegant proof is given in [65]. 
In the remainder of this chapter we present a rank function based approach that 
enables us to reach the same conclusion. This approach makes use of the process 
algebra CSP and, before continuing, we present a brief overview of the language.
1.2 An overview of CSP
Hoare’s process algebra CSP (Communicating Sequential Processes) [64, 100, 
107] is a language for describing and reasoning about interacting processes. CSP 
is widely used in the area of distributed systems design, to specify the behaviour of 
(for example) railway networks, communication protocols, buffers and intrusion- 
detection systems. The language is underpinned by several semantic models which 
enable us to reason about the properties of CSP processes. In this chapter CSP is
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used to give a formal representation of the MU-Puzzle; in the wider thesis it is used 
to describe security protocols. In both cases we use the traces model to determine 
whether a given process permits certain events to occur. This section provides an 
overview of the language and its semantic model.
1.2.1 Processes and events
CSP describes systems in terms of processes which communicate events. For ex­
ample, the process P i can communicate the event in followed by the event out 
before becoming the process STOP:
Pi =  in —> out —> STOP
The process STOP represents one of two forms of termination in CSP, and denotes 
deadlock. The other termination process, SKIP, denotes successful termination. 
By convention we write events in lowercase, processes with a leading uppercase, 
and distinguished processes (such as STOP and SKIP) in uppercase.
Compound events can be structured using the notation where, for example, 
in .x: T  signifies the communication of value x e T  along channel in. By conven­
tion, *?’ is used to denote input and T  to denote output. Consider the following 
one-place buffer:
P 2  =  i n l x : T  —>• out\x —> P 2
The process P 2  is willing to input a value x e T on channel in and then output x  
along channel out before recursing to behave like P 2  again.
Processes can be parameterised with values, sets of values, or sequences of 
values. For example:
P 3 (jc) =  out\x —>• i n l y : T  —> P 3 (y)
is parameterised by a value x  and outputs x  before inputting a new value y  and 
behaving as P 3 with the new parameter, y.
PA{X) = in lx : ( T \ X )  -+ P 4(XU{x})
P 4  is parameterised by a set X, and represents the input portion of a buffer in which 
only those values of set T which do not occur in X  can be stored. Since each
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buffered value is added to X  on each recursive call, this buffer ensures that each 
buffered value is unique. Finally:
Ps (xs) =  in lx : T  —> P 5 (xs ^  (x))
is the process parameterised by the sequence xs and simply appends each input 
value x to the end of the sequence.
1.2.2 CSP operators
External choice. The concept of choice is represented by the external choice oper­
ator □ . The choice P  □ Q enables the environment to choose to execute the process 
P  or the process Q. Consider the following buffer:
P 6( ()) =  i n l x : T - > P 6 ((x))
ou t \ y P & {ys )
P6(ys~(y)) =  □
i n l x : T P e iy s^  (y) ^  (x))
Pe models a FIFO queue; the environment can choose to output the value y  at 
the head of the queue (and then behave as a queue with y  removed) or input a new 
value x and add it to the queue. The generalised choice operator □ JG/Pj allows the 
environment to choose between a family of processes {P,-1 i e  I}.
Internal choice. Non-deterministic, or internal, choice is represented by the n 
operator. The process a —> P  n b —» Q can internally choose to offer (or refuse) 
either event a or b, and the environment has no control over which event is offered. 
As with external choice, the generalised internal choice operator n  ieiPi allows a 
non-deterministic choice between a family of processes {P,-1 i e  /}.
Generalised parallel. The ability of CSP to model concurrent systems stems from 
the presence of operators which support the parallel composition of processes. 
Processes that are composed in parallel can perform hand-shake synchronisation 
on any events in the alphabet of that process that the programmer chooses. The 
generalised parallel operator is written P |[X ]| Q. The process P |[X ]|()  forces the 
processes P  and Q to agree on all events in the set X. When an event x e X  is per­
formed by P  | [AT] | Q, both processes perform the event. Events outside of X  may 
proceed independently. The communication set X  will often be written in the form
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{| x i , X2 |}; the { | |} syntax denotes the closure of events on channels x\ and X2 .
Interleaving. An interleaving of two processes P  ||| Q allows P  and Q to pro­
ceed independently of one another, without synchronising on any events. If an 
event is performed that both P  and Q are willing to communicate, only one pro­
cess actually performs the event, and the choice of which is non-deterministic. The 
generalised interleaving operator 11 \jeJPi models the interleaving of a family of 
processes {Pj \ i e  /}.
Interleaving and generalised parallel are related in the following way:
f|[{}]is=-p|iie
Hiding. The CSP hiding operator allows the separation of the internal details of 
a system from the external interface. Hiding turns visible events into invisible t  
actions. The process P \ E  is the process P with all events from the set E  hidden. 
For example:
Pn = a ^ b - + c ^ > S T O P
P’1 = P1\{b ,c }
Pr1 has the visible events {a, b, c} \  {Z>, c} =  {a}.
Conditional choice. The process: 
if G then P  else Q
behaves like P  if the boolean guard G evaluates to true and behaves like Q other­
wise. As a shorthand for ‘if G thenP else STOP’ we write ‘G & P \
1.2.3 The traces model
A trace is a sequence of events; traces(P) is the set of all traces that a process P  
can perform. In the case of event prefixing, the traces of a P  are given by:
traces{a —> P) = {{)} U {(a) ^ s  | s £ traces{P)}
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For the process Pi this yields traces(P\) =  {(), (in), (in, out)}. Note that the traces 
of a process are never empty since every process can perform the empty trace (), 
and they are prefix-closed since a process which can perform a trace can always 
perform any initial segment of that trace.
Length. If tr is a finite sequence then #tr is the length of tr
Projection (i). The projection of a trace tr onto a set R, written tr \ R, is defined 
as:
Projection (ii). For a channel c and trace tr, tr Jj. c is the sequence of values (with­
out the label c) that are communicated along c in tr:
Trace membership. When an event e is in the trace tr we write e in tr. If e does 
not appear in tr we write e-> in tr.
Trace specification. A trace specification is a predicate on traces, and we write 
W(tr) if  the predicate W holds for a trace tr. A process P  satisfies W (written 
P  sat W) if all its traces satisfy W:
P  sat W o V t r  e traces(P).W(tr)
A trace specification facilitates the capture of safety properties; we may state the 
behaviour that may be observed, but cannot capture liveness (that some behaviour 
must be observed). For the latter we need to consider a richer semantic model, such 
as the stable-failures or failures-divergence model. However, all of the properties 
that we consider in this thesis can be expressed in terms of safety and, for this 
reason, the traces model will prove sufficient.
o r *  = o
( ( x ) ~ t r ) \ R  =
(x) ^  (tr \ R) (x E R) 
tr \ R (X £R)
(He = 0
((x)^/r)JJ.c =
otherwise
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1.2.4 Trace refi nement
An important concept in the traces model is the idea of trace refinement. A refine­
ment ordering on processes is defined for the traces model as:
Spec C j  Imp <=> tr aces {Imp) C traces {Spec)
meaning that a process Imp trace refines a process Spec precisely when every trace 
of Imp is also a trace of Spec. The refinement ordering on traces allows us to 
specify safety properties, since we can assert that a process Imp does not perform 
any (unwanted) behaviour that is not given by a specification process Spec.
FDR (Failures-Divergence Refinement) [48] is a model-checking tool for CSP 
that allows refinement checks to be made between CSP processes. Input to FDR 
takes the form of a (machine-readable) CSP script which may contain assertions 
about the refinement ordering of processes defined in the script. To verify whether 
a process Imp is a trace refinement of Spec, FDR builds state machines correspond­
ing to the processes and performs a breadth-first search through the state-space to 
check whether every trace of Imp is also a trace of Spec. If a trace is found that 
violates this property then the trace refinement does not hold and FDR will sup­
ply a trace that violates the assertion. Since the state-space search is conducted 
in a breadth-first manner, any counter-trace is guaranteed to be minimal in terms 
of the number of events leading to the violation. If, however, exploration of the 
state-space does not yield a trace that violates the refinement, then the refinement 
ordering holds. The state exploration nature of FDR means that only finite-state 
systems can be checked.
1.3 A message-oriented view of the MU-Puzzle
One goal of this thesis is to make a distinction between two approaches to the mod­
elling of concurrent systems (particularly security protocols) with CSP. In Chapters 
2 and 3 we will see an approach that focuses on the role of each particular agent 
within a system. In this chapter we champion a message-oriented approach in 
which we consider a single process who is ‘playing the game’ and has internalised 
each of the four rules for manipulating the theorems.
Consider such a process, named ORACLE mu-
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ORACLEm u  =  ORACLEm u (INIT)
ORACLEmu(S) = O seSshs, rec.s —»■ trans.s'
— ORACLEm u ( S U { s'} )
The process ORACLEm u  is initialised with a set INIT of axioms (which, for our 
purposes, will be the singleton set {{MJ)}) . ORACLE m u  {S) is then a recursive 
process that signals a current theorem by communicating some s e S  on the channel 
rec (receive) and is given the choice of generating any s' (as long as s b 5 ') before 
communicating this new theorem1 on the channel trans (transmit) and becoming 
the process ORACLEm u {SU  {s'}). A trace of this process captures a series of theo­
rems that can be generated from the set of axioms in INIT under K For example, if 
b is defined in terms of the rewrite rules R1-R4 of Section 1.1 and INIT =  { (M, 7)} 
then the following is a trace of ORACLEm u  (restricted to the channel trans):
«.M J J ), { M J J J , I ) ,  {M, UJ) ,  {M, UJ,  U))
and we can conclude that all elements of the sequence are theorems of the system. 
We are interested in proving that (M, U) is not a theorem of the system. More 
formally, we wish to prove that there does not exist a trace of ORACLEm u  which 
contains trans. (M, U).
Definition 1.3.1 We define the trace specification no T as:
P  sat no T <=>Vtr £ traces{P).tr \ {trans. t \ t £ T} = {)
The trace specification no T  holds of a process P  precisely when no message in 
T can be communicated along channel trans in any trace of P. Using this trace 
specification we can formalise our property by asserting that:
ORACLEm u  satno {{M, £ /)}
Our goal is to derive a special-purpose rank theorem that allows us to prove this 
predicate.
1The generated theorem may not be new in a strong sense since it is possible that the same 
theorem will be generated more than once in a given trace.
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1.4 A rank theorem for the MU-Puzzle
A rank function on a CSP process is a statement of invariance; a property which 
must be true for all traces of a process. In the context of the MU-Puzzle this 
invariant will enable us to conclude that the string (M, U) cannot appear on channel 
tra n s  in any trace of ORACLE m u - The goal of the rank function will be to divide 
the message-space of the puzzle (all sequences over the alphabet {M,I,  U}) into 
those messages that are theorems and those that are not. A central rank theorem 
will be defined that gives the conditions under which it is reasonable to conclude 
that the messages classified as ‘non-theorems’ can never appear on channel tra n s .  
The basic approach is as follows:
1. Express the system in CSP.
2. Define a rank function over the message-space of the system such that all 
strings which can be generated are assigned a rank of pub, and all strings 
that cannot be generated are assigned a rank of sec.
3. Define a set T  of events that we wish never to occur.
4. Verify that the rank function meets a series of healthiness conditions.
If the rank function meets the healthiness conditions, then the theory allows us to 
conclude that no events in T can ever be generated.
Our rank theorem should state the conditions under which we can conclude 
that certain strings cannot appear in traces of ORACLEmu- These conditions are 
formalised in Theorem 1.4.1, but it will be helpful to discuss them less formally 
first. If we can construct a rank function over the message-space of the system such 
that:
1. Every axiom in INIT is assigned a rank of pub
2. Every deduction m a in ta in s  the rank in the following sense: if  x s  has a rank 
of pub and x s  b y s  thenys also has a rank of pub
3. Every theorem in T  has a rank of sec
then the rank function will be sufficient to provide evidence that no string of rank 
sec can ever pass through the system, and hence nothing in T  can be generated. 
Typically, we will define T to be the set of events that we do not wish to appear
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in the system. If we define the message-space, Mmu, as the set of sequences over 
{M,I, U} then we have that:
Theorem 1.4.1 I f  fo r  a set T there is a rankfunction p : Mm u {sec, pub} satis­
fying :
Cl. \/xs e  INIT.p(xs) = pub
C2. \/xs,ys e  Mmu-P{xs) =  pub Axs bys =>■ p(ys) =  pub 
C3. Vxs1 e r.p(xs) =  sec
then ORACLEmu sat no T 
Proof See Appendix B.
1.5 The impossibility of the MU-Puzzle
The result of the previous section tells us that, if we can find a rank function, given 
INIT = {(M,I)}  and T = {(M, £/)}, satisfying conditions C1-C3, then we will 
have demonstrated that (M, U) is not a theorem of the MU-Puzzle.
Given an element m e  Mmu, we define #xm to be the number of occurrences of 
symbol x  within m. We then define Pmui as follows:
This rank function assigns a rank of sec to any sequence xs e  Mmu if the number of 
occurrences of I  inxs is exactly divisible by 3, otherwise it assigns it a rank of pub. 
The rank function comes from a number of observations regarding the MU-Puzzle:
1. The number of Is in the axiom (M, I) is not divisible by 3.
2. For each of the rules R1-R4, where xs b ys, if the number of Is in xs is not 
divisible by 3 then the number of 7s inys is also not divisible by 3.
3. The number of 7s in the goal, (M, U), is divisible by 3.
The rank function captures an invariant property of the system, namely, that any 
word xs generated by the system will satisfy the predicate {jjxs mod 3 ^ 0 .  Note 
that observation 1 effectively proves condition Cl from the central rank theorem
sec if tj/xs mod 3 =  0 
pub otherwise
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(INIT only contains rank pub values). Similarly, observation 2 demonstrates that 
C2 holds (each deduction maintains the rank) and observations proves C3 (because 
U)) = sec). Since C1-C3 hold, we say that the rank function Pmui is 
well-formed, and it follows that (M, U) is unobtainable from (M ,I) using the rules 
R1-R4 .2
1.6 Reasoning about MU variants
We have established a framework for reasoning about the MU-Puzzle and have 
proved that the original puzzle has no solution. However, our framework is general 
enough to allow us to reason about the introduction of new axioms and new rewrite 
rules, and we now consider several such variants.
Variant #1
We introduce a new rewrite rule into the system. R5 says that whenever UI is part 
of a theorem, it can be replaced by IU? Formally we have:
R5 x s ~ { U , I ) ~ y s  b x s ~ ( I , U ) ~ y s
All other aspects of the system remain unchanged. In this case it is not difficult to 
see that the rank function pm u \ continues to apply, since the rule does not affect the 
number of occurrences of I  in a theorem. Specifically, given a theory transforma­
t io n s  b /{5 ys where jj/xs mod 3 0, it will always be the case that jjjys mod 3 ^ 0 ,
and since the rewrite rule preserves the rank, we can conclude that (M, U) is not a 
theorem of this system.
Variant #2
This time we introduce a new rule, R6 , of our own devising, which says that when­
ever IIU  is part of a theorem, it can be replaced by IUU:
R6  x s ^ ( I , I , U ) ^ y s  b x s ~ ( I , U , U ) ~ y s
2 An implementation o f this puzzle, suitable for exploration using the ProBE tool [49], is given in 
Appendix A.
3http://www.rdegraaf.nl/index.asp? sND_ID=3 50452
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All other aspects of the system are as with Variant #1. When we attempt to use the 
rank function Pmui we see that the condition C2 is not satisfied by the new rule. 
Specifically, we cannot prove that:
Pmui (xs ~  (1,1, U) ~ys)  =  pub =» Pmui (xs ~  (I, U, U) ~ys)  =  pub
As a counterexample, consider the case where xs = (M,I , I ) andys =  (). Then:
(M,1,1,1,1, U) Kr6 (M,I ,I ,I ,U,U)
where, although we have that P m u i((M ,I ,I ,I ,I ,  U)) = pub, we find that the de­
duced message, (M,I,I,I,  U, U), is such that P m u \((M ,1 ,I ,I , U,U)) =  sec. Some 
intuition leads us to deduce the following counterexample:
(M,I) 1 222 (M,I,I) h a  (M,I,I,I,T) I-JH (M,I,I,I,I,  V)
\-R6 (M,I,I,I,  U, U) I-jq (M, U, U, U) b^4 (M, U)
In this case, the failure of the rank function has led to one of the solutions to the 
puzzle.
Variant #3
In this variant we consider a puzzle where the rules are R1-R4 and the goal is 
(M, V). This time, however, we define INIT =  {(M,I,I,  U,T)}, signifying that 
(M,I,I, U,I) is the sole axiom of the system. If we consider the rank function 
Pmui we see that, while conditions C2 and C3 continue to hold, Cl fails since 
j\i(M,I,I, XJ,I) mod 3 =  0 and, therefore, pmu\ ((M,I,I, U,I)) = sec.
It is important to note that the failure of a rank function does not demonstrate 
that the trace specification is false, since a suitable (and as yet undiscovered) rank 
function may still exist. Nonetheless, the failure of the rank function in variant #2 
actually suggested a solution to the puzzle. In this case (and the reader may wish 
to convince themself of this) some thought leads us to suspect that the puzzle is, in 
fact, still unsolvable.
To help us in finding a suitable rank function it is often useful to conjecture 
some invariant properties of the theorems produced by the system. The following
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are all theorems of variant #3:
Several conjectures we might make are as follows:
1. Every theorem has the prefix (M, I ,I ,U ).
2. If the theorem is (M, I, I, U) ^ y s  then the number of Is iny? is never divisible 
by 3.
3. Maximal contiguous substrings of U’s are of odd length.
4. Every occurrence of 1,1,1 is surrounded by Us.
It turns out that basing a rank function on any single one of these invariants is 
inadequate. For example, we can propose a rank function based on conjecture 1 as 
follows:
To see why this rank function is unsuitable consider the string (M ,I,I , U, U,I) and 
the rule R4. According to the rank function, the string has a rank of pub, and for 
the rank function to be well-formed, the application of R4 should maintain the rank 
of this string. However, R4 gives the deduction:
where (M, I, I, I) has a rank of sec, and so the rank function fails. This is rather 
counter-intuitive, since it seems clear that the invariance of the (M ,I,I , U) prefix 
does actually hold, and furthermore, it does not appear that the offending string 
(M ,I,I, U, U,I) is actually a theorem of the system. This intuition is well-founded, 
and leads us to conclude that the rank function is too eager—it assigns a rank of pub 
to too many strings. A similar result can be concluded for each of the other three 
conjectured invariants. However, if we consider a much stronger invariant—the 
conjunction of all four individual invariants—then we end up with a rank function 
that is sufficient to prove the unsolvability of the puzzle.
The following function captures both the first and second invariants:
sec otherwise
pub if xs = (M, I, I, U) ~ ys
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Definition 1.6.1 Let Inv\^,(xs) be the function that returns true whenever 3 ys.xs — 
(M, I, I, U) ^ y s  A §iys mod 3 ^ 0 ,  andfalse otherwise.
Before we can characterise the final two invariants, we need to introduce some new 
notation. If X  e  {M,7, U} and n e  N, let (X71) denote the sequence of n Xs. We say 
{Xn) e  xs to mean that xs = x s ' { X 71) ^ x s "  and, furthermore, that last(xs') f  X  
andfirst(xs") f  X, for some xs', xs".
Our intention is to get a handle on the homogeneous subsequences of xs (i.e., 
those composed of the same symbol) that are as long as possible. For example, 
(U3) e (M ,I,U ,U ,U ), but (U2) £ (M ,I,U ,U ,U ) since a longer homogeneous 
subsequence exists.4 Using this definition we can state the third invariant—that 
all strings of Us occurring in a (maximal contiguous) sequence xs have an odd 
length:
Definition 1.6.2 Let Inv^xs) be the function that returns true when xs = xs' ^  
(IF1) ^ x s "  => n m od2 ^ 0 ,  andfalse otherwise.
Finally, we have the fourth invariant—that when (1,1,1) is a sub-string of xs it is 
surrounded by Us:
Definition 1.6.3 Let Inv^(xs) be the function that returns true when xs =  xs' ^  
(1,1,1) ^ x s "  => last(xs') =  U f\first(xs") =  U, andfalse otherwise.
We then define the rank function as follows:
Vxs e  Mm u -Pm u i (x s ) =  <
lnvi,i(xs) 
pub if  a  Inv$ (xs)
 ^ A /m>4 (xs) 
sec otherwise
Since it is easily shown that Pmui is a well-formed rank function, the fact that (M, U) e  
T  enables us to conclude that the puzzle is unsolvable. Arguably, this rank function 
has little to commend it other than its correctness. Unlike pmu\ it does not give us a 
sharp and enlightening characterisation of what it means to be a theorem. It should 
be noted that a different, more succinct and (perhaps) more instructive, rank func­
tion may yet exist for this system. We leave the discovery of such a function as an 
exercise for the interested reader.
4It is the case, however, that (U2) € (M,I, U, U,I, U,U,U).
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1.7 Conclusion
This chapter has sought to motivate several concepts of importance to the remain­
der of this thesis. In particular we have introduced the process algebra CSP and 
its traces model and shown how Hofstadter’s MU-Puzzle can be captured as a 
message-oriented process. We have introduced the concept of a rank function and 
defined a rank theorem which establishes a framework within which it is possible 
to reason about the solvability of MU-style puzzles. The remainder of this thesis 
focuses on the verification of security protocols, but we will return to the puzzle 
in Chapter 6 to motivate an investigation into the meaning of a rank function. Our 
analysis of the MU-Puzzle also has some value in itself since it suggests that the 
combination of CSP and rank functions may have applications outside of the secu­
rity arena and that the framework is sufficiently malleable to enable special-purpose 
theorems to be defined without difficulty.
The rank functions for the original puzzle (pm/i) and variant #3 (Pm/2 ) respec­
tively show how elegant and how convoluted rank functions can be. Our model of 
the MU-Puzzle is simple, but as with any rank function analysis, the difficulty lies 
firstly in our ability to discover a suitable rank function, and secondly in devising 
a counterexample when it appears that no rank function exists.
Chapter 2
Rank functions for authentication 
and secrecy
Having demonstrated how CSP and rank functions can be used to state and prove invariant properties of the MU-Puzzle, we now turn our atten­tion to the verification of cryptographic protocols. The field of protocol 
analysis is one area in which CSP has proven particularly successful, and sev­
eral techniques have been proposed that use CSP to reason about their correctness. 
This chapter describes one such approach, based on the idea of a rank function, that 
was originally conceived to reason about authentication guarantees. We describe 
this approach and then tailor the idea for the verification of secrecy properties. In 
both cases we use the well-known Needham-Schroeder-Lowe public-key protocol 
[88, 73] as a motivating example. We also review recent developments in the rank 
function approach and discuss several related approaches to protocol analysis.1
2.1 Modelling cryptographic protocols
In their seminal paper [88] Needham and Schroeder proposed a way of using cryp­
tographic mechanisms, such as public-key and shared-key encryption, to establish 
authentication and secrecy guarantees across networks. Such mechanisms typi­
cally involve an exchange of messages between participants, and are known as 
cryptographic (or security) protocols. Participants carry out cryptographic opera­
tions particular to them (such as encrypting with a specific secret-key) which are 
intended to provide guarantees as to their identity. Such protocols are designed to
1This chapter is based on work originally published as [109].
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function correctly even in insecure environments, where other principals can po­
tentially interfere with messages over the network in various ways. For example, 
messages can be overheard, copied, blocked, replayed, diverted, duplicated, and 
spoofed.
As a motivating and running example, we will consider a key-establishment 
protocol due to Needham and Schroeder [88] which uses public-key cryptography 
so that principals^ and B can establish a shared secret:
1. A —> B : [A-riA}pK{B)
2. B —» A : {nA'k}pK(A)
3. A —> B :
This protocol is presented in the ‘standard’ notation: each protocol message ap­
pears on a separate, uniquely numbered, line with a designated origin, intended 
recipient and message content. The construct m\ • m2 is the concatenation of mes­
sages m\ and m2 and {m}k denotes the encryption of m under k  using, in this case, 
an asymmetric algorithm.2
The protocol involves two principals, A and B, where A ’s and B ’s public-keys, 
PK{A) and PK(B), are publicly known. The protocol relies on the assumption 
that the corresponding secret-keys, SK(A) and SK(B), are known only to A and B, 
respectively. The protocol begins with A, acting as initiator, who chooses a new 
random number (or nonce), nA, and transmits it to B (in message 1), concatenated 
with A ’s identity and encrypted with PK{B). Since PK{B) is public any other agent 
could spoof some arbitrary nonce nj to B as if it came from A but, since SK(B) is 
secret, no other agent can learn the value (As a result, B ’s receipt of the nonce 
does not carry any assurance that it originated from A.)
On receipt of this message, B, as responder, retrieves the nonce nA by decrypt­
ing with the key SK(B). He invents a new random number, k, concatenates it with 
nA and encrypts the message w ith e ’s public-key, PK(A). This message is then 
sent to A (in message 2), who decrypts it using SK(A). If this decryption contains 
the nonce nA then this provides a guarantee that nA must have been received and 
encrypted by B, since B is the only party that knows SK(B). This results in the
2In a symmetric encryption scheme the same key is used to both encrypt and decrypt a message. 
Given a plaintext m and a key k, a symmetric algorithm satisfi es the property that {{/w}t}jfc =  m. In 
contrast, an asymmetric scheme has distinct encryption and decryption keys. Typically, the encryp­
tion key, pk, will be made public and the decryption key, sk, kept secret; it will be computationally 
infeasible to compute sk given knowledge of pk. An asymmetric scheme satisfi es the property that 
{ { m}pk}sk =  m, and may also satisfy the property that {{m }^}^ =  m.
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authentication of B to A: A knows that she has been communicating with B, and 
not some malicious party pretending to be B and, therefore, the value £ is a secret 
known only to A and B. In order to achieve authentication in the other direction 
(A to B), A re-encrypts the session-key k  with PK(B) and sends it back to B (in 
message 3). If B finds that the decryption of this message contains k  then he has an 
assurance that it was A who received and returned the key, and hence was the other 
principal involved in the protocol run.
If A and B are only ever involved in one protocol run, then the protocol does 
provide the authentication required of it: A cannot reach the end of the run unless 
B  is involved; and B cannot reach the end of the run unless A is involved.
However, agents can generally be involved in multiple protocol runs, possibly 
simultaneously, potentially with a variety of other participants, and in each case 
may assume the role of either initiator or responder (or, indeed, both). Under such 
circumstances, the protocol is susceptible to an attack: an exchange of messages 
after which one principal has reached a state where authentication appears to have 
been established, and yet where the party supposedly authenticated has not in fact 
been involved.
The attack, discovered by Lowe [73] some seventeen years after the protocol 
was first proposed, involves two runs, where A assumes the role of initiator in one 
run with a malicious principal E  who uses the information gained in this run to 
initiate a run, with B as responder, in which E  masquerades as A and is able to 
convince B he is talking to A when he is, in fact, only talking to E. The runs, 
labelled a  and [3, are interspersed as follows:
al. A E {A -ha}pk(E)
PI. E(A) -> B {A-nA}pK(B)
P2. B -  m {nA • k}pK(A)
a2. E A {nA • k}PK(A}
a3. A —» E {k}pK{E)
P3. E(A) -+ B {k}pK(B)
The steps of the attack are as follows:
1. A  initiates a run using nonce nj with E.
2. E(A) (E masquerading as A) initiates a separate run with B by replaying the 
message in a l ,  re-encrypted withPiT(5).
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3. On receipt of (31, B invents a new session-key k  and returns it, together with 
nj, encrypted under PK(A).
4. E(A) intercepts this message and forwards it, as E, to A in response to the 
original nonce challenge ha of the first run. A accepts k  as a secret invented 
by E.
5. A responds by sending the encryption of k  under PK{E) to E, who re-encrypts 
it with PK(B) and sends it on to B whilst masquerading as A.
After this exchange of messages, B has reached the end of protocol run |3, appar­
ently with A, and hence the protocol is intended to provide an assurance that A was 
indeed the other participant. However, A has not been involved at all. Hence the 
protocol does not provide the assurances required of it.
In this example the attack was possible because the second message contains no 
information about which participant created it. This allowed a situation in which B 
generated such a message and, later, A was persuaded to accept it as if  it came from 
E. As suggested by Lowe, introducing the name of the participant who encrypted 
the message prevents the attack. This results in the revised protocol:
1. A —> B : {A-nj}pK(B)
2. B —> A : {B-riA-k}px(A)
3. A -» B : [k}pK{B)
However, can we be confident that no other attacks are possible on the corrected 
protocol?3
In order to obtain such confidence, it is necessary first to clarify several issues 
around the protocol:
-  What kind of environment is the protocol designed for? In other words, what 
are the kinds of attacks that the protocol is designed to be resistant to? For 
example, on a broadcast network an attacker may be able to overhear and 
spoof messages, but be unable to block them.
-  What level of authentication is the protocol designed to provide? For exam­
ple, is it simply intended to establish that the authenticated agent is present 
(e.g., that a server is online), or that the authenticated agent knows who he is 
communicating with?
3In fact, Lowe was able to prove that no other attacks are possible. Here we introduce the rank 
function approach by re-establishing this result.
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-  Are the other participants assumed to be honest (i.e., attacks can only orig­
inate from outside the collection of protocol participants) or can they be 
dishonest?
-  Can participants run arbitrarily many concurrent protocol sessions, or are 
there restrictions?
This kind of information should be included with any protocol description: the 
correctness of a protocol consists not only in the sequence of messages it describes, 
but also the environment it is designed for.
There have been a variety of approaches proposed for analysing and verifying 
security protocols [81, 86, 93, 76, 6, 1, 114]. Such approaches do indeed incorpo­
rate such information into the models that they describe and analyse.
This chapter is concerned with the application of CSP to the verification of se­
curity protocols, and in particular with Schneider’s rank function approach [105]. 
There has already been significant experience of the application of CSP to commu­
nication protocols, and that experience provides a framework for the application 
of CSP to security protocols. Broadly speaking, there are three components of the 
approach:
1. The requirements on the protocol are expressed either as a CSP process (to 
be refined by the implementation), or as sat specifications on the observable 
behaviours of the overall system. Such specifications describe the appro­
priate behaviour, and provide a basis for judging whether protocols exhibit 
correct behaviour or not.
2. A protocol, although initially described in terms of message exchanges, is 
traditionally captured in CSP in terms of the behaviour of each participating 
agent, leading to an agent-oriented rather than a message-oriented view­
point. Each participant in the protocol is described as a CSP process.4
3. Finally, the environment is also described as a CSP process. In communi­
cations protocols, this is generally an unreliable medium which might lose, 
reorder, or duplicate messages. The particular behaviour captured within the
4This shift in viewpoint, away from message transmission and reception, and towards the indi­
vidual agents considered in terms of their interactions with the rest of the system, was a key feature 
in the success of the approach when applied to authentication protocols. In Chapter 5 we suggest 
that, for secrecy, the case for agent-orientation is not so strong and propose that, in such cases, 
message-orientationmay lead to cleanerprotocol descriptions. Nonetheless, in this chapter we focus 
on agent-orientation.
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medium is precisely the behaviour that the protocol has been designed to 
overcome. In the case of security protocols, we need to include the capabili­
ties of possible attackers.
When all three components are in place: specification, environment, and proto­
col description, then the mature tools and techniques that CSP has to offer can 
be brought to bear on particular protocols, to decide whether or not they meet a 
particular specification.
The next section describes an approach to modelling protocols in CSP and 
elaborates a theory for verifying authentication properties of key establishment 
protocols based on this approach.
2.2 Specifying authentication protocols in CSP
Any security protocol is intended to run over a network which can be subject to 
particular kinds of attack. We take the approach of considering an attacker (syn­
onymous terms include ‘intruder’, ‘enemy’, ‘spy’, and ‘penetrator’) in terms of 
capabilities, such as being able to intercept messages on the network, create new 
messages for passing on the network, redirecting messages, and so on. We will 
assume a single attacker, though in fact the attacker we will describe has the ability 
to behave as a collection of attackers.
2.2.1 The attacker
Since the aim is to prove that protocols are correct, we take a pessimistic point 
of view and assume an attacker with maximal capabilities. In the worst case, the 
attacker has complete control over all the messages in the network. If a protocol is 
secure even in such an environment then it will be secure in any weaker, perhaps 
more realistic, environment. The only capabilities the attacker should not have 
are the ability to encrypt or decrypt messages without the appropriate keys. As a 
consequence, we assume there is enough redundancy in the cryptosystem so that 
each ciphertext can be produced in exactly one way. This restriction has become 
known as the perfect encryption assumption [96].
We use the Dolev-Yao model, first proposed in [40], in which the attacker has 
complete control of the network and, to all intents and purposes, replaces the net­
work. Thus, messages that are sent are automatically intercepted and held by the 
attacker. Messages that are received from the network must have come from the
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Figure 2.1: Attacker inference rules
attacker. This simple model allows for the kinds of attacker behaviour described 
above in Section 2.1. It allows for messages to be delivered normally, since one 
action the attacker can take is to deliver messages to the intended recipient unal­
tered. However, it also allows for messages to be misdirected, blocked, spoofed, 
reordered, and duplicated. Furthermore, the attacker can himself be in possession 
of some agent identities (names and associated cryptographic keys) and so appear 
to other agents on the network as a potential communication partner. In this way, 
dishonest principals are encapsulated within the model. Any message that can be 
generated by the attacker, from what he has already observed and what he origi­
nally knows, can be delivered to any other agent on the network that is willing to 
receive it, as if it came from any other agent.
The details of the CSP description of the attacker model will reflect the kind of 
environment the protocol is designed for. For example, if the protocol is intended 
to operate between two known honest participants, then the attacker might not itself 
control any agent identities. Furthermore, the precise cryptographic capabilities of 
the attacker will also be incorporated into the model, and this might be protocol- 
specific.
The overall network consists of a number of principals connected to the com­
munications medium, which is under the control of the attacker. The principals 
will be modelled as CSP processes USERj, where i is the agent’s identity. We will 
use a channel trans.i for principal i to transmit messages intended for others onto 
the network. An event trans.i.j.m will correspond to principal i sending message 
m, intended for j .  We will use a channel rec.j for j  to receive messages from the net­
work. An event rec.j. i.m corresponds to j  receiving message m from the network,
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apparently from z. All message exchanges between protocol participants will use 
channels and events of this form.
We also need to define the kind of messages that can be passed around the 
network. This will depend on the protocol under analysis, since different protocols 
use different message constructions. For the example protocol introduced earlier, 
we will have three pairwise disjoint sets, USER, NONCE, KEY, which give the 
agent identities, nonces, and keys respectively. Furthermore, for each distinct user 
z there will be an asymmetric key-pair PK(i), SK(i) such that SK(i) is a secret 
known only to z but PK(i) is publicly known. We will use the following space of 
messages, defined using BNF as the set MESSAGE:
M ,M \,M i ::= messages
I  (E USER) agent identities
N  (e  NONCE) nonces
K  (eK E Y ) keys
PK, SK  (E USER —»■ KEY) public and private keys
Mi • M2 concatenation of messages
{M}p k (i ) > {M }k  encryption of M
h(M) hash of M
For this space of messages, we can define the attacker’s capabilities in terms of 
the generation of new messages from those already possessed. We introduce a 
‘generates’ relation b, which relates a set of messages S  to a message m that can 
be generated from S. It is defined to be the least relation closed under the inference 
rules of Figure 2.1.
We are now in a position to describe the CSP model of the Dolev-Yao style 
attacker. It is given as the process ENEMY, defined as follows:
ENEMY(S) =  transliljlm  -► ENEMY(SU {w})
□
□ i-.usm recliljlm -> ENEMY(S)
j-.USER J  v '
m|Shm
The process ENEMY(S) describes the possibilities available to an attacker in pos­
session of the set of messages S. The first branch of the choice models the situation 
that a new message m can always be transmitted from any principal to any other 
principal, and this will be intercepted and added to the set of messages possessed
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by the attacker. The second branch of the choice describes that the attacker can 
provide any message m that can be generated from S  to any user i, as if it came 
from any other user j .  In this case the attacker’s store of known messages does not 
change.
The attacker will typically have some initial knowledge, including some nonces 
he can use, agents’ identities, and cryptographic keys of agents that he controls. If 
the initial knowledge is given as the set UK, then ENEMY—the environment that 
the protocol runs over—is given by:
ENEMY = ENEMY{IIK)
Although ENEMY may control several agent identities, we reserve a particular 
name, E, as the attacker’s own identity. The attacker can, at any time, signal his 
knowledge of a message m by performing the event trans.E.E.m.
2.2.2 Specifying authentication
When two parties engage in a protocol run aimed at authenticating one to the other, 
the intention is that completion of the run by the authenticating party provides a 
guarantee that the other party also participated in the run. Since specifications in 
CSP are defined in terms of events, we will introduce special signal events into 
the protocol runs at the points we wish to mark: completion of a protocol run, 
and participation in a run. The approach of introducing matching signals (or cor­
respondence assertions) to specify authentication was introduced (although not in 
the CSP context) by Woo and Lam [116]. These signals are introduced purely 
for the purposes of specification, to describe stages that protocol participants have 
reached, and they are used in the analysis and verification of the protocol. They are 
not events in which the attacker can engage.
In our example, we will introduce only two signals. Generally, others could be 
introduced depending on the authentication properties of interest.
Here we consider the property of the responder authenticating the initiator.5 
This can be specified by introducing the following signals:
-  respdone.j.i, which j  performs after a protocol run as responder apparently 
initiated by i.
5The responder’s authentication of the initiator is the goal violated by Lowe’s attack on the 
Needham-Schroeder public-key protocol.
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Figure 2.2: Introducing correspondence assertions
-  initgo.i.j, which i performs during a protocol run as initiator apparently in­
volving./.
The set of all possible signals for this protocol and property is defined as follows:
SIGNAL = {initgo.i.j \ i e  USER A j e  USER}
U{respdone.i.j \ i e  USER A j e  USER}
These signals will be inserted into the protocol runs. The intention is that an 
occurrence of the signal respdone.BA guarantees that (elsewhere in the network, 
at A ’s location) the event initgoA.B  has previously occurred, at least once. Thus 
the initgo signal must be inserted before the initiator transmits his response to the 
first message, since it must be placed causally prior to the respdone message. The 
placing of the signals into the protocol is illustrated in Figure 2.2.
The use of signals enables authentication to be expressed as a trace specifica­
tion: that any occurrence of respdone.BA in any trace of the overall network must 
be preceded by some occurrence of initgoA.B. This can be defined formally on 
traces, as:
{initgoA.B} precedes {respdone.BA}
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where the precedes predicate is defined as follows:
Definition 2.2.1 R precedes T = Xtr.tr \ R = () =» tr \ T = ()
Observe that this specification allows arbitrarily many T  events in response to a 
single R event and that the occurrence of respdone.BA only allows us to conclude 
that, at some point in the past, A believed that she was running the protocol with B 
(this has been termed weak agreement [75]).
2.2.3 Protocol participants
The protocol participants are also described as CSP processes. Here we will con­
sider Lowe’s modification of the Needham-Schroeder protocol where the respon­
der’s identity is included in the encryption of the second message. There are two 
possible roles in the protocol, and each of these will be described as a process.
An initiator run is parameterised by the identity of the initiating agent, the 
identity of the principal she wishes to authenticate, and the nonce used in the run. 
Thus we define INITj(j, n) as a run of principal i using nonce n with agent j:
INITj(j,n) =
trans.i.j.{i ■ n}PK(j)
—> initgo.i.j
n k:KEYreCjj - t i  • n * k}PK(i) 
trans.i.j.{k}PK{j)
—> Stop
Note the use of pattern matching in the input of the second message: n, j  and 
PK(i) are already fixed, and the input message must match these. However, any 
value for k  can be accepted as long as it is in the set KEY of all keys.
Similarly, RESPj(i, k) is a responder run for principal j ,  using k  as the key that 
he generates in a run with a principal that he believes to be i. This is defined as 
follows:
RESPj{i,k) =
a „JfONCEreCJ-i- i ‘-n'i^W  
^  trans.j.i.{j-n-k}pKfl
-> rec.j.i.{k}PKfj)
—> respdone.j.i
—> Stop
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USER*transA trans.B
ENEMY
USERe
USERC
Figure 2.3: The Dolev-Yao model in CSP
In the most general case, a principal will be prepared to participate in any num­
ber of concurrent protocol runs in either role: this is expressible as an interleaving 
of runs. Our model must incorporate the fact that each run uses a different nonce 
(in the case of the initiator) and key (in the case of the responder), so we use a 
collection of pairwise disjoint sets of nonces: Ny € NONCE is an infinite set of 
nonces that i can use in runs with j ,  and Kp e  KEY is an infinite set of keys that j  
can use in runs with z. A general initiator agent is then given by:
This architecture is pictured in Figure 2.3. Note that, in contrast to the honest 
users, ENEMY ‘sends’ messages on channel rec and ‘receives’ messages on chan­
nel trans.
To show that the protocol ensures that B authenticates A, we aim to establish 
that the following specification holds:
NET sat {initgoA.B} precedes {respdone.BA}
and a responder agent as:
\j:USER
The resulting system is given by:
N E T = l l l / W /M 7< IllJeSSPi) |[{| trans,rec\}\\ENEMY
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2.3 A theorem for verifying authentication
We now introduce the rank function approach to verifying authentication properties 
of security protocols. In this approach we consider a restriction to the process 
NET which prevents the occurrence of initgoA.B, and then aim to establish that 
respdone.BA cannot occur. This approach is valid because:
NET sat {initgoA.B} precedes {respdone.BA}
NET | [initgoA.B] \ Stop sat tr \ {respdone.BA} =  ()
We will associate a value, or rank, with each message that might occur in the 
restricted system, and aim to establish an invariant based on the message values: 
that only those with a rank of pub can circulate in the restricted system. We aim to 
define a rank function p : MESSAGE U SIGNAL —> {pub, sec} with properties that 
enable us to do this.6
Our required result will follow if we can establish the following properties for 
the rank function:
1. The attacker should not initially possess any messages of rank pub;
2. If the attacker only possesses messages of rank pub, then any messages he 
can generate should also have rank pub;
3. The signal respdone.BA has a rank of sec;
4. Any agent, when restricted on initgoA.B, does not introduce messages or 
signals of rank sec if it has not previously received any such messages.
The first two conditions ensure that the attacker cannot introduce any rank sec 
messages; and the fourth condition ensures that the protocol agents cannot do this 
either. Together these conditions ensure that no message of rank sec can occur 
in the system. Since the third condition requires that the signal we are concerned 
about should have rank sec, we can conclude that this signal cannot occur.
These conditions are formalised in the central rank function theorem, which is 
the heart of the approach:
6Initial work on the rank function approach divided messages into those with positive ranks and 
those with non-positive ranks denoting, respectively, the public and secret messages. The co-domain 
of p was potentially the whole of Z. It was quickly noticed that this is equivalent to using just two 
ranks: 1 for public messages and 0 for secret messages. Throughout this thesis we favour the use of 
the emotive rank names pub and sec.
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Theorem 2.3.1 (Rank theorem (authentication)) I f  p : MESSAGED SIGNAL —> 
(pub, sec} is such that:
1. Vm £ IIK.p(m) =  pub
2. VS C AffiS'&4G£.(p(S') =  pub AS\~ m) => p(w) =  pub
3. V/ e  T.p(t) =  sec
4. V i. ( (/M7f 111 RESPj) | [i?] | Stop) sat p (tr \ rec) =  pub => p (tr) =  pub 
then 11 j ..USER (INITj 111 RESPj) | [ {| trans, rec |}]| ENEMY sat R precedes T.
Here we have extended p to apply to events, traces, and sets:
-  p(c.m) =  p(m)
-  p(/r) =  m in jp^) | s in tr}
-  p(S) =  min{p(5) \ s e S }
where we assume that sec < pub.
Thus, if  we can find a rank function p which meets the four conditions above, 
then we will have established that the system as described meets the corresponding 
authentication property expressed as R precedes T.
2.3.1 Maintaining rank
The first three conditions of the rank function theorem can be checked indepen­
dently of any CSP protocol description. However, the fourth condition requires 
verification of CSP processes against a specification. The benefits of using the 
CSP traces model (Chapter 1, Section 1.2) is that a number of application-specific 
rules can be identified, and applied, in this particular kind of verification. We are 
interested in the property maintains p:
Definition 2.3.2 maintains p ^  p(tr \ rec) =  pub =>- p(fr) =  pub
Figure 2.4 identifies some compositional rules which are useful for establishing this 
property. The last rule in this figure requires some explanation. It concerns input 
of a message which matches a particular pattern f{x ) ,  with subsequent behaviour. 
If we can show that P(x) sat maintains p whenever the input has rank pub, then 
we can conclude that the inputting process rec.i.p.fix) —> P(x) also maintains the 
rank. We are not concerned with P(x) for which p(f(x)) =  sec, since in such cases 
the message of rank sec must have been introduced externally to the process, and 
so we do not need to consider whether P(x) maintains the rank.
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V i. (Pi sa t m a in ta in s  p)
Interleaving -rn---------------------------
j | \.Pi sa t m a in ta in s  p
V i. (Pi sa t m ain ta in s  p)
External choice — ---------------------------
□  .P /s a tm a in ta in s  p
P  sa t m ain ta in s  p p(m ) =  pub
Output ---------------------------------------------
trans.i.j.m —> P  sa t m ain ta in s  p
Stop 
Input
Stop sa t m ain ta in s  p
Vx.(p(/■(*)) =  pub => P(x) sa t m ain ta in s  p) 
rec.P.p.f(x) —>P(x) sa t m ain ta in s p
Figure 2.4: Composition rules for m ain ta in s  p
2.3.2 Verifying the protocol
We aim to identify a rank function which meets the four conditions of the rank 
function theorem; we call these proof obligations healthiness conditions and say 
that a rank function is well-formed if it satisfies the conditions. A function that has 
been proposed but not verified is labelled as a candidate rank function. In devising 
a rank function it is helpful to consider the sorts of messages that can legitimately 
pass on the network. Furthermore, the nature of the generates relation h, and the 
CSP protocol descriptions, impose constraints on any putative function p.
For the fourth condition, we are required to show, for an arbitrary user C, that:
(INITq 111 RESPc) | [initgoA.B] \ Stop sa t m ain ta in s p
We have that:
(INITc HI RESPc) |[initgoA.B]\Stop =
,11 [-.USER 1 1 L  Ci(m T c (j»\[in itgoA .B ]\Stop ))
JI \j-.user 11 Ikci RESPc ^ ,^ )  |[initgoA.B]\ Stop))
In order to show that this combination satisfies m ain ta in s p, the inference rules 
for interleaving and choice in Figure 2.4 mean that we have only to establish that 
each component separately maintains p. In other words, for each C ,j, n and k, we 
have to establish:
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INITcij, n) |[ initgoA.B] \ Stop sat maintains p 
RESPciji k) | [ initgo A  .5] | Stop sat maintains p
There are a number of cases to consider:
Case RESPcij, k),C  = B J  = A ,k  = kB 
In this case we have:
RESPb (A, kB) | [ initgo A  .B] \ Stop =
^n\NONCEreC'^'^"{^‘' n}pK(B)
—> trans.BA .{B-n-kB} p k (a )
rec.B.A.{kB}PK{B)
—> respdone.BA
—> Stop
We know from condition 3 that respdone.BA must have rank sec, since this is the 
signal whose non-occurrence we wish to establish. If we are to apply the rules 
for prefixing to establish that this process satisfies maintains p, then we require 
that the message input in step 3 of the protocol must have rank sec. This follows 
because the behaviour following a rank pub input must itself satisfy maintains p— 
and this is not possible because respdone.BA is performed.
We therefore obtain a constraint on the rank function: that the message {kB}PK^  
must have rank sec.
Case INITa
A second case which is of interest is that of agent A as initiator. In this case we 
have that:
INITa (/?n) I [initgoA.B] \ Stop = 
trans A .j.{A  • n}PK{j)
in itgoA .j-> D tJCEYrec.A.j.{j • n • k}PK{A)
—> trans .A .j. {&}pkq) —>■ Stop 
k Stop
Runs with B are blocked, but all other runs are allowed.
If the first branch of the condition is followed, then we have that j  ^  B. In this
i f j ± B  
i f j  =  B
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case, if  the received message {j • n • k}PK(^ has a rank pub then the output message 
{k}pK(j) should also have a rank of pub, since this protocol run should maintain the 
rank.
Candidate rank function
The constraints arising from the two cases above give rise to the first attempt at a 
rank function. This is given in Figure 2.5.
In this rank function, we give a rank of sec to those messages and signals 
identified above as requiring such a rank, and also to the long-term decryption 
keys of A and B (SK(A), SKiB)) , which must remain out of the hands of the 
attacker to prevent him from constructing messages that should not circulate. Other 
atomic messages (nonces, agent identities and other keys) can have rank pub. Other 
compound messages essentially have the ranks dictated by their components: if 
a message’s content has rank sec, then any encryption or concatenation of that 
message will likewise have a rank of sec.
It is straightforward to check that condition 2 holds for this rank function, and it 
is reasonable to state that in the model the attacker does not start with any message 
of rank sec, as required by condition 1.
Lastly, we are required to show that condition 4 holds for all other cases. How­
ever, since these cases do not involve the important signals or protocol messages 
their proofs are all straightforward. Thus the rank function is sufficient to establish 
that the corrected protocol indeed provides weak agreement o f ^ ’s identity to B.
2.4 Tailoring the approach for secrecy properties
When two parties, A and B, engage in a protocol run aimed at establishing a shared 
session-key, each party is seeking assurance that the key is known only to A and B 
(and, in certain protocols, to a mutually trusted third-party). Although this prop­
erty is often termed implicit key authentication it may be profitably regarded as 
being about the confidentiality or secrecy of the key. In the case of the Needham- 
Schroeder-Lowe protocol, it is the session-key k  that should remain confidential. 
However, this cannot be achieved if the attacker (or any identity under the attacker’s 
control) is a legitimate participant in the run under consideration. If an honest 
agent willingly engages in a run of the protocol with the attacker then there can be 
no hope that the session-key in that run will remain secret. As a result, the secrecy
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Usernames
Public-keys
Secret-keys
Nonces
Keys
Encryptions
Decryptions
Concat’s
Signals
p(0
p (PK®) 
p (SK®)
p (n) 
p(k)
P({k}pK(i)) 
p({i-n}PK(jj) 
p{{j-n -k}PK{i))
P({™}sK(i))
p{mi-m2)
p(respdone.i.j)
p (initgo.ij)
pub
J sec if ie { A ,B }
) pub otherwise
J sec n e  
1 pub otherwise
J sec if  k £  Kba 
1 pub otherwise
J sec i fkeKsA 
1 p(£) otherwise
J sec if  w £ NUb A ( i ^ A V j ^  B) 
1 pub otherwise
J sec if k e  Kba 
) p (j • n • k) otherwise
j  p(iwi) ifw  =  {rn\}pK(i)
1 p(m) otherwise
min(p(wi),p(/w2))
J sec if  / =  B A j = A 
1 pub otherwise
J sec if  i = A Aj = B 
1 pub otherwise
Figure 2.5: A rank function for authentication
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property we are seeking to establish is that, in any protocol run between two honest 
principals, the session-key remains secret.
Definition 2.4.1 Let P  be a key-establishmentprotocol involving a set Q o f  prin­
cipals, and let k  be a value generated and shared as a result o f  P. We say that P  
guarantees the secrecy o f k i f  each q £ Q is assured that no q' £ Q can learn k  
unless aided by some dishonest q" £ Q.
Recall that the process ENEMY is parameterised by a set S  of known messages 
and the secrecy of a particular message m corresponds to m £ S  for any S  that 
ENEMY can generate. Since the attacker can always signal his knowledge of m by 
performing trans.E.E.m, the secrecy of m can be defined as:
tr \ {trans.E.E.m} =  ()
i.e., a trace tr maintains the secrecy of a message m precisely when trans.E.E.m 
does not appear in tr. More generally, we can define what it means to maintain the 
secrecy of a set T  of messages:
Definition 2.4.2 (Secrecy) secret T &  Xtr.tr \ {trans.E.E.t \ t £ T} =  ()
A process P  will preserve the secrecy of every message in T  if  P  sat secret T. Note 
the similarity between this notion of secrecy and the idea of ‘non-theorem hood’ in 
the MU-Puzzle of Chapter 1.
2.4.1 Secrecy as a flavour of authentication
Authentication properties, stated in terms of a predicate R precedes T, can be read 
as saying that an event in the set T  is permitted to occur once an event in R has 
occurred. As noted by Heather [58], secrecy of a set T  can be stated in similar 
terms by setting R =  0. The predicate:
0 precedes T
can be read as saying that there is no event which will permit the subsequent per­
formance of an event from T. Recall that:
R precedes T  =  Xtr.tr \ R = () => tr \ T — ()
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In the case of R = 0 the antecedent, tr \ R =  (), is trivially true, so:
0 precedes T — tr \ T  =  ()
For authentication, R and T  are (typically) sets of signal events inserted into the 
CSP processes at appropriate points, whereas our secret predicate is defined in 
terms of a set of messages. Nonetheless, given a set T  of messages, we will be able 
to conclude secret T  if we can prove the predicate:
0 precedes {trans.E.E.t 11 £ T}
Casting secrecy in terms of the precedes predicate enables us to reason about con­
fidentiality using the central rank theorem of Section 2.3. However, since this 
thesis is primarily concerned with secrecy, it will be beneficial to tailor the central 
theorem to this property.
2.4.2 A theorem for verifying secrecy
In contrast to authentication, our formalisation of secrecy does not depend on the 
use of signal events. As a result, a CSP protocol model which is devised with a 
secrecy property in mind will tend to eschew signal events entirely.7 In particular, 
since we cast secrecy in terms of the predicate R precedes {trans.E.E.t j t e  T} 
where R = 0, condition 4 of the central rank theorem no longer needs to consider a 
system in which each process is blocked from communicating events in the set R. 
This follows from the semantics of CSP parallel, which tell us that P |[0 ]| Stop =  P. 
This results in the following central theorem for secrecy:
Theorem 2.4.3 (Rank theorem (secrecy)) I f  p : MESSAGE —> {pub, sec) is such 
that:
1. V m e  IIK.p(m) =  pub
2. VS  C MESSAGE.(p(S) = pub A S\- m) =* p(m) =  pub
3. Vt € T.p(t) =  sec
4. V i. (INITi 111 RESPi) sat p (tr \ rec) = pub =» p (tr) = pub
then 111 ,USER (INITi 111 RESPi) I [ {I tram, rec |} ] | ENEMY sat secret T.
Nonetheless, it is entirely possible to introduce a signal channel iknow into the process ENEMY 
to enable the attacker to state his knowledge of m by communicating the event iknow.m. This would 
lead to a different (but conceptually equivalent) defi nition of the set T in terms of these signal events. 
The difference is purely cosmetic.
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Although we refrain from doing so here, Theorem 2.4.3 can be used to show that 
the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol preserves the secrecy of the session-key k, 
on an unbounded network, in any run involving honest participants.
2.5 Discussion
2.5.1 Theorem-proving
In practice, protocols tend to be more complicated than our running example, in a 
variety of ways. For example: the messages used in the protocol might be more 
complex, or simply much larger; there may be more messages involved in the pro­
tocol; the protocol could involve additional protocol agents, such as trusted third 
parties, or even entire groups of communicating agents; more complex combina­
tions of cryptographic mechanisms might be used. All of these possibilities make 
the CSP modelling of the protocol a more difficult task, and the verification of 
candidate rank functions becomes more intricate and error-prone. Tool support is 
of great benefit in keeping track of the housekeeping involved in consideration of 
numerous cases, and in assisting in the construction of rank functions.
The constraints introduced by the rank function theorem can generally be used 
to derive a candidate rank function. Firstly, every message in IIK  must have a rank 
of pub. Secondly, any message derivable from a set of rank pub messages must also 
have rank pub. Thirdly, any message output from a protocol step which follows 
only rank pub inputs must also be of rank pub. These three conditions allow the 
identification of a set S  of messages which must have rank pub. However, the set 
of desired secrets in condition 3 of the rank function theorem are required to have 
a rank of sec. If any of those messages exist in the set S  then no rank function can 
exist. Otherwise the function p which gives a rank of pub to all messages in S, and 
a rank of sec to all other messages, will be a suitable rank function.
The RankAnalyser tool [61,58] provides a way of computing this rank function 
automatically in the case of authentication (where the protocol uses public-key or 
shared-key cryptography, nonces, agent names, and concatenation). The (infinite) 
message space is partitioned to a finite set of equivalence classes, and the set of 
values of rank pub is obtained by repeatedly applying protocol steps and generates 
rules (on the equivalence classes), starting from the attacker’s initial knowledge 
IIK. This procedure is discussed further in Chapter 5.
More generally, the PVS theorem prover [90] has also been used to support
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rank function proofs of protocol correctness. Theorem provers such as PVS are 
well-suited to keeping track of all the unavoidable detailed housekeeping involved 
in the nuts and bolts of a protocol correctness proof. The traces model for CSP has 
been embedded in PVS, together with much of the consequent theory, including 
proof rules such as those of Figure 2.4, and the rank function theorem has been 
proved for this embedding [43]. Specific protocols can be modelled and verified 
(see [23], for example), demonstrating that this approach supports the full general­
ity of an infinite message space, and arbitrary numbers of runs and protocol agents. 
More recently the CSP hierarchy of theories within PVS has been restructured [44] 
to more easily allow extensions within the rank function framework, such as the 
introduction of (discrete) time [45], as well as consideration of other properties 
such as non-repudiation [44].
The rank function approach has also been extended in other ways. It is able to 
incorporate algebraic properties of the cryptographic mechanisms into the analysis, 
provided they can be expressed appropriately within the model [108]. For example, 
if Vemam encryption (exclusive-or) is used explicitly within a protocol, then the 
algebraic properties of exclusive-or should be taken into account in the analysis. 
This can be achieved by giving the algebraic identities that encapsulate exclusive- 
or on the message space, and checking that whenever two messages are equivalent 
then they should have the same rank. (We propose an alternative approach to this 
in Chapter 3.) This approach is clearly limited since only known algebraic proper­
ties can be included in the model. Nonetheless their inclusion allows the protocol 
analyser to reason about the properties which a cryptosystem must satisfy if  the 
protocol is to be implemented correctly.
2.5.2 Model checking
The use of CSP to describe and specify protocols naturally enables the use of 
model-checking for verification, and there has been a significant body of work 
using the FDR tool [48] in this area which began a decade ago [72, 99, 74, 79]. 
The approach constructs a CSP description of the protocol agents interacting over 
a Dolev-Yao style attacker as described earlier, and refinement-checks it against au­
thentication and secrecy properties expressed as CSP trace specifications in terms 
of the signal events which are inserted judiciously into the protocol runs. If the re­
finement check fails then FDR produces a (minimal-length) counterexample trace 
which corresponds to an attack on the protocol: a sequence of messages which lead 
to a failure of the authentication or secrecy property under consideration.
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Since the construction of the model of the protocol is routine from the message- 
passing protocol description, Lowe has developed a tool, Casper [76], which trans­
lates a high-level protocol description into the corresponding CSP model, ready for 
FDR to analyse. The ease of use of this tool, together with the speed of the FDR 
analysis, means that the model-checking analysis should generally be the first to 
be carried out when considering a new protocol: simple flaws can be identified and 
corrected quickly, before too much effort is put into carrying out a rank function 
proof.
Of course, any CSP model which can be completely checked by FDR must 
have a finite number of states. This means that the number of protocol runs in the 
model, the number of agents, and the size of the message-space, must necessarily 
be finite. Refinement failures will always correspond to attacks, but a successful re­
finement check on a finite model does not guarantee correctness in the presence of 
arbitrary concurrent runs—it may be that an attack requires more possibilities than 
have been included in the analysis. However, a collection of sophisticated tech­
niques have been developed for enabling more general conclusions to be drawn 
from finite model-checking. For example, Lowe [77] has presented, for secrecy 
specifications, a list of conditions under which the correctness of just a single run 
of a protocol is sufficient to conclude the correctness of an unbounded number of 
runs of the same protocol. Hui and Lowe have shown how protocol messages in 
CSP models can be simplified without losing attacks (fault-preserving transforma­
tions) [66], thus enabling complex protocols to be reduced to a point where they 
can be analysed by FDR. Broadfoot and Roscoe have applied data independence 
techniques [21,22] which allow results about a finite number of runs to be lifted to 
arbitrary runs.
An extensive coverage of the use of CSP for modelling protocols, and both the 
model-checking and the rank function approaches to protocol analysis, is provided 
in [104].
2.5.3 Related approaches
In addition to the CSP approaches discussed above, a wide variety of formal tech­
niques have been developed for protocol specification and analysis. These include 
approaches based on belief logic, graph theory, induction, multiset rewriting, type- 
checking, and non-interference. Here we give a flavour of each.
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BAN logic
The logic of Burrows, Abadi and Needham [26] was one of the first significant 
formal methods for reasoning about security. BAN logic is a logic of belief and the 
notation is used to describe protocol messages as logical formulae. Inference rules 
enable the consequences of the logical constructs to be derived. For example:
P \= X
means that principal P  has good reason to believe X, and:
P ^ Q
states the belief that the key K  is only known by principals P  and/or Q. The infer­
ence rule:
p\=x
asserts that, if P  believes the concatenation of X  and Y then he should believe X. 
Finally:
P \ = P < ^ Q
states the protocol goal that P  believes that K  can be used for communication with 
Q. The check then proceeds by seeing whether the protocol goals can be reached 
by applying the inference rules on the initial assumptions and the protocol steps.
The BAN logic requires that a concrete protocol be translated into an ‘ide­
alised’ form. The advantage of this lies in the necessity to make explicit many 
assumptions that are implicit in an informal protocol description. Indeed, the logic 
has been used to reason about, and find flaws in, several published protocols. 
Nonetheless, the formalism has received criticism, mainly on account of flawed 
protocols which can be ‘proven’ correct in the logic. Boyd and Mao [16], for 
example, have described two such protocols; one proof relies on an incorrect ide­
alisation, the other on an invalid assumption. Famously, the Needham-Schroeder 
public-key protocol was also proven correct in the BAN logic, and found to be 
flawed by Lowe. In this case the problem revolves around an assumption that all 
agents are honest; Lowe’s attack, on the other hand, depends on a principal’s will­
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ingness to engage in a protocol run with the attacker.8
Several improvements to BAN logic have been proposed, notably the SVO 
logic of Syverson and van Oorschot [113]. As noted by Boyd and Mathuria [17], 
however, a proof based on such logics can only provide a limited assurance that a 
protocol is correct. Many of the more recent techniques for establishing protocol 
correctness are based on weaker assumptions (such as the presence of a malev­
olent agent) and a proof in such frameworks will tend to offer stronger security 
guarantees.
Strand spaces
In the strand space approach [114], a strand is a trace that represents either the 
execution of a legitimate protocol participant (an ‘honest’ strand) or the action 
of an attacker (a ‘penetrator’ strand). A strand space is a collection of strands 
equipped with a graph structure that represents both consecutive operations on the 
same strand (the behaviour of a single user) and the interaction between strands 
(communication between users). Theorems have been developed on strand spaces 
which enable proofs that a protocol is correct, and a number of theoretical results 
have been established using the formalism [62, 60]. Some relationships have been 
identified [59] between the rank functions used to verify protocols and the struc­
tures (ideals) used in the strand spaces approach, and there are some similarities in 
the philosophies of the two approaches.
The inductive approach
The inductive approach [93] uses the theorem-prover Isabelle/HOL to support a 
theorem-proving approach to protocol verification. Protocols are coded directly in 
terms of event traces and rules that participants apply to ‘received’ messages in 
order to produce new messages. The possible actions of a ‘Spy’ are also specified 
by rules. A theory concerning the possible traces of the overall system is developed 
and the protocol is verified by establishing inductively that no trace violating the 
specification can ever occur. A particular achievement of this approach is its use in 
the verification of SET [94], an electronic commerce protocol whose description 
runs to nearly 1000 pages.
8Abadi is outspoken in his defence of the BAN logic, claiming that any assumptions made by the 
logic are stated in the original paper. The fault, he says, therefore lies with more recent users of the 
logic, who apply it in circumstances where the assumptions are no longer valid.
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Multiset rewriting
Cervesato et al. [28] have developed a way of specifying protocols using first- 
order multiset rewriting. This has become known as the MSR approach. Using 
MSR, protocols are specified by roles which represent the behaviour of protocol 
participants. Each role constitutes a series of rewrite rules which represent the 
actions of that particular user. The attacker, typically in the style of Dolev and 
Yao, is also defined via rewrite rules. Each rewrite rule that an attacker can apply 
corresponds to a deduction that is analogous to a deduction under b in the rank 
function approach. Recent work has sought to establish a correspondence between 
MSR and the strand space [29] and process algebraic approaches [13].
Interestingly, Butler et al. [27] have developed a notion of rank and corank 
functions and used them, in congress with MSR, to reason about the Kerberos 5 
protocol [89]. In this approach, rank functions are used to establish authentication 
properties, with the rank of a message being the number of times that the message 
is encrypted with a key. Specifically, given a key k and message m, the k-rank 
relative to m is the number of nested encryptions of m under k  which appear in 
a term. The A>rank can be seen as specifying the amount of work that needs to 
be performed to create the encryption m. Origin authentication of {w}^ is given 
by showing that (i) no messages at the start of a trace can have a positive &-rank, 
and (ii) none of the attacker’s deduction rules can increase the £-rank relative to m. 
If these conditions are met then the appearance of a message with positive £-rank 
implies that some honest principal created {m}k-
Conversely, coranks are used to reason about secrecy and capture the minimum 
amount of work needed to obtain an atomic message from within an encryption. 
Given a set E  of keys, the E-corank of a term (relative to m) is defined as the number 
of decryptions using keys from E  that are required to derive m. A trace guarantees 
the secrecy of m if:
1. The E-corank, relative to m, is positive for all facts known at the start of a 
trace,
2. The attacker’s rules do not decrease the E-corank relative to m,
3. No honest principal creates a message with a non-positive E-corank relative 
to m.
There are strong similarities between the corank theorem and the rank theorem 
for secrecy described above. The approach begins by assuming that the secret, m,
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has a corank of 0, and conditions 1, 2 and 3 from the corank theorem correspond 
to conditions 1, 2 and 4 of Theorem 2.4.3. It would be interesting to examine 
whether, as with Schneider’s rank approach, the range of coranks (positive for 
public and non-positive for secret messages) can be collapsed to just two—pub and 
sec—without loss of generality. Whilst this may be possible, a pleasant side-effect 
of assigning a rank based on the depth of encryption is that it provides a metric 
regarding the amount of work required to derive a particular value. Restricting the 
ranks to two values is sufficient to enable us to conclude the non-deducibility of 
a message, but does not enable us to gain additional information about how close 
(in terms of encryption depth) an attacker can get to a message. One can envisage 
situations in which such additional information would be useful.
The spi-calculus
Abadi and Gordon have proposed the spi-calculus [6 , 7] as a means of includ­
ing cryptographic primitives in the 7t-calculus [87]. As with the CSP approaches, 
protocols in the spi-calculus are expressed as processes, but the fundamental dif­
ferences between CSP and nominal calculi mean that this similarity is superficial. 
In the spi-calculus, for example, communication of secrets between parties can be 
achieved via scope extrusion, where channels can be dynamically forged, and their 
names passed to other processes during a computation. In addition, there is no 
need for an explicit attacker process: correctness is proven in the context of some 
arbitrary operating environment.
Originally, security properties were expressed as an equivalence between the 
protocol model and some other, more obviously correct, process. However, proving 
correctness via equivalence can be difficult. In recognition of this, a number of 
type-systems have been developed to achieve similar ends.
Gordon and Jeffrey, for example, have developed type-systems [52, 53] that 
enable authentication properties to be statically checked for a spi-calculus protocol 
model. The approach makes use of correspondence assertions and uses effects 
to track the correspondence of signal events across processes. Authentication is 
proven by showing that each end label has a matching begin label. This is rather 
different to the rank approach, where we show that the end label cannot occur when 
communication of the begin label is prevented.
Abadi [1] has proposed a type system for reasoning about secrecy in the spi- 
calculus; a type soundness theorem guarantees that, if a process type checks, it does 
not leak a certain set of values. The idea of assigning a type to protocol messages
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has interesting links with the assignment of a rank. In particular, Abadi’s use of 
Public and Secret types begs comparison with the pub and sec labels of the rank 
approach. There are also similarities between, on the one hand, the typing rules 
for processes and the proof rules for maintains p (Figure 2.4) and, on the other 
hand, the typing rules for terms and the attacker inference rules of Figure 2.1. For 
example, one of Abadi’s typing rules for output is as follows:
E  h  M : Public 
E  b M i: Public . . .E  b Mk : Public 
E \-P :O k  
E \-M (M u ... ,M k).P :O k
This rule says that the process which outputs M \ , . . . ,  Mk on channel M  and then 
behaves like P  type checks in environment E  if, (i) M has type Public, (ii) each of 
M i,.. . ,  Mk has type Public, and (iii) process P  type checks in E. This is almost 
indistinguishable from the proof rule for output in the rank approach:
P  sat maintains p p(/w) =  pub 
trans.i.j.m —> P  sat maintains p
This rule says that a process which outputs m on channel trans and then behaves 
like P  maintains the rank if m is public and P  maintains the rank. There are differ­
ences: in the type-checking approach the channel itself (in this case M) is assigned 
a type; in the rank function world we typically assume the presence of a single, 
public, transmission channel. There are also differences arising from use of types 
themselves. Abadi’s system is based on three types, Secret, Public and Any, where 
the first two are subtypes of the last. The typing rule for concatenation (expressed 
as (M ,N ) in the spi-calculus) is then given as:
E V M '.T  E \~ N :T  
E \-{ M ,N ) :T
This says that the concatenation of two messages, M  and N, both of type T, results 
in the message (M ,N ) which also has type T. This rule only permits the concate­
nation of messages of the same type. For M : Public and N  : Secret, the application 
of this rule requires that we first perform a level subsumption to arrive at M : Any, 
N : Any, resulting in (M ,N ) :  Any. The type system appears to dispose of the infor­
mation that one of the catenands had type Secret—looking at (M ,N ) in isolation 
does not tell us anything about the types of the components. In contrast, the rank
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approach has no concept of an any rank and the deduction rule for concatenation 
states:
Pairing
S\~mi S\~m2 
S  b mi • m2
In isolation, this rule does not place a constraint on the ranks of messages, but 
viewed in the context of the rank theorem, it tells us that, whenever m\ and m2 have 
rank pub, the concatenation m\ • m2 must also have a rank of pub. Furthermore, 
we typically define the rank of a concatenation as the lesser of the ranks of its 
arguments (where sec < pub). The concatenation of m\ and m2 , with p(wi) =  pub 
and p(wi) = sec, therefore results in m\ • m2 with p(mi • m2 ) = sec. In this case, 
the rank approach discards less information about the ranks of m\ and m2 , since, 
with just the knowledge that p(m\ • m2 ) = sec, we can conclude that one of the 
catenands had a rank of sec.9
It would be interesting to see whether a richer type system (which preserves in­
formation about the components of concatenations), and a rank approach endowed 
with a concept of Any, can be formally linked. 1 0  In particular, can we establish 
correspondences between (i) the typing rules for terms and the attacker deduc­
tions of the rank approach, and (ii) the typing rules for processes and the rules for 
maintains p?
Non-interference
The concept of non-interference [50] has also formed the basis of protocol analy­
sis techniques. These approaches generally impose a partition on protocol agents, 
with a group of ‘high-level’ privileged users distinguished from other ‘low-level’ 
users. Non-interference is achieved if  the behaviour of a high-level user has no 
effect on what a low-level user can observe. For the purposes of protocol analysis 
this corresponds to the inability of an attacker (a high-level user) to induce bad 
behaviour in the legitimate participants (the low-level users). A suite of tools have 
been developed that enable protocols to be reasoned about using non-interference.
9This ‘loss of information’ is not a fundamental limitation of the rank approach. In [108], for 
instance, Schneider defi nes a rank function which preserves rank information for each component of 
a concatenation.
10 We must also consider that Abadi’s type-system only addresses the use of symmetric-key cryp­
tography. In this case we could proceed by restricting the rank approach to the case of symmetric 
encryption, or extending the type system to address asymmetric cryptography.
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A high-level protocol description can be translated into the notation of the Secu­
rity Process Algebra (SPA) using the CVS compiler [42]. This SPA script is then 
amenable for analysis using the CoSec tool [47] which checks for the presence of 
non-interference. Similarities between non-interference and the concept of process 
equivalence in CSP have been established [103].
*  *  *
The above techniques, along with the CSP-based approaches, have much in com­
mon, most notably their basic assumption about the capabilities of the attacker. 
Indeed, in many cases it will be feasible to reason about a protocol using any one 
of these methods, and the results obtained from each will be broadly similar. As 
alluded to above, there is a growing body of research which aims to demonstrate 
fundamental similarities between these different approaches. In the end the choice 
of which technique to use will be guided by the previous experience of the proto­
col analyser. The advantage of applying CSP in this domain lies in the simplicity 
of the notation and the transparency with which protocols can be modelled. This 
transparency is essential for a model to be shown as an appropriate abstraction of a 
real protocol. Furthermore, the maturity of the language backs this up by allowing 
well-understood and powerful techniques to be brought to bear on the problem of 
verifying whether a given protocol model meets its intended goal.
Chapter 3
Protocol verifi cation in the 
presence of equational theories
Analysis and verification are distinct, but complementary, methods for rea­soning about security protocols. Whilst protocol analysis aims at discov­ering attacks, verification seeks to establish proofs of correctness, and 
it is important to note that, in general, failure to find an attack does not enable a 
conclusion of correctness. 1 Nonetheless, protocol analysis is an important tool for 
discovering design flaws or gaining assurance that the rationale behind a protocol 
is sound. Protocol verification tends to be less concerned with the discovery of 
attacks, although the inability to complete a proof of correctness may suggest an 
attack.
Both analysis and verification tend to assume the presence of a malevolent 
agent, whose behaviour is limited by the Dolev-Yao model. This attacker has the 
ability to eavesdrop on all messages passing through a communication channel, 
may block, delay or replay messages, masquerade as other agents, and generate 
and send any new messages that are cryptographically justifiable. This notion of 
cryptographic justifiability is the basis of the perfect encryption assumption: the 
attacker may only decrypt messages for which he knows the correct key. Further­
more, it is assumed that messages contain enough redundancy to indicate when 
they have been successfully decrypted.
This formal, black-box, view of encryption has proven useful for protocol anal­
ysis since an attack discovered under the assumptions of perfect encryption will 
tend to be preserved in any implementation of that protocol. However, establishing
lr[b recast a mantra of software testing—absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.
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correctness via protocol verification is a more subtle issue, and we must be very 
careful in placing restrictions on the capabilities of the attacker. A real attacker 
may exploit the algebraic properties of a cryptosystem or errors in a particular pro­
tocol implementation. For example, Ryan’s and Schneider’s attack on the recursive 
authentication protocol [1 0 2 ] illustrates how the use of exclusive-or encryption can 
introduce a flaw on a protocol that is secure on the assumption of perfect encryp­
tion [92]. Although this fact has been known for some considerable time (see [46], 
for instance), it is only in recent years that formal techniques have begun to address 
these issues.
Recently, Schneider used rank functions to show that an authentication pro­
tocol due to Gong [51] is secure given the algebraic properties of exclusive-or 
encryption. In this chapter we extend the approach to address the case of Difiie- 
Hellman key agreement. Difiie-Hellman seems particularly amenable to verifica­
tion within this framework due to the arithmetic properties that must be considered 
for the scheme to be effective. As a minimum we must consider the commutativity 
of exponentiation, and any satisfactory analysis should also consider the algebraic 
properties of finite groups. Indeed, the concept of perfect encryption does not seem 
readily applicable to Diffie-Hellman schemes since there is no concept of decryp­
tion,just further rounds of exponentiation. Furthermore, on receipt of a message, a 
principal cannot usually determine whether it is of the correct type, since a Diffie- 
Hellman message is indistinguishable from a random value.
In our approach we treat the salient properties of the underlying cryptosystem 
by introducing a series of algebraic equivalences onto the message-space. We then 
define a complete term-rewriting system which enables us to reduce the language 
over which a rank function must be defined. We demonstrate the approach by 
reasoning about the A-GDH.2 authenticated group key-agreement protocol, devel­
oped as part of the Cliques suite [112, 10]. Pereira and Quisquater have shown 
this protocol to be flawed [97]. We demonstrate how rank functions can be used to 
uncover these attacks and present a proof of correctness for a restricted form of the 
protocol.2
3.1 (Group) Diffi e-Hellman key-agreement
The Diffie-Hellman scheme [38] is a simple 2-party key agreement protocol whose 
security is based on the so-called Diffie-Hellman problem. In the standard case, two
2An earlier version of this work appeared in [33],
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principals^ and B agree (publicly) on an element g  that generates a multiplicative 
group G. A and B then select, respectively, random values and rB in the range 
between 1 and the order of G. The protocol is then as follows:
A B
ZA
ZA =  g A ---------► ZB =  g B
Zab =  zrg  <----------  Zab = zr%
If the protocol is completed without interference then A and B share the se­
cret Zab = grjrB- The protocol is secure against a passive eavesdropper, on the 
assumption that it is infeasible to recover Z a b  from the values grA andg^. We note, 
in passing, that the Diffie-Hellman problem is no harder than solving the discrete 
logarithm problem, since, if  the discrete logarithm of either of the exchanged val­
ues can be recovered then Z a b  can be computed [15]. The Diffie-Hellman scheme 
offers no authentication of the exchanged messages, and is susceptible to a ‘man- 
in-the-middle’ attack launched by an active attacker [17].
3.1.1 Diffi e-Hellman extended to group communication
The A-GDH.2 protocol was developed as part of the Cliques project [112,10]. The 
protocol is a natural extension to 2-party Diffie-Hellman key agreement that estab­
lishes a shared secret between n communicating parties (where n >  1). The pro­
tocol also aims to authenticate the shared secret, as described in Definition 3.1.1, 
below.
The protocol consists of two stages. In the first (upflow) stage the group is 
traversed by a message that collects the contributions made by each principal. The 
final group member to receive this message is designated as the controller, who 
carries out the second stage by broadcasting the collected keying material to each 
member of the group.
For a group of size n, each principal w,- (i e  [1,«]) chooses an random value r{ 
and maintains a long-term key K ^ 1 whose inverse, Kis, is known to the controller 
us. In general, the w-party A-GDH.2 protocol executes in n rounds via the exchange 
of messages given in Figure 3.1. The complexity of the definition belies the sim­
plicity of the protocol, and, to make its operation clear, we describe a run of the 
protocol where n =  3, and the principals are A, B and C (C plays the special role of 
group controller). The users respectively generate the secret values ta, rB and rc 
and C shares the keys Kac and KBc  with A and B, respectively.
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A computes the value grA and sends the message:
1 .A -+ B : { g , f A}
On receipt of this message, B adds his own contribution by computing the set 
W B aHd sends the message:
On receipt of message 2, the group controller C adds his own contribution by com­
puting {grBrc,grArc,grArBrc}. The value g ^ ri?rc will not be broadcast, since this is 
the actual shared secret. Instead, C ‘encrypts’ each partial secret with an appropri­
ate long-term key and then performs the broadcast:
3. C —*A,B  : {gBrcKAC^ArCKBC}
On receipt of the broadcast message, A identifies her intermediate value gjBrc(KAc) 
and computes:
k  =  (gBrcKACyAKAC
B identifies his value gfArcKBC computes: 
k =  ^ArcKBcyBKsc
Due to the commutativity of exponentiation, A, B and C share the key:
£ =  gTArBrC =  grBrCrA _  gfArcrB
It should be noted that the final round does not need to be a true broadcast; the 
group controller may instead perform n — 1 (serial or simultaneous) unicasts.
3.1.2 (Group) Implicit key authentication
The A-GDH.2 protocol aims to provide implicit key authentication in the following 
sense [1 0 ]:
Definition 3.1.1 Let P be an n-party key agreement protocol, M  be the set o f pro­
tocol participants and let k be a secret jointly generated as a result o f  P. We say
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Upflow: round i \ i e  [1,n — 1]
Uj — > Ui+ 1  : {g"V" \ j e  [U ],gn - ri}
Broadcast: round n
n v
us — > w/|i€[i5„_ i]: g  r>
Upon receipt of the above, each Uj computes
Figure 3.1: A-GDH.2 protocol
that P provides implicit key authentication i f  each w e M is  assured that no party 
v £ M  can learn k (unless aided by a dishonest w e M).
Note that implicit key authentication makes no guarantees about the actual group 
membership, or that any of the members actually participated in the protocol. It 
only states that, once key is computed, nobody outside of the group can recover k.
3.2 A model for Diffi e-Hellman
Computation in Diffie-Hellman key agreement takes place in an abelian group G 
with a multiplicative identity 1 and an operation • satisfying:
1. \/g,h e G .g‘h = h -g  commutativity
2. Vg, h, i e  G.g • (h ■ i) =  (g • h) • i associativity
3. VgG G.g-1 = g  identity
4. Vg £ G. 3 h e G.g • h = 1 existence of inverses
A satisfactory formal analysis of Diffie-Hellman key agreement in general, and 
the A-GDH.2 protocol in particular, must capture the properties of associativity and 
commutativity, model the existence of the identity element and be able to perform 
the group operation with multiplicative inverses.
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3.2.1 Notation
The notation described in this section is summarised in Table 3.1. Let D be the set 
of all Diffie-Hellman values. For each d  € D there exists a multiplicative inverse 
d~l such that d~l e  D.
Let S be the set of values used as random exponents by group members. Each 
principal u maintains two sets, S£ C S and S„ C S, representing the values that u 
will use in protocol runs as group-controller and non-group-controller, respectively. 
For all u, the sets S„ and Su are all pairwise disjoint. We make the following 
assumptions:
Vw € USER, jc £ Scu.x~l £ U (Sv USV)
veUSER
Vw e USER,x £ Su.x~l £ U (S^USv)
veUSER
That is, if a principal’s set of secrets contains x, then the inverse jc-1 does not appear 
in the set of secrets of any user.
For any given protocol run, the sequence Useq represents the agents running the 
protocol. Each principal u maintains a function X'-
X : USER -> X
(where X  is disjoint from all sets S£ and S u of secrets). The function X  maps prin­
cipals to long-term keys, such that Xu (v) is a key shared with principal v. (Actually, 
user v will know the inverse of this key Xd~l (v), and we define X {u)  =  X T 1 (v) 
for all u, v £ USER). For convenience we may abuse the notation by using X  to 
mean the set of keys known by v.
We use the standard notation for sequences, with (m) representing the singleton 
sequence containing m, and xs ^ y s  representing the concatenation of sequences xs 
andys. We use ^ ”= 1  xs to represent the generalised concatenation operation, i.e., 
xs concatenated with itself n times. We write #xs for the length of xs, first (xs) for 
the first, and last(xs) for the last, element of a non-empty sequence.
The Diffie-Hellman operation
We use the notation DH(x,y) to model the exponentiation xy. We do not define 
a general function D H : D x Z —> D, but restrict the operation to cases where the 
second argument is atomic. A  value y  is atomic iff it has no internal structure.
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For example, the message DH{DH{x,y),z) is well-formed in our model, but the 
message DH(x,DH(y,z)) is not, because the second argument, DH(y,z), is not 
atomic. We define the set Do =  US as the set of all atomic values and declare 
the type of DH  as:
D H : D x D0  —> D 
We discuss the appropriateness of such abstractions in Chapter 4.
The group Diffie-Hellman operation
The GDH function models the Group Diffie-Hellman operation:
GDH(S~ (s),x) =  i (DH(S.i,x))) ~  (s) ~  (DH(s,x))
For example, an agent receiving the message (g,DH(g,x)) would choose a secret 
value y  and perform:
GDH((g,DH(g,x)) ,y) = (DH(g,y),DH(g,x),DH(DH(g,x),y))
This operation will be available to all users in the protocol, honest or otherwise. 
We define an ingredients function t in the style of [62]:
i : D —► PD0
that offers a god’s-eye-view of the contents of a Diffie-Hellman value. The ingre­
dients function returns the multiset (bag) of components that make up a value and 
is recursively defined over the structure of a message. It is only well defined for 
normalised input (see Section 3.3). For example:
t (DH{g,x-y-z)) = lx ,y ,z\
The empty multiset is written as [[]], and the number of times that an element x 
appears in a multiset B is denoted Bftx. We generalise this notation so that j\B is the 
total size of B. In the recent example, Bpc = 1 and $B = 3. We override n  to define 
the intersection of two multisets in the obvious way. For example:
l*,x,yl n lx,y,y,zi = [x,y]]
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USERh
D
Do
X
X
K
Su
U,seq
g
set o f  honest principals ( USERh C USER)
set of all Diffie-Hellman values
set o f atomic values
set o f  all long-term keys ( X  C Do)
function mapping users to long-term keys known by user u
set o f  secrets used by u as a group controller (S£ C Do)
set o f  secrets used by u as a non-group controller (SK C Do)
a finite, non-empty, injective sequence o f  users ([ran(Useq) C USER)
publicly agreed generator o f  G
Table 3.1: (Group) Diffie-Hellman model notation 
A multiset is actually a set of tuples, where, for instance:
$x,xty ,z l = {(*,2 ), (y, 1 ), (2 , 1 )}
We assume that the range of the multiset only contains positive integers (or °°). We 
may have cause to perform the intersection of a set and a multiset. In this case, a 
set V is interpreted as the multiset {(v, «>) | v 6  V} so, for example, we have that:
The ingredients function will prove useful when we come to assign a rank to 
Diffie-Hellman values. Clearly, a protocol participant cannot hope to see inside a 
value in this way. Consequently, whilst the protocol analyser will be permitted to 
use the ingredients function, it cannot be used by any protocol participants.
3.2.2 Extending the attacker
We extend the capabilities of Chapter 2 to endow the attacker with the ability to 
perform the Diffie-Hellman and group Diffie-Hellman operations, compute the in­
verse of a value and construct and destruct sequences. These attacker deductions 
are given in Figure 3.2.
3.3 A normal form for Diffi e-Hellman values
The process of assigning a rank to each message is hampered by the great variety 
of messages that may circulate in the system. Many messages that are structurally 
different will represent the same value. For example, the message DH(DH(g,x •
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MkSq 
S\~ m
S\~ (m)
Figure 3.2: Attacker inference rules for (Group) Diffie-Hellman protocols
1 -y),z) is equivalent to DH(g,x •y - z ) according to the group laws defined above, 
since both messages represent the value g c'y'z. In its raw form, this equational 
theory gives rise to further proof obligations on any rank function: that all messages 
representing the same value are assigned the same rank. So, for example, we would 
need to show that:
p{DH{DH{g,x• 1 .y),z)) = p (D H (g ,x -yz))
In many cases, however, a message may be safely replaced with one that is struc­
turally simpler. For instance, messages containing applications of the GDH func­
tion can be expressed solely in terms of the DH  function. To ease the task of 
assigning ranks to these messages we introduce a Term Rewriting System (trs) 
[6 8 ]. With this TRS, values in an arbitrary form can be transformed into values 
in a normal form. In the ensuing analysis, we will ensure that all messages in the 
system are normalised, thereby reducing the need for further proof obligations on 
the rank function to be met. A similar system has been proposed by Meadows [83] 
in the context of a unification algorithm for Diffie-Hellman. Here, we tailor the 
idea to include GDH messages.
3.3.1 A  rewrite system for Diffi e-Hellman
If a rewrite rule in a TRS *T is applied to a message t\ to produce a message t2 , we 
write t\ /2- If * i|—*► • ■ • t„ in 0  or more steps then we write t\ A  tn and say that
DH
S\~m\ S\~m 2 r
c , n m  r-(mi g D >"J2G d °1S  b DH(mi,m 2 )
GDH
S b ms S h m
S tG D H (ms ,m ) lmS&Seq{D)’meDo]
Inverse
S\~m
S h m ~ l
CatSq BkSq
S\~ms S\~ns S\~ (m i,...,m n)
—  ------     — ---------- [*e[M j]S h m s  ns S h  ntj
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t\ reduces to tn in T . If no member of T  applies to a message t, then t is said to be 
irreducible with respect to T . Note that / A  t even if  t is irreducible. If t\ A  tn and 
tn is irreducible, then tn is said to be a normal form o it\.
Definition 3.3.1 Define *T to be the TRS with the following rewrite rules:
<r = {
GDH{S~ (s),x) i—> (DH(S.i,x))) ~  (s) ~  (DH(s,x)),
DH{DH{m\,m2 ),m f) ^ D H {m \,m 2 -mf),
DH(m, 1 ) i—► m, 
m • 1 i—> m,
1 • m i—> m , 
m -m ~l i—► 1 ,
(m\ - m i) '1 1 -m j1,
1 - 1 ^ 1
}
For CT to be used in a normalisation procedure we must show that it is complete 
(i.e., that it terminates, and that it is confluent). Informally, the termination property 
guarantees that a message in standard form can be normalised in a finite number of 
steps. The confluence property ensures that the outcome of a derivation is indepen­
dent of the order in which rules are applied, and that the normal form of any term 
is unique.
Definition 3.3.2 A TRS is terminating i f  there is no infinite sequence o f  terms 
h  j *2 j *3 • • ■ such that
Theorem 3.3.3 CT is a terminating Term Rewriting System .
Proof We prove the termination property by defining a reduction ordering on CT, 
where a reduction ordering on a set of terms T is any well-founded rewrite ordering 
of T. Our goal is to assign a value to all terms t \ , where t\ »-»• t2, and show that 
the value of t2 is strictly less than the value of t\ .
The mapping T : T i—> (2 ,3 ,...}  is defined by:
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{DH{m\,m2))z =  (wn)x+(™2 )x + 1
(m\ • tw2)x =  {m\)x +  (tw2)t
((mi-m2)_1)T=  +  +  l
(1 -1)t = ( 1 )x+ 1
GDHx{ms,m) =  (£f=f(»w.i)x+ (w)T + 1) + 2{{msMms)z)
for (tm)t  =  (mi)x =  (/W2 )t =  {ms.i)z = (1)T =  1. Note the difference between 1 
and 1 : the former is an integer while the latter is the abelian group’s identity el­
ement. Given the mapping 1 , we show that each rule in CT always decreases the 
interpretation of a term:
Case 1—1 1—^ 1. We need to show that (1 _1)x > (1 )z:
(1 l ) z >  (1)x
{definition of t}
( 1 ) x + 1 >  0 ) t
1 > 0
Case (mi • W2 ) - 1  ^  mj- 1  -m^ 1;
( (wi  •tw2) - 1 )t >  ( w f 1 • r r q 1)x 
{definition of i}
(w r 1) T + ( w 2 1) x + 1 >
4=
1 > 0  
Case m ■ m~l 1—> 1:
>  (1)x 
<= {definition of t}
( w ) x + ( w - 1 ) x >  (1)x
<= {definition of 1 }
2  >  1 
Case
( 1  -w)T > (w)x 
<= {definition of t}
(1)i  +  W x> W x
<=
(1)t > 0
Case m • 1 m. As for case 1 • m m.
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Case DH(m, 1) i-+m\
( M (m , 1 ))x>  (tm)t 
{definition o f  t}
(™)t +  (1)t +  1 > (w)x
<=
(1)t +  l> 0
CaseDH(DH(m\,m2),m3) DH(mi,m2-mi):
{DH{DH{m\,m2),m{))z >  (DH(m\,m2-m3))x 
<£= {definition o f  x}
{DH{m\,m2))z + (m)'t + 1 > («i)x + {m2 • W3)t + 1 
*<= {definition o f  x}
(/Mi)x +  (m2)T +  (/«3 )T +  2  >  (wi)t +  (w2)t +  (w3)t +  1 
<=
2 > 1
Cas eG D H (S~(s),x) h-> (~ f£ j (JDH’(5,.i,Jc )))^ (s) '>(D/f(j,Jc)). We need to show  
that:
For the left-hand side:
<= {definition of x}
(Zf£i(S-i)x+ (x)T + 1) +  ((* ) t+Wx +  1) +2((SM S)x)
<= {definition of x} 
(2 g ,3 )  + 3  +  2(1)
(S g 03 )+ 2
For the right-hand side we have:
( K i l  (DH(S.i,x))) ~  (s) "  <PH (S,*))\
4 = {definition of x}
\{S-i)t+  (*)t +  l)  +  (5)t +  (Cs’)t +  C*)x +  1 ) 
<= {definition of x}
( 2 ^ 3 )  +  1 +  3
Finally, we have that:
( ^ i 03 ) + 2 > ( S g 03) +  l
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D efinition 3.3.4 A TRS is confluent if, when t\ A  t2 and t\ A  /3, there is a term U 
such that ti A  / 4  and ti A  t .^
T heorem  3.3.5 CT is a confluent Term Rewriting System .
Proof The proof of confluence proceeds by showing that all critical pairs in 'T 
are joinable. However, we will not be in a position to prove this theorem until the 
following definitions and results have been introduced:
Let / i—► r and k  ► s be two rewrite rules of a TRS T with distinct variables. 
Suppose p  is the position of a subterm of / that is unifiable with k  for a most 
general unifier (mgu) a. The term a(/) =  a(/[£|p) is subject to the reduction steps 
a(/) i—► c ( r )  and g ( I )  c(/[s]p). The pair (cj(r),a(/[s}p)) is a c r i t i c a l  p a i r  of T, 
obtained by the superposition of k  i—»■ s on / 1—> r  [18, 37].
Two distinct terms t\ and t2 form a critical pair if  they are both derivable in a 
single step from a third term t.
Terms t and t' are said to be joinable if there exists a term s such that t A  s and 
A  s [37].
According to the Critical Pair Lemma [37], a TRS is locally confluent iff all of 
its critical pairs are joinable. Furthermore, the Diamond Lemma [37] shows that a 
terminating trs is confluent iff it is locally confluent. Since we have proved the 
termination property of T , we will have proved that T  is confluent (and, therefore, 
complete) if we can show that all critical pairs in T  are joinable. There are many 
critical pairs to consider, and we work through a representative example:
DH(m , 1) is unifiable with DH(DH(m\, m2) , m3 ) with mgu c, where:
a  =  {mi i—»• m, m2 1 }
This yields the critical pair (DH(m , 1 • m{),DH(m,mf)), which is joinable since 
DH(m, 1 ^ 3 ) h-> DH(m,mf) andDH(m,m2) is already normalised.
The remaining critical pairs can be shown to be joinable in a similar manner.
□
3.3.2 The structural simplifi cation o f formal messages
The purpose of normalisation is to reduce the structural complexity of formal mes­
sages, and thereby reduce the size of the message-space over which a rank function 
must be defined. The commutativity law of abelian groups is conspicuous by its 
absence from (T. Generally, the introduction of such a rewrite rule: x -y i—>y -x
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would result in a non-terminating TRS, since the rule permits derivations of the 
form x -y  y -x  x -y  .... One solution to this involves restricting the appli­
cation of the rule to commute only in a direction that decreases the term in some 
given ordering. This ordering is largely arbitrary and could be based on the lexico­
graphic ordering of terms. So, for example, the term D H (g,y-z-x) would have a 
normal form D H (g,x-y-z). Alternatively, we can include the commutativity rule 
in the standard way and say that *T terminates modulo commutativity and that a 
value t which is irreducible in T  is normalised modulo commutativity.
In this case, it is not clear that such an addition would be worthwhile, since ap­
plying a rewrite rule for commutativity does not increase the structural simplicity 
of a message. We therefore omit the commutativity rule from the rewrite sys­
tem, and separately state the equivalence of messages such as D H (g,y-z-x) and 
D H (g,x-y-z).
3.4 A CSP model of the A-GDH.2 protocol
In this section we develop a CSP model for the protocol, with the attacker and prin­
cipals represented by CSP processes. The final network is modelled as a parallel 
composition of the user and attacker processes.
3.4.1 The initiator
We define a unique initiator process for each run of the protocol. The process 
is parameterised with its username, i, and a secret r2- that i will use in the given 
protocol run. The process also has a priori knowledge of the sequence of users in 
the current group (Useq = (i) ^ J ) ,  such that i shares a unique key 9Q(j) with each 
other group member j:
INITj {rh =  trans.i.first{J) . ((g, DH{g, rt)))
<i) J
—> □  n rec.i.last(J).msms:seqD x '
—> let
key =  {DH{DH(first{ms), r2) , 3Q(last(J)))) 
within
trans.i.i.{msQUseq}key 
—» Stop
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Although the sequence (i) ^  J  determines the identity of the group controller and 
the order in which group members are traversed, the ordering is arbitrary. The 
process begins the protocol by constructing and sending the first upflow message, 
(,g,DH(g,rj)), and then waits to receive the broadcast message ms. The pro­
cess identifies its intermediate key firstims) and computes the group key key = 
DH(first(ms),rr  JQ(j)). For reasons associated with the secrecy specification on 
the protocol, we also include the transmission of a special message msg encrypted 
using a symmetric algorithm under key. Although the process sends this message 
to itself, the important point is that fraws.i.z.{msguseq}itey may appear in a trace of 
the system. The correctness of the protocol will depend on an attacker’s inability 
to decrypt this message.
3.4.2 The responder(s)
Any principal who is not an initiator or an attacker can be considered a responder. 
One particular responder, the group controller, has the special task of broadcast­
ing the keying material to the rest of the group. The process RESP captures this 
behaviour:
R E S P ^ r u r '^ )  =
H  ( i)  J
□  ,^rec.i.last(H ).m s—>ms:seq(D) v '
i f  J  () then
( trans.i.first(J).(GDH(ms,r,•)) —» ^
D mS':Se,(D)reC-i-t o W -mS' ^
let
key — (DH{ms'.i,s• f^(/<3 5 /(J)))) 
within
trans.i.i.{msQUseq}k£y 
\  -> Stop 
else
( Broadcast((GDH(ms.(#H+ l),r-))j 9d)lH;  ^
let
key =  (DH(last(ms), rty) 
within
trans.i.i.{msgUseq}key 
V ~+Stop j
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If J  ^  (), the responder process is not the group controller. In this case, the pro­
cess receives an upflow message, adds the user contribution ri} and then behaves 
in a similar manner to the initiator process. Otherwise, the process is the group 
controller and adds the controller’s contribution r- to the key before exponentiating 
each value in ms with a long-term key from 3Q. The process then performs the 
broadcast before sending the dummy message trans.i.i.{msgUsei]}key The secret 
contributed by the responder process depends on whether it is a group controller 
process. If it is the group controller the contribution is r- e  S?, otherwise it is r,- G S;. 
This distinction is relevant for the construction of the rank function in Section 3.5.
The Broadcast process models the distribution of keying material to the other 
group members:
Broadcast((m)^ms, 3Q) 1 = trans.i.j.DH{m, %ij)) —>
< /r*
As mentioned previously, the broadcast round does not have to be a true broadcast. 
The keying material may be transmitted via a suitable number of sequential uni­
casts. This is the approach taken by Broadcast, which is defined recursively over 
the sequence of participants. Note that, since the sequence (J) does not contain 
the group controller’s identity, keying material is not (needlessly) broadcast to the 
group controller.
3.4.3 The attacker
We use the attacker model of Chapter 2, extended to include the deduction rules of 
Section 3.2, above.
3.4.4 M odelling the network
We construct the final system as a parallel composition of principal processes with 
the attacker. The process I(i) models the behaviour of initiator i:
( i fK  7^() then
Broadcast(ms, 9Q) lK 
\  else Skip
\
/
i(0 = r,-€S; J€iseq(USER) INITt(rh SQ)j
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Similarly, the process R(i) represents a responder, i:
*(’■) =11 Us, K)j
Note that the responder uses the secret r,- if it is not the group controller, and cs(rj) 
otherwise. The function cs : S/ >—> Sf is an injective mapping used to generate the 
controller secret from the process parameter r,-.
Finally, the system is produced in the standard way:
III M(0 ) \ [{trans,rec}]\Enemy
The CSP model should guarantee that the attacker can never learn a key gener­
ated by a group of honest principals. This corresponds to the inability of ENEMY 
to derive msg from {m sg}^ in any run where key is generated by a sequence, J, 
of honest processes (i.e., where J  e  iseq(USERh)).
3.5 A candidate rank function for A-GDH.2
We use the rank theorem for secrecy of Section 2.4, where we seek to prove that:
NET sa t secret { m s g ^ }
Although our task is to assign a rank to all messages in the space of the protocol, 
it will be sufficient to restrict the domain of the rank function to the subset of the 
message-space that contains all messages in the normal form of Section 3.3. The 
exclusion of commutativity from the term-rewriting system gives rise to a proof 
obligation on any rank function:
C ondition  3.5.1 Vjc,y ,z  e  D.p(DH(x,y-z)) = p(DH{x,z-y))
Intuitively, this condition will hold of a particular rank function if the assignment 
of rank is independent of the order of the components in a value.
3.5.1 The rank o f Diffi e-Hellman values
The candidate function is given in Figure 3.3. Since the rank of atomic messages 
and sequences is rather routine, we focus here on the assignment of ranks to non- 
atomic Diffie-Hellman values.
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Usernames 
Group identity 
Group generator
Secret exponents
Long-term keys
Sequences
Plaintext
DH values p (d) =
p (j) =  pub
p(1) =  pub
p(g) =  pub
_  /  S0C ^  e  (S«U SU) Aw
|  pub otherwise
f sec ifw ^ £ A v ^ £
P fe M )  = \  . .  .
I pub otherwise 
p( (m i , . . . ,w „) )  =  mzn(p(mi), . . . ,p(m„))
p(mSgt, ) =  (  SSC
se q  |  pub otherwise
/  i(d)n%=|A \
 ^ J(i(rf)ns9>HWd)n5&) /  
sec i f  v
/ i DJa  \
V ti(i(d)n(suus£)) > #(i(d)n%) J
pub otherwise
Figure 3.3: Candidate rank function for A-GDH.2
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When determining the values which must remain secret throughout the proto­
col, it is instructive to consider the consequences when p(m sg^e?) =  sec (i.e., a 
protocol run in which the clique does not contain the attacker E), with regard to the 
constraints it places on the ranks of other values. Since a principal will transmit 
the message { m s g ^ } ^ ,  the secrecy of msg depends on the secrecy of key, and 
we must assign a rank of sec to any key that an honest principal may generate.
This task seems particularly difficult in the case of Diffie-Hellman, where the 
rank of a value can vary depending on the particular protocol run (and the attacker’s 
interference, if any, in that run). For example, consider a protocol run where the 
message g*? is generated by some principal. In a two-party protocol, this value 
may well be the final key, so we must assign p(g^) =  sec. However, if the pro­
tocol is establishing a key between three or more parties then g® will be an inter­
mediate value—passed over the network—requiring a rank of pub. The rank of a 
Diffie-Hellman value appears to depend on the context of the protocol, and invites 
a run-time rank allocation. Yet, a rank function analysis must proceed via a static 
assignment of ranks to messages. How, then, are we to partition the set D inde­
pendently of a particular protocol run? Equivalently, what property distinguishes a 
final Diffie-Hellman key from an intermediate Diffie-Hellman value?
Definition 3.5.2 Let v and u be the identities o f the group controller and a regular 
participant, respectively, in some protocol run, where all participants are honest. 
We assign the rank o f  Diffie-Hellman values according to the following predicate:
i(d)n % = [[]] a 
It(i(d)ns9>tt(i(rf)n3&) 
sec if  v 
i(rf) n % ^  [Ua 
#(i(rf)n(s„us£))> #«d)n%)
pub otherwise
P(<0 =  <
Informally, this definition says that a non-atomic Diffie-Hellman value, d, has a 
rank of pub unless:
1. The ingredients of d  does not contain any of principal u ’s long-term keys, 
and the number of group controller secrets in d  is greater than the number of 
group controller keys. Or,
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2. The ingredients of d  contains at least one of w’s long-term keys, and the 
number of w’s secrets in d  is not less than the number of u’s long-term keys 
in d.
This definition is not intuitive, but results from an investigation of the ways in 
which keys can be generated by protocol participants. The first disjunct addresses 
the ideal case, where the resultant key does not contain any long-term keys added 
by u. Consider the key computation performed by u (adapted from the CSP pro­
cess):
d = DH(ms, ru • f^(v))
Since u adds the long-term key ^L(v), ms must contain the inverse key %/(u) if  the 
resultant value d  is to satisfy the condition \{d) D %u =  [[J. In this case, our defini­
tion of a rank sec value is one in which d  contains more group controller secrets 
than group controller keys. For example, let d = DH(g , ru ■ rv) be the key computed 
by u in a two party protocol run, where ru and rv are the secrets contributed by u 
and (group controller) v. The value d  satisfies the predicate:
i(d)nai = lA
i(i(<i)ns$) >#(!(</) n%)
since d  contains more group controller secrets ( 1 ) than group controller keys (0 ). 
The message d  therefore has a rank of sec. Now consider the same value, DH(g, ru • 
rv), as it might appear as an upflow message in a three party protocol, where ru and 
rv are contributed by non-group-controller users. In this case the value does not 
satisfy the predicate and so is assigned a rank of pub. In this way the rank function 
definition is able to distinguish between values used in different contexts. 3
The second disjunct addresses the case when a key d  contains a key in %u. This 
might occur, for example, if an attacker replays a value computed during a previous 
protocol run. Since we must assign a rank to all messages that may pass through 
the system, such cases must be considered. In this case u computes a key d  that 
satisfies the predicate:
i
3Here, in the rank function, we see the motivation for dividing each principal z’s set o f session- 
secrets into the disjoint sets used as group controller (S f) and non-group controller (Sv). Interestingly, 
it was the diffi culty of defi ning the rank of Diffi e-Hellman values that prompted this division, high­
lighting a certain interdependence between a CSP protocol model and the subsequent rank function.
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Although the key d  has clearly been tampered with, u cannot know this and will be 
willing to use this value as (the basis of) a session-key. We must therefore ensure 
that such a value has a rank of sec. For this to be the case we demand that:
U(l(^)n(suus£)) >i(i(rf)n%)
i.e., that the number of w’s session-secrets in d  is greater than or equal to the num­
ber of m’s long-term keys in d. Since u adds a secret from Su as part of the key 
computation operation, we know that JJ(t(J) fl SM) >  1. Furthermore, since u never 
adds any key in HQ without also adding a secret in Suusc„, the predicate must hold 
for such keys.
It should be noted that the satisfaction of Condition3.5.1 relies on the rank func­
tion not distinguishing the order in which components appear in a message. Since 
this definition only talks about the ingredients of a message, the proof obligation is 
satisfied.
3.5.2 Attem pting to verify the rank function
To show that our candidate rank function is a well-formed rank function we need 
to dispatch the proof obligations from the central theorem. In fact, this will not be 
possible since the protocol is flawed. However, the way in which the proof fails is 
instrumental in discovering why this is the case. The failed proof also directs us 
toward a possible attack.
The problem arises when we attempt to meet condition 2 of the central theorem:
MS C MESSAGE.(p(iS) =  pub A S\- m) p(m) =  pub
The interesting case is the application of the Diffie-Hellman operation. Specifi­
cally, we need to prove the following:
VffJi 6 D,»i2 G Do-
p(mi) =  pub Ap(m2) = pub => p (D H (m \,m 2)) =  pub
In fact, this conjecture turns out to be false. It has been established that a given 
value (DH(g,x -y), say) has a rank that is dependent on the context in which the 
value appears. In some protocol runs the value should have a rank of sec, and in 
others a rank of pub. It is tempting to speculate whether an attacker can obtain two 
rank pub values mi and m2 such that p(DH(mi, m2 )) = pub in one context, but sec
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in another context. Consider the value d = DH(g,x ■ z), such that z  e  S£ for some
u. In a run of the protocol with u as group controller we have that p(<7) =  sec. 
However, consider a protocol run where the attacker is a legitimate group member. 
Clearly, the value d  may now have a rank of pub if, for example, d  is a value 
obtained by the attacker on receipt of a broadcast message. The value d  can be 
known to the attacker, and has a rank that is dependent on context. This fact can be 
exploited to violate the secrecy property.
Attack against a regular protocol participant4
Assume a protocol run with Useq = {A,E,B). The attacker, E, generates a value rE 
and sends the following upflow message to the group controller:
E - ^ B  : {DH{g,rE),DH(g,rE),DH{g,rE))
B responds by performing the following broadcast:
B ^ A , E  : (DH{g,rE -rB - %B{A)),DH{g,rE-rB - Xb{E)))
From this, the attacker can compute DH(g , rE • rB), and is also careful to remember 
the value DH(g, rE-rB - 3(s(A)).
In a subsequent run of the protocol with Useq =  (C:A ,B ) (i.e., the attacker is 
not a legitimate participant in this protocol run), the attacker can masquerade as C 
and replay the message:
7(C) -> A : (g,DH(g, rE-rB))
A chooses a random value rA and sends an upflow message to B, which is blocked 
by the attacker:
A -> 7(5) : (DH(g,rA) ,DH(g, rE • rB) ,DH{g, rE -rB-rA))
The attacker makes a note of DH{g, rE-rB-rA) and masquerades as B  by faking the 
broadcast message:
7(5) -+ A ,C : (.DH(g,rE-rB-!fa(A)),Y)
4By regular, we mean a participant who is neither the protocol initiator, nor the group controller.
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(where the value of Y is unimportant). A subsequently computes the key key =  
DH(g, rE -rB - r j) , which is known to the attacker. The attacker has managed to 
share a key with A, and has violated the implicit key authentication property. A 
similar attack, described in [33], can be launched against the group controller.
3.6 Rank function for a restricted model
The attack presented in the previous section depended on the attacker exploiting 
his legitimate presence in one protocol run to subvert a subsequent run. In this 
section, we consider the security of a restricted protocol in which the attacker is 
excluded from all groups.
3.6.1 The restricted protocol model
The restricted protocol model inherits much from the previous model—the CSP 
processes remain largely unchanged—we merely enforce a restriction on the se­
quence of protocol participants: J  e  iseq(USERh). This says that any sequence of 
protocol agents must be drawn from the set of honest users. We must also restrict 
the interleaving of processes to only act on honest principals. We adapt the process 
representing the entire system as follows:
N E T = IIUoker* (E(0 l l |R(0)  \[{trans,rec}]\Enemy
Since the attacker is now unable to act as a legitimate protocol participant, he 
must no longer share long-term keys with any honest agents. Nonetheless, the 
attacker will still have access to a set of secrets SE which can be used to generate 
new messages. The set S£ does not appear in the attacker’s initial knowledge, since 
he is no longer permitted to act as a group controller.
In the context of this restricted model, the (flawed) rank function given in Sec­
tion 3.5 is not a suitable candidate. It is worth clarifying exactly why the original 
candidate rank function cannot be used with the restricted model. Recall that the 
original candidate failed because Condition 2 of the central rank function theorem 
proved to be false. The falsity of this condition enabled an attacker to derive a 
message with rank sec from messages with rank pub. In particular, an attacker was 
able to learn the message DH(g, rE • rB), where rE is the group controller’s secret. 
The attacker could learn this message since he was allowed to act as a legitimate 
protocol agent. Consequently, the message DH(g, rE • rE) was assigned a rank of
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pub. This message led to the attack presented in Section 3.5.2. In the restricted 
model, the message DH(g, r£ • rg) cannot occur unless it is leaked by an honest 
principal, since a group controller u will only ever add ru along with some long­
term key ku{v). Since the attacker is excluded from all groups, agent v cannot be 
the attacker. In the restricted model the values such as DH(g,r£ • rg) should be 
assigned a rank of sec. At this point we can see why the original candidate rank 
function is unsuitable for the restricted model: it assigns a rank of pub to too many 
messages.
We therefore derive a new candidate, which differs only in the assignment of 
ranks to non-atomic Diffie-Hellman values:
Let cs(d) be the number of C’s ephemeral secrets and lt(d) the number of long­
term secrets in a Diffie-Hellman value d. If LK is the set of all long-term secrets 
shared by honest principals and Sc is the set of ephemeral secrets known to the 
controller C, define:
cs(d) =  tl(i(d)ns<i) 
it(d) = #(i(d)na:)
where Sch =  (JueUSERh is the set of all secrets known by honest group controllers.
Then, the rank of d  is defined as:
, sec if {cs(d) + lt(d)) mod 2 = 1
pM = {
pub otherwise
As before, this definition arises from a careful consideration of the ways in which 
keys are computed by agents in the protocol. In particular, it makes use of the fact 
that the group controller only ever transmits messages to which he has added both 
a controller secret and a long-term key.
The proof that this rank function meets the four conditions of the central theo­
rem is omitted but may be found in [33]. In brief, it allows us to conclude that, if 
the attacker is excluded from all groups, then any resulting session-key cannot be 
recovered by the attacker.
3.7 Equations and assumptions
Although this chapter has focused on Diffie-Hellman key agreement, it is inter­
esting to consider how other low-level cryptographic properties may be embedded
3.7 Equations and assumptions 70
within the rank approach. Here we discuss the case of symmetric encryption.
Abadi and Rogaway recently presented a computational justification for for­
mal encryption [8 ]. In particular, they proved that (under certain assumptions) the 
equivalence of formal expressions implies the indistinguishability of their bit-string 
representations. For example, in formal models an attacker cannot derive the mes­
sage m from an encryption {mi]k unless he possesses the key k. For this reason, the 
following equivalence holds:
[m}k =  {m '}v
Since the attacker cannot break into the encryption, he cannot distinguish between 
the two messages. They are effectively black boxes. In contrast, the computational 
approach to security analysis views any message as a bit-string, and the attacker 
may be able to derive certain facts from a bit-string or a set of bit-strings. For ex­
ample, the length of an encrypted message may imply the length of the underlying 
plaintext. Deductions of this nature cannot usually be made in formal models.
In [8 ], the authors propose three interesting attributes of a symmetric encryp­
tion scheme:
1. Repetition concealing: given two ciphertexts c and d , can one tell whether 
the underlying plaintexts p  and p' are equal? If not, the encryption scheme 
is repetition concealing.
2. Which-key concealing: If messages are encrypted under various keys, can 
one tell which messages were encrypted under the same keys? If not, the 
scheme is which-key concealing.
3. Message-length concealing: Does a ciphertext reveal the length of its under­
lying plaintext? If not, the scheme is message-length concealing.
These properties are introduced in the context of computational approaches to pro­
tocol analysis. The eight combinations of these properties correspond to eight 
notions of security (type-0-type-7), as given in Table 3.2.
Computational security tends to correspond to type-3. Formal analysis tech- . 
niques typically do not incorporate a concept of message-length, and deductions 
based on such information cannot therefore be made. In addition, formal tech­
niques tend to assume that the encryption scheme is which-key concealing and
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Type , rep. conc. key conc. length conc.
type- 0 / / /
type- 1 / / X
type- 2 / X /
type-3 / / X
type-4 X / /
type-5 X X X
type- 6 X / /
type-7 X / X
Table 3.2: The Abadi and Rogaway security models
repetition concealing. This notion of security corresponds to type-0 in Table 3.2. 
Based on this, computational (type-3) proofs offer stronger security guarantees 
than formal (type-0) proofs. Extending formal analysis techniques to work with 
other notions of security seems a useful and achievable task.
3.7.1 A  formal view o f message-length
It is not difficult to conceive of how message-length can be included in a rank func­
tion proof. Including a notion of message-length would enable us, for instance, to 
demonstrate the insecurity of the symmetric-key Needham and Schroeder protocol 
when implemented using a cipher in Cipher-Block-Chaining (CBC) mode [85]. 
We can allow for a message-length revealing cipher by the inference:
Msg length reveal 
S\~ {m )k
S\~length{m)
where {m}k represents the message m encrypted with symmetric-key k  and where 
length is defined recursively over the structure of the message. We lift the concept 
of length to apply to all messages and not merely the length of plaintext underlying 
an encrypted message:
Msg length 
S\~m
SY- length {m)
For simplicity we assume that user names, nonces and keys have unit length. 
The length of a concatenation is the sum of the length of its components. For
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1. A -»• S A - B - N a
2 . S -»• A {N a • B - K ab • {K ab ' ^ } kbs} kas
3. A -> B {Kab ‘A } kbs
4. B -> A {Nb }kab
5. A -»• B { N b - 1 }kab
Figure 3.4: Needham-Schroeder shared-key protocol
instance:
length{A.B.Na) =  3
The length of an encrypted message is dependent on the encryption scheme used. 
For the moment we will assume that encryption is performed using a symmetric- 
key block cipher in cipher-block-chaining (CBC) mode. In this scheme, the en­
cryption of message m\.mj ...m„ with key k  is co-ci . . .c n, where co is the initiali­
sation vector and c,- =  {c,_i ©/w,}^. The length of an encryption {m}k is therefore 
1 +length(m) (where the 1 represents the length of the initialisation vector).
Note that, in an implementation, message-length can be concealed by padding 
plaintexts to some fixed size.
3.7.2 Extending the concept o f message-length
Knowing the length of a plaintext message does not appear very useful by itself. 
However, in the context of cipher-block-chaining, the following interesting prop­
erty should be noted:
co • ci • c2 •.. • • Ci • ci+1 •... • c„ = {m\ • m2 •. . .  • m,- • mi+\ •. . .  • m„}k
co • Cl - c2 • •. • • Ci =  { m \ ■ m 2 • . . .  • in /}*
In [96] this property is used to subvert the Needham-Schroeder symmetric-key 
authentication protocol [8 8 ]. The protocol is given in Figure 3.4.
Variables A and B represent agent identities, S  is a trusted server, Na and Nb 
are nonces and Kas is a key shared between A and S. The goal of the protocol is 
for S  to provide a key K a b  that is known only to A and B. Mutual authentication is 
provided by the key confirmation phase (the last two messages).
This protocol can be proven secure in Dolev-Yao style models. However if  the 
underlying cryptosystem is a CBC mode block cipher, then the attacker can take
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the message {A^ • B • Kab • {Kab ' A} kbs}kas = cq- c\- C2 - ■. c„ and extract the first 
three blocks to deduce cq-c\-C2 = {Na ■B}kas■ However, {A^ -B}kas is the form of 
message that B expects to receive in message three of the protocol. If the attacker 
injects this message into the system during a subsequent protocol run (with B as 
initiator and A as responder), A will accept Na as the shared key. The attacker 
knows the value of N a  since it is transmitted in the clear in the first run.
3.7.3 CBC properties and rank functions
It is worth investigating how the above attack might manifest itself in a rank func­
tion verification. We can formalise the attacker’s ability to manipulate CBC mes­
sages with the following deduction:
CBC
S \-  { m h - - - , m„} k ,
-----------------------i e  [ l ,« -1 ]
S b {mi, - - - ,mi}k
We note that the attack assumes that nonces are indistinguishable from keys. 
This is a reasonable real-world assumption, but goes against standard protocol 
analysis practice where keys and nonces are drawn from disjoint sets, and cannot 
be confused.
-  The intention is for the session-key, K a b , to have a rank of sec.
-  Since the nonce N a  is sent in the clear we are compelled to assign it a rank 
of pub.
-  The message { N a  • B • K a b  • { K a b  -A}kbs}kas must have a rank of pub,
-  Anything generable from a message of rank pub should also have a rank of 
pub. In the context of the CBC deduction rule, this means that the following 
should all receive a rank of pub:
• {Na )kas
■ { N a - B } Kas
■ {Na -B-Ka s} ^
-  However, since nonces and keys are indistinguishable, {Na • must have 
a rank of sec.
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This contradiction leads to the breakdown of the rank function, and exposes the 
attack.
This initial investigation suggests that it is not, in fact, the cryptographic prop­
erties themselves that are interesting, but the deductions that can be made in their 
presence. This appears to be a subtle issue. In a formal model, what can an attacker 
deduce from the fact that two ciphertexts share the same key? An answer to this 
question appears to be protocol specific, and deserving of further investigation.
3.8 Conclusion
In this chapter we have shown how a rank function verification can take into ac­
count some low-level properties of Diffie-Hellman key agreement. This scheme 
features an array of interesting properties that any sensible analysis ought to ad­
dress. We have illustrated the approach by performing an analysis of the A-GDH.2 
protocol, rediscovering a known attack against implicit key authentication. We 
have also proved that the protocol is secure under the restriction that all members 
of all groups are honest. These results reinforce those of Pereira and Quisquater, 
who first discovered the attacks on the Cliques protocols using a novel theorem- 
proving approach [97] (we discuss this approach further in Chapter 4). Subse­
quently, Pereira was able to prove the correctness of A-GDH.2 under the honest 
group restriction [95].
The nature of Diffie-Hellman key agreement is such that some algebraic prop­
erties must be considered for the protocol to function correctly. Specifically, the 
protocol relies on the equivalence of commuted values (so that key =  g*'y = g 'x), 
and the cancellation caused by exponentiation with multiplicative inverses (so that 
gx k-k 1 _  However, further algebraic properties of the cryptosystem which 
are not used by the protocol may still be exploited by an attacker. By consider­
ing a wider class of algebraic properties we have discovered a stronger proof of 
security than is possible in a classical Dolev-Yao approach. 5 Recently, Millen and 
Shmatikov applied their constraint solving approach [8 6 ] to the A-GDH.2 proto­
col, and rediscovered the original attack. An interesting feature of this work is the 
inclusion of equational theories of exclusive-or and abelian group properties. As 
with our approach, the inclusion of these properties is achieved via a normalisa­
5In fact, Diffi e-Hellman does not fi t neatly into classical analysis approaches. The concept ofper­
fect encryption (see [96] for example) demands that an agent should know when a message has been 
successfully decrypted. Since there is no concept of decryption in Diffi e-Hellman key agreement, a 
principal is restricted in his ability to perform this check.
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tion procedure. In addition, the solution of a constraint sequence leads directly to 
an insecure protocol run. In the rank function approach, some ingenuity is often 
required to derive an attack from a failed proof. Previously, this author applied 
Lowe’s Casper compiler to the Cliques protocols [32]. The restrictions of this 
state-based approach severely limited the size of group that could be considered 
(typically to 3), but Casper was nonetheless expressive enough to capture some 
properties of Diffie-Hellman. More recently (since the completion of the present 
work), Abadi and Cortier [4] have demonstrated that protocol analysis is decidable 
under a variety of equational theories (including exclusive-or, homomorphic en­
cryption and blind signatures). This result opens up the possibility of automated 
protocol analysis in the presence of algebraic theories. Currently, however, the 
work is limited to the case of a passive attacker.
A particular difficulty of our approach is the assignment of ranks to Diffie- 
Hellman values. The rank functions proposed in this chapter did not arrive fully- 
formed, but came as the result of many failed attempts. Diffie-Hellman keys seem 
particularly resistant to the a priori assignment of ranks, since the rank of a value 
is dependent on the context in which the value is used. As mentioned, the value 
may possess a rank of sec in a two-party protocol run, but require a rank of pub if 
it had appeared in a three-party run. Since our attacker model allows for messages 
legitimately learned in one protocol run to be replayed in a subsequent run, the 
boundaries of particular protocol instances become blurred. Indeed, the use of 
values outside of their intended context results in the attack presented above. The 
rank definitions are tightly bound to the A-GDH.2 protocol, and do not apply to 
Diffie-Hellman key agreement in general. The difficulty of this rank assignment 
motivates the need for a more general approach (in the style of [61]) in the Diffie- 
Hellman context, and the discovery of such an approach should be a focus of future 
research.
An alternative approach is to examine how Diffie-Hellman protocols may be 
reasoned about at a more appropriate level of abstraction. We carry this work 
forward in the next chapter.
Chapter 4
An algebraic approach to the 
verifi cation of Diffi e-Hellman 
protocols
In the previous chapter we saw how the rank approach can be extended to include equational theories of the protocol under investigation. The shortcom­ing of that approach lay in the difficulty of statically defining the rank of a 
Diffie-Hellman key. In this chapter we present an alternative framework for rea­
soning about secrecy in a class of Diffie-Hellman protocols. The technique, which 
shares a conceptual origin with the idea of a rank function, uses the notion of a 
message-template to determine whether a given value is generable by an attacker 
in a protocol model. We describe the approach in the context of the MTI protocols, 
and derive the conditions under which these protocols can be considered secure. 1
4.1 Introduction
Formal protocol analysis techniques have a simplicity which is due, in part, to 
the high level of abstraction at which they operate. Such abstractions are justified 
since any attack discovered at the abstract level will tend to be preserved in a more 
concrete model. As noted in Chapter 3, however, failure to discover an attack does 
not imply correctness, and in seeking to establish correctness we must be mindful 
of the assumptions on which our abstractions are based.
Portions of this work have previously appeared as [35].
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Protocols based on the Diffie-Hellman scheme present an interesting verifi­
cation challenge since, in this context, we cannot assume such an abstract view 
of cryptography. Certain algebraic properties (such as the homomorphism of ex­
ponentiation in (g*)* =  (g^)*) must be represented for the protocol to reach its 
functional goal, and other properties (such as the cancellation of multiplicative in­
verses) must also be considered if  we wish to prove a meaningful security result. As 
a consequence, such protocols have tended to be evaluated in complexity-theoretic 
models (see [19], for example) which aim to reduce the correctness of the protocol 
to some well-defined hard problem, such as the computation of discrete logarithms 
in a finite field. The resulting proofs tend to be difficult to conduct and evaluate, 
and a small change in the protocol will often require an entirely new proof to be 
constructed.
With some exceptions [82, 97, 8 6 , 4] formal techniques have been slow in ris­
ing to the challenge of Diffie-Hellman. This chapter presents a theorem-proving 
approach to the verification of a class of Diffie-Hellman protocols. Although our 
approach is quite general we present it in the context of the MTI protocols of Mat- 
sumoto, Takashima and Imai [80]. These protocols are chosen for the simplicity 
of their messages and non-standard use of Diffie-Hellman (in particular, the com­
putation of a shared key as g* • ^  = g*+y in MTI A(0)). The design of the MTI 
protocols is such that we are able to model them at a very abstract level. The MTI 
class A protocols are described in Section 4.2. Our model revolves around the idea 
of a message-template which, suitably instantiated, can represent any value that 
an attacker can deduce (under a defined set of capabilities). A particular value re­
mains secret if  it cannot be realised via any instantiation of the message-template. 
This model, and its associated definition of secrecy, is described in Section 4.3 and 
applied to the MTI A(0) protocol in Section 4.4. Section 4.5 then extends the tech­
nique to the remaining protocols in the suite. Although we do not describe it in 
such language, our approach shares a conceptual origin with the notion of a rank 
function, and is informed by the approach of Pereira and Quisquater; we explore 
these relationships, and conclude, in Section 4.6.
4.2 The MTI protocols
Three infinite classes of authenticated key agreement protocols fall under the ban­
ner of MTI [80]. All of the MTI protocols are amenable to analysis in our frame­
work but, in the first instance, we focus on one particular protocol, A(0). The
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rA,rB, rc Random integers, chosen by A, B and C respectively
tA, tB Ephemeral public-keys, tA =  grA, tB =  grB
xa ,xb ,xc Private long-term keys of A, B and C respectively
y j  ,ys Public keys o f A and B: yA = g XA,y B = g XB
Zab The shared secret between A and B
x Er X  An element x  chosen at random from the set X
Table 4.1: Diffie-Hellman protocol notation
protocol combines long-term and ephemeral key contributions to provide authen­
tication in the Diffie-Hellman scheme. A summary of notation, following [17], 
is given in Table 4.1. In protocol A(0) (Figure 4.1) principal A (who wishes 
to establish a shared-secret with B) possesses a long-term secret, xA, and pub­
lishes the corresponding public-key yA — g CA. B does the same with xB and yB. 
A randomly chooses rA, computes zA =  grA and sends it to B. In response, B 
randomly chooses rB, computes zB =  grB and sends it to A. B then computes 
Z ab = z A y A =  {$fAYB ■ {fYAYB = grAXB+XArB and A computes Zab  The
protocol aims to convince each principal that no one, aside from the other protocol 
participant, can learn the shared-secret Zab- This property is often termed implicit 
key authentication. In Chapter 3 we defined this property in the context of group 
key-agreement protocols; here we tailor the definition for the two-party case:
Definition 4.2.1 Let P be a 2-party key agreement protocol involving principals A 
and B, and let k b e a  secret jointly generated as a result o f  P. We say thatP provides 
implicit key authentication i f  A and B are assured that no principal C £ {A, B} can 
learn k  (unless aided by a dishonest D e  {A,B}).
In line with previous work [97,33] we formalise implicit key authentication as the 
inability of an attacker to learn a shared secret.
All of the MTI protocols involve the exchange of two messages, zA and zB, each 
of which is computed within the principal and not as a function of a previously 
received message. (Contrast this with protocols like Cliques, where a principal B 
may receive an input m from A, apply some function to m and send the result on to 
C.) We will see in the next section that this fact enables us to model protocols at a 
very abstract level.
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A B
rA
ZA = g A
Zab
Figure 4.1: MTI A(0) protocol
4.3 A model for Diffi e-Hellman protocols
In this section we present a model for Diffie-Hellman protocols based around the 
idea of a message-template which defines the general form of any message gener- 
able by an attacker in a given protocol.
We begin by noting that transmitted messages are elements of some group G in 
which the Decisional Diffie-Hellman problem is believed to be hard. A generator 
g  of G is agreed by all principals and there exists an identity element 1 such that 
1 x = 1, for all x e  G. We assume that elements of G can be expressed as g  raised to 
the power of a sum of products of random numbers. This assumption permits, for 
example, g ^ +z, where x, y  and z are random integers, but excludes values such as 
g ^  since the exponent is itself a group element. The users of the system therefore 
manipulate two types of element, (i) random exponents, and (ii) powers of g, and 
we assume that only the latter will be sent on the network:
Assumption 4.3.1 All values passing on the network are powers o fg  where the ex­
ponent can be expressed as a sum ofproducts o f  random integers, and computation 
takes place in a group in which the Diffie-Hellman problem is hard.
In the protocol, principals make use of public-key certificates, such as gXA, but 
we do not specify how such certificates are registered and obtained. Instead, we 
assume the following:
Assumption 4.3.2 There exists a certification authority; or some other means by 
which a principal A can obtain B ’s public-key certificate and be sure that B (and 
only B) knows the corresponding private-key.
Finally, we divide the principals into disjoint sets of honest and dishonest 
agents, such that:
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Assumption 4.3.3 Honest principals do not deviate from the protocol and do not 
(knowingly) divulge their secret keys or any previously established session-keys.
In fact, we assume the presence of a single dishonest principal: the attacker.
4.3.1 The attacker
We divide the users of the system into a set of honest principals, {A,B}, who will 
always adhere to the protocol, and a malevolent agent, C, whose goal is to subvert 
the protocol.
Some elements of (i) and (ii) (from Section 4.3) will be known initially to the 
attacker (such as random numbers he has chosen himself, and their corresponding 
powers), and some elements of (ii) will become known to the attacker during the 
course of the protocol. The design of the protocols means that an active attacker 
cannot influence any of the values sent by honest participants, since the functions 
which produce these values are not dependent on any external input2. This is im­
portant, since it is then sufficient to assume that the attacker knows these values 
from the start.
Following [97], we divide the attacker’s initial knowledge into a set E  of ex­
ponents, and a set P  of exponents where the corresponding powers of g  are known 
and x e P  indicates knowledge of gx but not of x  (unless x e E). We then define the 
computations that the attacker can perform:
Definition 4.3.1 (attacker capabilities) Given a set P ofexponents o f initially known 
powers o fg  and a set E o f  initially known exponents, the attacker can grow P based 
on the following operations:
1. given mi G P and m2 £ P  add m\ -\-m2 t0 P
2. given m £ P  and n G E  add mn, w(«-1) toP
3. given m G P add —m toP
In other words, we allow the attacker to (1) compute gm] ■ gmi = g7” 1+7772 given 
knowledge of g 7” 1 and g7”2, (2 ) compute the exponentiations (g777 ) 77, (gm)n 1 given 
knowledge of g777 and n, and (3) compute the inverse ^  =  g~m given g777. Moreover, 
these capabilities can be combined:
2They may, however, be infhenced by the perceived sender of the incoming message, as the
subsequent outgoing message may contain the identity of this sender.
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E xam ple  4.3.2 Suppose that P  =  {1 , r f \  and E = {re}- The attacker can deduce
(i) —rA GP by rule 3 from rA, (ii) Ire  GP by rule 2 and —rA +1 rc GP by rule 1 
from (i) and (ii), representing the computation o f gfc~rA.
Crucially, the attacker is not able to use m\ e  P  and m2 GP to deduce mi m2 .
■
In this model, the attacker’s entire knowledge can be defined as the closure of P 
under the deductions of Definition 4.3.1 and set E. In any useful protocol, E  and P  
will initially be non-empty, and the resulting knowledge sets will be infinite. For 
this reason, it will be infeasible to enumerate these sets by growingP via successive 
application of rules 1-3.
4.3.2 System defi nition
An examination of the sorts of values that can be deduced by an attacker leads to 
the following observation: a generable value can be written as some number of 
elements of P  multiplied by some product of (possibly inverted) elements from E. 
For instance, the value derived in Example 4.3.2 can be written as — l(r^)(r^) +  
l ( 1 )(rc) (n°ting ^ e  difference between the group identity 1 and the integer 1 ). 
In fact, we can go further by defining a polynomial over the variables of E  and P  
which represents any value generable by the attacker using rules 1-3, above.
Definition 4.3.3 Let F  be a finite family o f  functions that map elements o f  E  to 
integer powers: FCfi„E  —* Z.
Given E = {xc}, f°r example, we may define F  =  {{xc — 1}}.
D efinition 4.3.4 Let h be a higher-orderfunction which, fo r a member ofF, maps 
elements o fP  to integers: h : F  —> (P —» Z).
As an example, givenP =  {ta} andF  = {{xc •—> —1}}, we might choose to define 
K i x c  ^  -1}) =  {^a  ^  1}.
Definition 4.3.5 (m essage-tem plate) Fix some E  and P. Then:
v(F ,h) =  ZfeF ( I pephfs 'P) ( jle eE ^ )
We call v the message-template for a system defined by E  and P. Intuition is little 
help here, so consider a simple example:
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Example 4.3.6 Given the system defined byP  = {r^} andE =  {xc}> consider how 
the value g~rAXc +5rA*c can jje expressed. Our goal is to find  F  and h such that:
v(F, h) = - r Ax f}  +  5 rAxc
We begin by rewriting the right-hand side o f  the equation to include all multipliers 
o f P elements and powers o f  E  elements:
v(F, h) = ( -1  ■ rA) • (x^1) +  (5 • rA) ■ (xj.)
The term is a linear combination o f  two components, each o f  which makes reference 
to a different power o fxc  (—1 and 1 / This guides us to a definition ofF, as:
F  = {{xc  I—* — 1}, {xc  ^  1}}
In the first component o f  the linear combination, the — 1st power o f  xq is multiplied 
by — 1 • rA, leading us to:
K ixc ^  —1}) = {rA ^  -1}
In the second component, the Is/power o fxc  is multiplied by 5 • rA, leading to:
h{{xc ^  1}) =  {rA •-* 5}
So, v(F, h) = —rAx f l +  SrAxc precisely when F  =  { {xc — 1}, {xc ^  1}} and h 
is defined such that h({xc  •—► — 1}) =  {rA hh► 1 } and h{{xc 1}) =  {rA i—> 5}. ■
As a more complex example, consider the following:
Example 4.3.7 Let P  = { 1  ,rA,rs \, E = {xc, rc\. Expanding the definition o f 
v(F, h) in terms o f  P and E results in:
v(F ,h) =  X/eP{hfA • 1 +  hUA • rA +  hf n  • rB) (x*c • r£c )
Taking a different approach this time, consider how the value gfc~rA (from Example 
4.3.2) can be represented. We are looking for F  and h such that:
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I/eF (A/,1 •1 + hUA ■ rA + hf.rB • rB) (xfc C ^c )
( - l - ^ ) - ( r » )  +  ( M ) . ( 4 )
Note that, on the left-hand side o f the equation, each component is in terms o f  the 
product o f  some powers o f  xc  and r& Since xc  does not appear in the target value 
rc — rA, this leads us to:
2 /€ f(V . 1 • 1 + hffA ‘rA +  hf f B • rB) ( /£ c -/cC)
( - l - r A)-(x 0c -r0c) + ( l - 1 )-(x°c -rlc )
This, in turn leads us to a definition o f  F:
F =  {{xc*-*- 0,rc ^  0 } ,{ ^ c ^  0 , r c ^  1}}
We also note that rB E P  does not appear in rc — rA. Expanding the right-hand side 
in terms o fP w e get:
S /e F ^ / ,1  • 1 + hU A -?A + h f,rB -rB) ( $ • / ? )
( 0  • 1 +  - 1  • rA +  0  • rB) • (x° • rjl) +  ( 1  • 1 +  0  • rA +  0  ■ rB) ■ (*£ • rxc)
Finally, the coefficients o f  each P term in the above lead us to define h such that:
^ ( { ^ c ^ 0 5^ c |- >0 }) =  { 1  0 ,r j - l , r B h->0 }
^({*c 0,rc i—^ 1}) =  {1 m  1, ^  i-» 0 ,rB h-> 0}
We then obtain: v(F,h) =  (0 • 1 +  — 1 ■ +  0 • rB) (jc^ , • rty +  (1 • 1 + 0  +  0 •
rB) {xQc  • rlc ) = - r A + rc. ■
Note that, in the definition of the message-template, h is defined in terms of F. 
Therefore, any values v(Fi ,h\) and viF jihf) exhibit the following property:
Lemma 4.3.8 Given v(Fi,h\) andv(F2 ,hf), we have that:
F\ 7  ^Fi = >  M 7 ^ 2
□
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As stated, our intention is that, for a given system (defined by E  and P), the poly­
nomial v(F, h) expresses the general form of all values deducible by an attacker, 
from P  and E, by appeal to the deduction rules of Definition 4.3.1. We embed the 
ability of a polynomial to take a certain value in the concept of realisability:
Definition 4.3.9 A value m is realisable (written realisable{m)) i f  there existsfunc­
tions F  and h such that v(F, h) = m.
That is, a value m is realisable if  there exists a solution to the equation v(F, h )—m —
0. If m is not realisable we write ->realisable(m). Define Pub to be a closure 
containing all possible polynomials for a given system. Pub is the set containing 
all realisable values of that system: the set of public messages.
Theorem 4.3.10 (Faithfulness) Fix some P and E and Pub as defined above. Pub 
is closed under the deductions o f  Definition 4.3.1.
Proof By induction. For the base case we show that, whenever p  £ P, p  is realis­
able.
Base case: Given some p  £ P ,p  is realisable with v(F, h) by defining: 
F = { { e ^ 0 \ e £ E } }
and:
h({e i—> 0  | e e E } )  =  {ph-»l}u{#H-> 0 | < 7  € P \{ p } }
Inductive step: There are three cases, corresponding to the three attacker deduc­
tion rules:
-  (i) realisable(m\) Arealisableimf] =$realisable{m\-\-m2 ),
-  (ii) realisable(m\) An £ E  => realisable(m\n) Arealisable(m\n~l), and
-  (iii) realisable(mi) => realisable(—m{).
(i) Assume mi = v(F \,hi) and m2 = v(F2 ,h2 ). Then m\ -f m2  is realisable with 
v(F3 , hf} by defining F 3 = F \ UF2  and h such that:
h ( f ) = {
h \if)  i f f  £ dom (hi)\dom (h 2 )
h2 (f) iff  £ dom{fi2) \dom{h\)
Xp.hi(f){p) Jrh 2 (f){p) i f f  £ dom{h\) ndom(h2)
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(ii) For the first conjunct assume m\ — v(F \,h\) and n e  E. Then, m\n is 
realisable with vifi '21 hj) by defining:
Fi = { f ® { n (Fi(n) +1)} \ f  €Fij
and ti2 such that: 
h iif)  =  h  (/■©{« t-+if i n ) -  1 )})
The second conjunct follows the above, with addition in place of the subtraction 
in the definition of h2 .
(iii) Assume m\ = v(F \,h\). Then —m\ is realisable with v(Fi, hf) where h2 is 
defined such that / * 2 (f){p) =
□
Our intention is for the model to respect the fact that some values are only 
possible for an attacker to derive by a lucky guess (with negligible probability). 
The following example makes this clear:
Example 4.3.11 Consider the system defined by P = {1 ,xA] and E — {*<;}• Any 
group value g*A can be realised by definingX = v(F, h), where F  =  {{xc ^  0}} 
and h{{xc ^  0}) =  {1 i—> X}. I f  the attacker chooses X  = x j  this yields v(F, h) =  
( 1  -xA)x% = xA. ■
In this example, the attacker should not be able to derive xA (since he only knows 
g*A), but it seems that he can derive it via a judicious choice of X. Using this 
tactic the attacker can potentially derive any group member, and no session-key 
can ever remain secret. In practice, however, such lucky guesses are not possible, 
and we require that our abstraction respects this fact. This is a thorny issue since 
it invites us to impose an unnatural separation between ‘numbers’ (such as X  in 
the above example), and ‘symbolic terms’ (such as xc) by stating that numbers and 
symbols are disjoint. Clearly this separation is unreasonable since both X  and xc  
are numbers.
Instead we say that, for a system, an interpretation of that system is the as­
signment of concrete values to the terms xA, xc, etc. We then limit the attacker by 
stating that a value is only realisable if  the realisation is independent of the inter­
pretation. In particular, the value xA is not realisable here since it depends on the 
interpretation of xA as X. By extension, any ‘attack’ on a protocol in our abstrac­
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tion must be independent of the interpretation of terms within the model of that 
protocol.
Note that an element n e E \ P  will typically only be realisable if 1 £ P. That 
is, n is realisable by v(F,h), where F  =  {{« 1}} and h({n 1 }) =  { 1  h-> 1},
giving 1 • ( 1  -w1) =  n.
Condition 4.3.12 1 £ P = > P n E  = ®
We require that the above condition be true of any protocol model. To see why 
this is necessary consider the system given by E — {*c}, P =  {1 ,*c}- The value 
xc  can be realised in two ways, xc  = v(F, h\) =  v(F, fc), where:
F  =  {{xc1-* 1}}
and hi, Ji2 are defined such that:
— h \({ x c |—► 0 }) =  { 1  h  0 ,xc.i-» 1 } 5 h\ ({^c ^  1 }) =  {"I ^  0 ,xq > 0 }
— /?2 ({^c ^  0}) =  {1 l—► ^  0}, h2 ({xc >—> 1}) =  {1 i—► l ,x c  ^  0}
The first case yields v(F ,h\) = (:x;c)*c +  (0)xc =  Xc second results in
v(F, h2 ) =  (0)x^+ (l)*c =  x c • Since h\ h2 , but v(F, h\) =  v(F , /Z2 ), the example
allows the same value to be derived in two separate ways.
Even in the context of Condition 4.3.12, the property of unique realisability— 
that a value can be realised in at most one way—is not generally true. Consider the 
following counter-example:
Example 4.3.13 Let E  =  {ic}, P = { x a }  and note that E andP satisfy Condition
4.3.12. The value x a X c  can be realised in at least two ways:
(i) Define v(F \,h\) where:
F\ = {{xc ^  0}, {xc >-> 1}} 
h  ({*c »-»• 0}) = {xA i-> 0}
h\ ({xc !► 1 }) =  {xa ^► 1 }
Then v(F \,h\) = \xax1c +  =  xaxc
(ii) Define v{F2 ,h2 ) where:
F\ =  {{xC '-> 1 } ,{ ^ C ^ 2 }} 
h\ ({xc  ►^ 1 }) =  { ^ 4  1 }
hi ({*c 2}) = {xa ^  0}
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Then v(F2 , hi) =  1xa*c +  ®xaXc ~  XAX& ®
In this example, the property of unique readability is violated by the presence, 
in the linear combinations, of components equalling 0 , in (i) we have 0 xax®c =  0  
and, in (ii), Qxax2c . We introduce a normalisation procedure which removes such 
degenerate components.
Definition 4.3.14 Given v(F,h), define norm(v(F,h)) =  v(F',h') where:
F' = F \{ fe F \r a n { h ( f ) )  = {Q}} 
t i  = h \{ h ( f )  | / £ F  Aran(h(f)) =  {0}}
This would yield, for example, norm(v(F\,hi)) = v(F[:h[), where F[ = {{xc i—> 
0}} and/?i({xc ^  1}) =  {xj 1—» 1}. For the remainder of this chapter, we assume 
that all values are normalised.
Theorem 4.3.15 (Unique realisability) Fix some E and P satisfying Condition
4.3.12. Given some v(F \, hi) and v(Fi, hi),
v{F\, h\ ) =  v{Fi, hi) =>■ F\ =  F2 A hi =  hi
Proof. For a contradiction assume some Fi, Fi, hi and hi such that v(F i,hi) = 
v(F i,h2 ) but -i(Fi =  Fi Ahi =  hi). Since
~<(Fi =  Fi A hi =  hi) = F i f^F iV h i hi
there appear to be two cases to consider, Fi 7  ^F i and hi f  hi. However, from 
Lemma 4.3.8 we have that Fi f  F i ==> hi 7  ^hi, so it will be sufficient to treat the 
case hi^fih i.
In this case, hi f  hi tells us that (a) there exists some/  £ Fi such that f  £ F i,  
or (b) there exists some/  £ F i,p  £ P  s.t. hi(f)(p) 7  ^hi{f){p).
In this first case there exists some coefficient of the linear combination of 
v(F i,hi) which does not appear in the linear combination of v(F i,hi). It is not 
possible (in all interpretations of the system) for any combination of components 
from v(F i,hi) to equal (and, therefore, cancel with) the presence off  in v(F i:hi). 
Therefore, the equality v(Fi,hi) = v(F i,hi) cannot hold, yielding a contradiction.
In the case that/  c F i, h i(f)(p) 7  ^hi(f){p) tells us that there exists somey £ Z  
s.t. y - p - f  is a component of the linear combination of v(Fi ,h{). Since y  • p  • /  is 
distinct from all other terms on either side of the equation v(Fi,/zi) =  v(F i,hi)),
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there are no values of the coefficients of v(F2 , hf) which will allow the equality to 
be met in all interpretations, yielding a contradiction which establishes the theorem.
□
4.3.3 Secrecy
In a Diffie-Hellman protocol, a principal u performs some key computation func­
tion on an input z  to derive a secret Zuv believed to be shared with v. We denote 
this function kuv with Zuv = kuv(z).
Example 4.3.16 In the standard Diffie-Hellman protocol [38], a principal A, ap­
parently running with B and using the ephemeral secret xa performs the key com­
putation kjB (z) = zxa representing the shared secret Zab = gZXA- ■
Definition 4.3.17 (Secrecy) Given a system defined by E andP, a key computation 
function k maintains secrecy iff:
Vm.realisable(m) =4> ->realisable(k(m))
Intuitively, secrecy is defined as an anti-closure property of the set of generable val­
ues: the result of applying k  to a realisable value should never result in a realisable 
value. If this property does not hold then an attacker will possess two values, x  and 
y, such that, ifx  is sent to some principal she will compute y, wrongly believing it 
to be secret.
4.4 Reasoning about the MTI A(0) protocol
A complete model of a protocol is a combination of the message-template with an 
appropriate key computation function. In this section we present a model of the 
MTI A(0) protocol and use it to deduce the conditions under which the protocol 
guarantees the secrecy of a shared key.
Define EAW =  {rc,xc}> representing a run of the
MTI A(0) protocol. We wish to show that the key computation function k ^  (z) =
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zxa +xi,ra maintains secrecy. There are eight cases to consider:
1. a = A A b  — C 5. a = A A b = A
2. a = B Ab = C 6 . a = B Ab = B
3. a = CAb = A 7. a = A Ab = B
4. a =  C Ab =  B 8 . a =  B Ab =  A
We treat each in turn.
Cases 1 -4
Let a = A and b = C. We are trying to show that, for any z where realisable{z), 
->realisab!e(k^ (z)). There exists some F\ and h\ such that v(Fi,/zi) =  z. If we 
can find some F2 and hi such that v(F2 ,h2) =  k a c \z ) we will have shown that 
(z) is realisable and is therefore not secret.
Note that k ^  (z) =  zxa +  x&a is a linear combination, and that the linear 
combination will be realisable if  each of its components is realisable. In general 
zxj will be realisable if z does not mention x j  (since x j  e  P  but x j  £ E). Consider, 
then, z =  rc, given by v(Fi ,h\) where:
Fi =  {{rc ^ l } }
h \ { { r c ^  1}) =  (1 l}U {pi->0j/7G P\{1}}
then zxa — yqxa is realisable by v{F\,h{) where h2{{rc 1}) =  {xa i—»■ 1}. Simi­
larly, x cva is realisable by v{F?„hj), where:
F3 = {{*c ^  1}}
h4 ( { x c ^  1}) =  { ta ^  1}u{/?h-+o \ p  e f \ h } }
Theorem 4.3.10 then tells us that, since r e a l is a b le { r & A )  and r e a l is a b le { x c r A ) , the 
sum tcxa +xqta  is also realisable, and is given by v(F2 , hi), where:
F2 = F 1 UF3 =  { { r c ^  1},{xc ^  1}} 
h { { r c ^  1}) =  { ^ ^  1}U ^  0 |p e P \{ x j} }  
h i ( { x c ^  1 }) =  {ta ^  l}U {p 0  |/7 6 f \ { ^ } }
From this we conclude that the attacker can deduce a pair of values, rc  and 
vqxa +xcrA, related by the key computation function k ^ \  and so secrecy fails. 
This failure should come as no surprise since b = C represents the attacker’s legit­
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imate participation in the protocol. Any honest principal who willingly engages in 
a protocol run with the attacker cannot hope to maintain secrecy of the resulting 
session-key. We note that similar conclusions can be reached in cases 2-4.
Cases 5 and 6 (b =  a)
Let a = A ,b  = A. The corresponding key computation is given by (z) =  zxA +  
xat a- Note that xArA is the multiplication of two elements from P. The attacker 
model only allows the addition of elements from P  and, since xa f iE  and rA £ E, 
the component xaya is unrealisable. Consequently, for zxa + xava to be realisable, 
zxa must be a linear combination that includes —xArA (since —xa^a +xArA = 0  is 
realisable). Consider the simplest case, where z =  —rA, which is realisable, since 
7“a € P- The result of k ^ \ —rA) = ~ rAxA + xa?a =  0 is realisable by v(Fs,hs), 
where, for instance:
5^ = {{rc *-»• 0}, {xc 0}} 
hs{{rc 0}) = {p h* 0 \p e P}
h5 {{rc 0}) = {p 0 \p e P}
As a result, the attacker can deduce a pair of values —va and 0 such that 0 =
^a a \ ~ va ) and, again, secrecy fails. A similar result holds for case 6 , where
a = b = B. This attack is a simpler version of one discovered by Just and Vaudenay 
[67]. In the original attack, z was set to be rc — ta and the resulting session-key 
computed as g Arc (where xatq is realisable). The attack depends on A’s will­
ingness to engage in the protocol with herself, and can be seen as stipulating a 
condition on an implementation: namely, that a principal should only engage in 
the protocol if  the other party has a distinct identity.
Cases 7 and 8 (b ^  a)
For the final cases, assume a = A and b = B (a similar result holds for a — B and 
b = A). The key computation is given by (z) =  zxa + xsrj. For secrecy to fail 
there must exist some z =  v(F \ , hi) and k ^ (z) =  v{F2 ,hi) such that:
v{F\,hi) •xA +xBrA = v(F2 ,h2)
Consider the coefficient of x^r^. We have:
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h i{\xc  0 , yq i > 0 }) =  { 1  ^ n u rA ^ n 2 ,rB h-> n3,x j  (-»• n4 ,xB ^ « 5}
0 , r c > - *  0 } )  =  { 1  ^ m , r A  *~>m2 ,rB ^  rn3,x j i ► m4 ,xB h-> tw 5 }
for some w i .. .ms e Z, « i .. .7 2 5 6  Z where the coefficients on both sides are the 
same:
m\XA + m2rAXA + m3rBXA + m^x\ + msxBXA +xbya
rn +  n2 rA +  n3 rB +  n4XA +  n5*B
Since xbya is distinct from all other terms on either side of the equation, there are no 
values of the coefficients which enable the equality to be met in all interpretations 
of the terms. We conclude that, for any realisable z, 1 c ^  (z) is unrealisable.
Results
The analysis enables us to state the following result:
Theorem 4.4.1 Given EA(°) =  {rc,xc}, =  {1 ,ya,yb,xa,xb}, 
a ^ C A b j^ C A a ^ b = >  maintains secrecy
□
This tells us that protocol A(0) maintains the secrecy of the session-key precisely 
when the initiator and responder are distinct entities and neither of them is the 
attacker C.
4.5 Further examples: A(z), B(z) and C(z)
In the previous section we saw how message-templates can be used to reason about 
the MTI A(0) protocol. In fact, A(0) is just one of an infinite number of protocols 
that fall under the banner of MTI. In this section we investigate these protocols and 
describe their corresponding security analyses. In particular, we note in passing 
that the correctness conditions for A(0) appear to apply equally well in the general 
case A(z). In the following, we concentrate instead on the remaining MTI protocol 
classes: B(z) and C(z).
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z M i) B(z) C(z)
-1 xa*b 1 rB +  1 rA XAlr A + x ^ r B xA lrAXslrB
0 xArB+xBrA rA + rB rArB
1 XAXsrs +XBXATA xArA + xBrB XArAXBrB
2 xa^ b + xbx^ ya x^rA +x^rB X^AX&B
: :
k XAX^rB +xBxIArA x lArA + x lBrB xArAxlBrB
Table 4.2: Exponent of shared secret in the MTI protocols
A B
rA £r %q
ZA = gc'ArA ---  — » rB Er Z q
Z B = ^ rB
z AB= / A*yr *
Figure 4.2: MTI A(z) protocol
4.5.1 General form of the MTI protocols
All MTI protocols are of the same basic form, involving the exchange of two mes­
sages, and aiming to provide implicit authentication of the resulting shared secret. 
The three classes of MTI protocols: A, B and C, differ in the precise format of the 
exchanged messages and the computation which each principal performs to derive 
the shared secret. The general form for each class is given in terms of a parame­
ter i e  Z where, for instance, B(z) is the z'th protocol of class B. For comparison, 
Table 4.2 summarises the exponent of the shared secret derived in each protocol.3 
Protocols A(z), B(z) and C(z) are given in Figures 4.2,4.3 and 4.4, respectively.
Note that the format of exchanged messages does not differ between the B(z) 
and C(z) protocols; instead, the distinction lies in the computation performed to 
derive the shared secret in each case.
It is also interesting to note that the A(z) protocols are rather different in nature 
to the B(z')/C(z) protocols. In the A(z) protocols, any message M  = g ^ rA sent by a 
principal^ is independent of both:
Reproduced from [17].
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za = / b X‘a rB e R Z q
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Figure 4.3: MTI B(z') protocol
B
I'A Ziq
—
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Figure 4.4: MTI C(z) protocol
-  the claimed identity of the sender of any previously received message,
-  the intended recipient of M.
A ’s intention to share a secret k  with a principal B is captured in the key com­
putation itself, Z^s =  z ^ y ^ ,  which makes mention of B ’s public-key, yB. (A’s 
computation of the shared secret can be interpreted as a statement of belief: at the 
point at which A performs the key computation she believes that Zab is a secret 
shared with no-one other than 5.)
The opposite is true of the B(z)/C(z) protocols, where A ’s output message, y^ A, 
is dependent on the identity of the intended recipient (B). The key computations, 
on the other hand:
-  Protocol B ( i ) :Z ^ = 4 ;VY ^
-  Protocol C(z'): ZM  = zx/ rAX‘A
are independent of the principal with whom A wishes to establish a shared secret 
since A only adds her own exponents (r^ and xa) to the received value zB. Whilst
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this difference does not appear to have security implications, it does affect the way 
in which we represent the protocols in our model.
4.5.2 M essage-templates for B(z) and C(z)
We use the message-template of Definition 4.3.5, where we define the set E  (of 
known exponents) as:
EB = Ec = E = {xc ,rc}
where xc  is the attacker C’s long-term secret-key and rc  is some random exponent 
generated by C. Note that the set EB is independent of the protocol parameter, z. 
For each z £ Z, we define the set PB{i) (of known powers of g) as follows:
PB(i) =  { l,x A,xB}
U
{Wa^a I b £ {A,B, C } ,a £  {A,B}}
The intuition behind this definition is based on several observations:
-  An attacker can query a certification authority to obtain the public-keys, g*A 
and gKB, o f A and B, respectively,
-  When a principal a = A wishes to establish a shared secret with b = B, she 
does so by sending a message with the exponent:
Xbrjta = xBrAx*A
-  Since b may choose to run the protocol with any principal, we form P  as a 
comprehension over the set {A,B, C] of principals
-  The attacker, C, is excluded from the comprehension over a since any mes­
sage of the form Xbrcxlc (b £ {A, B, C}) can be formed using the deductions 
rules of Definition 4.3.1 on the values Xb £ P B(i), xc  G EB, rc £ EB.
This definition of PB allows the attacker to learn a larger set of values than is typi­
cally assumed since it allows for the reuse of the random exponents. For instance, 
PB(i) includes the values xBrAxlA and xcrAx‘A which respectively represent a run 
between A and B and a run between A and C; the session variable, rA, is used in
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both cases. However, proving correctness in this context will enable us to conclude 
correctness in a more restricted context where r j  is used just once.
4.5.3 Reasoning about B(z)
Given an input z, a principal a in protocol B(i) computes the shared secret with 
exponent zx~l +  raxla. As noted above, a’s key computation is independent of the 
identity of the other protocol participant. The resulting key computation function 
is therefore:
We wish to prove that, for any i e  Z, k ^  maintains secrecy. The case a = C 
(representing the attacker’s key computation function) is redundant since C can 
achieve the same result using his deduction rules on the values xc, rc. We therefore 
restrict ourselves to the following goal:
Vi G Z ,a  € {A ,B}.ka^  maintains secrecy 
A first restriction
We begin by noting that, as with protocol A(0), we cannot expect the shared secret 
to be unknown to C if either^ or B actually choose to run the protocol with C. In 
such a m nA  and B will generate and send the values xcrjxA e  P®(i) and xcrsx^ e  
P3 ^), respectively, and will not maintain secrecy. We therefore consider the 
restricted set:
ptf(j) =  {^,xA,xB}
U
{xbTc^a \b ,a e  {A,B}}
A second restriction
We fix some arbitrary i £ Z and consider the case a = A, noting that analogous 
results hold for a = B. For secrecy to fail there must exist some z  = v(F \, h \) and 
k ^ \ z )  =  v{Fi,h2 ) such that:
v(Fi, h\)xA 1 +  rAxlA =  v{F2, h2)
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Consider the coefficient of ^ c ro  where p  and q are arbitrary integers:
h i { { x c ^ P , r c ^ q } )  = {
1 i ► ti\ , xa  i->  ri2,XB n i,rA X 1^ 1 i—> « 4 ,  x ^ x #  i->  n s ,
•->  « 6 , rBX1B l « 7 }
1 i—► i—> rri2,XB ^  fn3,J’AX1J ' 1 W 4 , X A rsxB h-* W 5 ,
^  ^6, ^  ^ 7 }
for some m \ , . . . ,  mq G Z, n \ , . . . ,  777 6  Z where the coefficients on both sides are the 
same:
n iix j1 + m 2+ W3 X5 XJ1 +  m4 rAxlA +  msrBxlB 
+m6XBrAxlA l +  W7rgxJhlJcJ1 +
« i +  «2*4 +  +  n ^rA^ A Y +  n 5 x a ^b x b
+ n 6 X srAx lA +  n i r Bx £ l
One solution that presents itself is =  — 1, with all other coefficients set to 0, 
resulting in:
—1 taXa +  rAxiA =  0
As with the impersonation attack on A(0), this attack exploits a scenario in which 
A runs the protocol with herself, generating the value xa a^x^. The attacker returns 
the inverse of this value, —xa^ax^, causing .4 to compute the exponent of the shared 
secret as 0  (g° — 1 ):
kB} l\-X A rAx^A) = -xavax^Xj1 +rAxiA =  0
As with A(0), this attack suggests that any implementation should ensure that the 
protocol participants are distinct. However, it is worth considering whether this is 
strictly necessary. The impersonation attack on A(0) allows the attacker to force 
the shared secret to be computed as one of a number of values. Here, the attack 
only appears to work when the resulting exponent is 0  (i.e., the attacker cannot 
inject his own value into the shared secret). We formalise this in the property of
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non-degenerate-key secrecy:
Definition 4.5.1 (non-degenerate-key secrecy) Given a system defined by E and 
P, a key computation function k  maintains non-degenerate-key secrecy iff:
Vm.realisable{m) A k{m) fiO  =$■ ->realisable(k(m))
non-degenerate-key secrecy is weaker than the secrecy property of Definition 4.3.17 
since it disregards cases where the exponent of the shared secret is computed as 0 . 
Note that this definition does not prevent the exponent of values passing on the 
network from being 0 .
Results
Restricting the output of k ^  to non-zero values translates to a constraint on the 
coefficients of v(F2 ,h2): that at least one has to be initialised to a non-zero value. 
Under this constraint, it can be shown that the key computation function ka ^  main­
tains non-degenerate-key secrecy, given EB and P'B:
Theorem 4.5.2 Given EB = {rc,xc} and P,B(i) =  ( 1  ,xa,xb}
U
{xbra^a | b ,a e { A ,B } }
Vz e  Z, a G { A f f } . k ^  maintains non-degenerate-key secrecy.
Proof We fix some arbitrary z € Z and consider the case a = A, (an analogous 
result holds for a = B). For non-degenerate secrecy to fail there must exist some 
z =  v{Fx, h\) and k ^  (z) =  v(F2, h2) such that:
v(Fi, hi )x2 1 +  rAx \  =  v ( F 2 , h2)
where v(F2, h2) f  0. The constraint that the resulting secret be non-zero means that 
there must exist at least one non-zero coefficient in v(F2 :h2). Let p  e  Z, q e  Z be 
the powers ofxc and rc (respectively) in v(F2, h2) in which a non-zero coefficient 
occurs, the coefficient of jcpcrqc , wherep  and q are arbitrary integers:
h i { { x c ^ p ,r c ^ q } )  = {
1 ^  ” l ,x A n2 ,XB n 2 ,r Ax ' 2 l «4, xA r s x lB i-> n s ,  
XBrAXA ■-> Z26, rBx l£ l i * n 2}
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h {{xc '-> p sc '-+ q }) = {
1 i ► m\,xA t-> m2 ,xB >-*■ W3 ,rjx^+1 m4, xArBxlB >-» ms,
* s r ^  ^  ^ 6 , rs * ? 1 ^  ^ 7 }
for some m \, . . . ,  7M7 6  Z, 721, . . . ,  727 G Z where the coefficients on both sides are the 
same:
m\xA l +  m2  +  m s x ^ 1 +  m47 ^  +  m5rBx^
+m6xBrAxlA l + m2rBx £ lxAl +rAx lA
n\ +  +  m*B +  n4 rAxlA l +  n$xArBxlB
+n&cBrAxlA +  n1 rBx 1^ 1
One of « i , . . . ,  « 7  must be non-zero; let this coefficient be nr . There is no value of 
the coefficient nr which can enable the equality to be met. For example, if  nr = 774, 
then the component nrrAx'A l is distinct from all terms on either side of the equation.
As a result, we conclude that, for any i e  Z, ka^  (z) is unrealisable (under the 
assumption that (z) 4  0), and the theorem holds. □
4.5.4 Reasoning about C(z)
The C(z) protocols involve the same exchange of messages as the class B protocols; 
the difference lies in the key computation. In an ideal run of C(z'), each principal 
computes the key:
_  gfyje^rB
In our model, a principal a, on receipt of an input z, will perform the following key 
computation:
Following the approach that we used for B(z'), we consider whether there exist 
realisable values, v(F \,h\) (whose coefficients are represented by subscripted m 
values) and v(F2 , h2) (represented by subscripted n values), such that:
ka^l\v (F i,h i) )= v (F i,h i)x a =  v(F2 ,h2)
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To exclude cases where honest principals willingly engage with the attacker, we 
define the P  set as per the first restriction in the B(z') analysis, above. Specifically, 
we have that:
P C(i] = {1,*U,x*}
U
{W t^a  I b’aG
We also define Ec = EB = {xc,rc}- As before, we fix a = A  and consider the 
coefficients ofx?crqc , for arbitrary integersp  and q. For secrecy to fail, the following 
equality must hold:
m\xA l rAxlA +  m2XjXj 1 rAxlA +  mixBxA1 rAx'A +  m ^ j x ^ x J 1 rAx \
+m5xA rBX^xJ1 rAx lA +  m6xBrAxlAxA 1 rAx \  +  m'jrBx £ 1x J 1 rAxA
n\ +  ri2XA +  n&B +  mrAxlA l +  n5XArBx'B 
+n6XBrAxtA + n 7rBx g 1
In contrast to the A(z) and B(z) protocols, the left-hand side of the above equation 
does not contain any component that is not multiplied by an m coefficient. This 
arises from the difference in key computation between A(z)/B(z) and C(z'). In the 
former cases, the key computation relies on the multiplication of two elements 
of G, and results in the presence of addition in the exponent of the shared secret 
(g* • ^  = S?+y)- I11 the latter case, the key is computed by exponentiating the re­
ceived value, and the exponent of the shared secret is therefore a simple product 
((g^Y =  g^). For this reason, the above equation can be solved, very simply, by 
setting all coefficients to 0, resulting in 0 =  0. This solution corresponds to a well- 
known attack on standard Diffie-Hellman, where the attacker simply replaces the 
exchanged values, zA and zB, with g° =  1. The principals then compute the shared 
secret:
Z^B =  1 xA rA^A = =  1
which is realisable by the attacker. This attack can be prevented in a straightforward 
manner; each principal must check incoming messages and reject those which have 
the degenerate value g° = 1. This translates to a constraint on the coefficients of 
v(Fj,/z2 ): that at least one has to be initialised to a non-zero value. We formalise
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this property in the concept of non-degenerate-input secrecy'.
Definition 4.5.3 (non-degenerate-input secrecy) Given a system defined by E and 
P, a key computation function k maintains non-degenerate-input secrecy iff:
\/m.realisable(m) A m f0 = >  -irealisable(k(m))
Note the difference between the three definitions of secrecy that we have introduced 
in this chapter—the first (secrecy) is unconstrained; the second (non-degenerate- 
key secrecy) looks at cases where the exponent of the value output by the key 
computation function is non-zero; the third (non-degenerate-input-secrecy) looks 
at cases where the exponent of the value input to the key computation function is 
non-zero.
Results
C(i)It can be shown that the key computation function ka maintains non-degenerate- 
input secrecy, given EB and P,B:
Theorem 4.5.4 Given Ec = {rc,xc} and P c (i) =  {1 ,xA,xB}
U
{xiTctfa I bia e
\ti e Z ,  a e  {.A,B}.ka  ^  maintains non-degenerate-input secrecy.
Proof The argument used in this proof is similar to that used in the proof of 
Theorem 4.5.2. We consider whether there exist realisable values, v(F\ ,h\) (whose 
coefficients are represented by subscripted m values) and v(F2 , hf) (represented by 
subscripted n values), such that k a ^ \v {F \fi\) )  — v{F2 ,hi). Specifically, we fix 
some arbitrary i e  Z, a = A, and consider the coefficients of x?crqc  f°r arbitrary 
integers p  and q. For secrecy to fail, the following equality must hold:
mixAlrAxIA+m2XAx f lrAxlA+mi,xBxAlrAx1A+m4rAxlA 1x f lrAxIA 
+m5XArBXiBx2lrAXlA +  m6xBrAxlAx2 lrAxlA -\-m’jrB^ lX jl rAxiA
n\ +  n2xA +  n3xB +  n^rAx 1^ 1 +  n5xArBxlB 
+n&cBrAxlA +  n-jrsx1^ 1
In the case of non-degenerate-input secrecy, we only consider cases where one 
of the m coefficients has a non-zero value. Since each component of the linear
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combination is distinct from all others (on either side of the equation), there can be 
no values of the coefficients which cause the equality to hold in all interpretations. 
We can therefore conclude that the theorem holds. □
4.6 Discussion
4.6.1 Summary o f results
The three classes of MTI protocols are conceptually similar, yet the security results 
yielded by our model are subtly different in each case:
A(0
The model of the A (i) protocol maintains the secrecy of the shared secret if  the run 
involves distinct, and honest, protocol participants. If a principal is willing to run 
the protocol with herself an attacker can manipulate that run to learn the (possibly 
non-degenerate) session-key s.
B(0
The B(z') protocol maintains the secrecy of the shared secret if  the run involves 
honest protocol participants, and each rejects any shared secrets computed as 1 
(i.e., when the exponent of the shared secret is 0). Note, in particular, that this does 
not preclude situations where a principal runs the protocol with herself.
C(0
The C(z) protocol maintains the secrecy of the shared secret if  the run involves 
honest protocol participants and each rejects incoming values of 1 (i.e., g°). If a 
principal is willing to accept 1 as an input to the key computation function she will 
compute a shared secret (Z a b  =  1) which is known to the attacker.
4.6.2 The link with rank functions
Although we have not described our approach in such terms, it shares a conceptual 
origin with the notion of a rank function. A rank function, recall, partitions the 
message-space of a protocol by assigning a rank of pub to public and sec to secret 
messages. In the previous chapter we demonstrated how the CSP/rank approach 
could be extended to incorporate some low-level properties of Diffie-Hellman key
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agreement. However, a fundamental difficulty with that approach was the necessity 
to statically assign a rank to messages. It is interesting to note that the present 
work side-steps this issue by defining (via the message-template) the set Pub of 
public messages. This set corresponds to the set of messages assigned a rank of 
pub by the rank approach.4 One could extend the analogy by defining the set 
Sec, of secret messages, as the range of a given key computation function (whose 
input is restricted to values in Pub). The set Sec would then correspond to the set 
of messages assigned a rank of sec by a rank function. In this view secrecy is 
maintained if  the sets Pub and Sec contain no common elements.
4.6.3 Pereira and Q uisquater’s approach
Previously, Pereira and Quisquater [97] developed a formal model of the Cliques 
conference key agreement protocols [10], based on linear logic, and discovered 
attacks on each of the claimed security properties. In the model, secrecy is defined 
as the inability of an attacker to discover a pair of values such that, if
a principal is sent g*, he will compute the key gy. Values are assumed to take 
the form of g  raised to a product of exponents, and secrecy becomes the inability 
of an attacker to learn a pair of messages separated by the ratio The model 
allows the attacker to grow a set of known ratios, in the hope that some secret 
ratio(s) remain unobtainable. This ratio-centric view of secrecy seems particularly 
natural for Diffie-Hellman exchanges, and our initial attempts at modelling the MTI 
protocols sought to embrace this approach. However, it turns out that this view of 
secrecy does not generalise in the obvious way. Consider, for example, a value z  
in the A(0) protocol, and the key computation function (z) = zxj -j-x^rj. The 
ratio between (z) and z:
is still in terms of z, due to the presence of addition in the exponents. This fact 
makes it difficult to derive the set of secret ratios, since a ratio cannot be stated 
without recourse to the argument to the key computation function. The present 
work can be viewed as an attempt to provide a more general view of Diffie-Hellman 
key computation.
In a different respect, Pereira’s and Quisquater’s model is more general than 
ours, since it applies to protocols which provides services, in which protocol par­
4In fact, Pub is similar to Heather’s concept of a minimal rank function [58].
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ticipants receive a message, perform some computation on that message and send 
out the result. These services are encoded in terms of the values added to the ex­
ponent of an incoming message. For instance, a principal may receive a message 
gx and generate and send the message g®2 (where y  and z  are known to that princi­
pal). The attacker can then (with some restrictions) use the principal as an oracle, 
enabling him to send a spurious message gc and receive g0?2 in return. One could 
envisage weakening the assumptions of the current work by internalising such ser­
vices in the attacker (in the style of Broadfoot and Roscoe[22]) where, for example, 
the multiplication of a value withyz is encoded as an additional attacker deduction. 
The message-template would need to be redesigned to account for these additional 
capabilities. In contrast to the present work, such a message-template would tend 
to be protocol specific.
4.6.4 Assumptions and attacks
In light of the above, some care is needed in establishing the assumptions upon 
which our proofs of the the MTI protocols are based.
Consider the three assumptions of Section 4.3. These assumptions are nec­
essary, since attacks exist when one or more of them are relaxed. For example, 
Menezes et al. [84] discovered an unknown key-share attack on all classes of the 
MTI protocols under the assumption that an attacker can register a public-key yc  
which is related to A 's public-key by the equation yc  = y ^  = g*AXc- However, C 
does not know the corresponding secret key (in violation of Assumption 4.3.2).5 
As another example, Lim and Lee devised attacks which apply to MTI variants 
[71]. These attacks depend on the attacker sending a value to an honest princi­
pal B  which is not in the group G, and so violates the Assumption 4.3.1. Lastly, 
Burmester proposed an attack which requires the attacker, C, to run the protocol 
with both A and B and later induce A and B to reveal the keys used in sessions 
between them [25]. This violates Assumption 4.3.3.
These attacks are computational in flavour, and it is not clear whether a sym­
bolic approach should seek to reason about such attacks. It is clear, however, that 
care should be taken—when claiming a proof of correctness—to state the assump­
tions on which that proof is founded.
5 However, it is not clear that this attack actually violates implicit key authentication. Furthermore, 
as noted in [17], the importance of unknown key-share attacks is questionable as there exist well- 
understood methods of prevention.
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4.7 Conclusion and further work
We have presented a framework for reasoning about secrecy in a class of Diffie- 
Hellman protocols, and demonstrated the approach by a consideration of secrecy 
in the MTI protocols. The work hinges around the idea of a message-template, a 
term which defines, in a highly abstract way, the values that can be deduced by 
an attacker under a given set of capabilities. A protocol model is given as a com­
bination of a message-template and a function representing the key computation 
applied by a principal to derive a shared secret.
This work is nascent, but we are currently applying it to protocols beyond the 
MTI suite. In particular, we have used the approach to reason about two further 
key agreement protocols: one proposed independently by Just and Vaudenay [67] 
and Song and Kim [111], and another due to Ateniese, Steiner and Tsudik [10]; 
in both cases we can apply our approach without modification. Other protocols, 
however, may prompt us to extend the approach. The key establishment protocol 
of Agnew, Mullin and Vanstone, for instance [9], makes use of messages of the 
form g* -y, where y  is an integer (and not a group element). This is inexpressible in 
our current model where we are limited to messages expressible as g  raised to the 
power of a sum of products of integers. Relaxing the restrictions on our algebra to 
allow the expression of such messages seems particularly interesting. The consid­
eration of further protocols (such as Cliques) may require us to address situations in 
which protocol participants provide services. In many cases, this extension appears 
straightforward.
The ad hoc nature of the secrecy proof in Section 4.4 is unfortunate, and it 
would be useful to derive a general framework for such proof (as is achieved in 
[97], for instance). There also appears to be interesting links between the idea 
of a message-template and the concept of ideal used within the strand space ap­
proach [114]. Future work will investigate whether this correspondence enables us 
to deduce general principles with which a protocol can be proven correct.
Chapter 5
Global reasoning and 
message-orientation
Cervesato et al. [30] argue that authentication and secrecy are proven using very different methods: the former being established via local reasoning about the order in which events occur and the latter by global reasoning on 
the impossibility that a given value can be discovered. Based on this, they propose 
a logic of authentication that honours this separation of concerns: their proofs of 
authentication encapsulate secrecy as an assumption.
Such a clear division between authentication and secrecy is not present in the 
rank approach. The rank framework, recall, was originally conceived to reason 
about authentication goals. By adapting the approach, we have ended up viewing 
secrecy as a special case of authentication (Section 2.4), and verify such properties 
via ‘local reasoning’. This can be attributed to at least two (interdependent) factors:
-  The goal of the rank approach is to reduce a condition on an entire system 
to conditions on the individual components of that system. This guides us 
towards a verification technique which reasons, separately and locally, about 
each agent in the system.
-  The CSP protocol models are structured in terms of the individual agents of 
the system, which enables us to reason cleanly about the individual compo­
nents. We term this the agent-oriented approach.
When considering secrecy, we are seldom concerned with the ordering of events 
(in contrast to the correspondence assertions used for authentication), but only with
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the question of whether certain values can become publicly known. Such was the 
case with the MU-Puzzle of Chapter 1 where the pertinent question surrounded 
the theorem-hood or non-theorem-hood of particular strings. In that chapter we 
presented a message-oriented model of the system in which the oracle (essentially 
the attacker of the security context) had internalised the deduction rules and ‘played 
the game’ according to those rules. The reasoning subsequently used to conclude 
that the puzzle was unsolvable was distinctly more global in nature.
It is interesting to consider that a message-oriented model leads us to apply 
global reasoning to verify a particular property; an agent-oriented model, con­
versely, leads us to verify properties using local reasoning. To further highlight 
the difference between local and global reasoning, contrast the agent-oriented ap­
proach used for the Cliques protocols in Chapter 3 and the message-oriented ap­
proach taken for the MTI protocols in Chapter 4; the message-oriented model had 
a simplicity that was entirely absent from the CSP model of Cliques.
In this chapter we begin with a premise: that the message-oriented/global rea­
soning approach is a useful paradigm for reasoning about secrecy properties, lead­
ing to simple models and meaningful proofs. We then sketch a CSP modelling 
strategy for achieving message-oriented protocol models via the internalisation of 
protocol behaviour within the attacker. We also discuss Heather’s rank algorithm 
and claim that it can profitably be viewed as a form of internalisation. As a result 
we suggest that a separation of rank functions from the underlying CSP may be 
amicably achieved.
5.1 Internalisation
The idea of internalisation, promoted by Broadfoot and Roscoe [22], is based 
around the subsumption of all, or part, of a protocol participant’s role into the 
model of the attacker. Their motivation for doing so lies in the limitations of anal­
ysis techniques based on model-checking.
The use of the model-checker FDR [48] in exploring the state-space of a CSP 
protocol model forms the basis of a well-established, and successful, analysis 
framework. This approach benefits from good tool support. Since the construction 
of a CSP protocol model is largely routine, the Casper compiler [76] was devel­
oped to automate this process. Furthermore, if a check in FDR fails, a trace which 
violates the desired property is returned to the user: this trace corresponds to an 
attack on the protocol. However, the approach suffers from the drawback inherent
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in state-exploration approaches: only a finite protocol model can be checked and, 
for practical purposes, this will tend to limit the model to a small number of pro­
tocol runs involving a small number of principals. Whilst consideration of a single 
protocol run is often sufficient to uncover attacks, it is generally insufficient for 
concluding the correctness of the protocol on a larger (or unbounded) network.1 In 
recognition of this limitation, Broadfoot and Roscoe have developed an approach, 
based on the internalisation of principal roles within the attacker, which achieves 
two goals:
1. it reduces the state-space of a protocol model, and
2. allows attacks to be captured which require an arbitrary degree of paral­
lelism.
The approach proceeds by extending the syntax of b to allow deductions which in­
troduce fresh variables. This extension allows protocol steps (performed by honest 
principals) to be encoded as attacker deductions. For example, the deduction:
defines the deduction which, given a set S  of facts, will produce a set of messages 
M  which makes use of the fresh variables For example, consider the fol­
lowing protocol steps:
1. A -> B : {n}KAB
2. B -> A : {n,k}KAB
denoting the transmission of a fresh key k  from B to A under a shared symmetric- 
key K ab (following a challenge involving the nonce ri). When we internalise this 
protocol step, we need to capture the fact that, having received { n } ^ ,  B will pro­
duce a new message {«, k} i n v o l v i n g  a fresh session-variable k. This is encoded 
as follows:
(*)>{{”} £ * } !-{ { ” > fck*}
By proceeding in this manner, the behaviour of all, or part, of a principal’s be­
1 As we will mention in Chapter 7, however, Lowe [77] has derived a series of conditions on a 
protocol model whose achievement allows the conclusion of correctness on an unbounded network 
from correctness on a small (single-run) network.
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haviour can be embedded in the attacker model.2
Although Broadfoot and Roscoe’s approach applies to the verification of both 
authentication and secrecy, the approach—when taken to its extreme—results in a 
message-oriented protocol model. This model centres around the attacker, whose 
abilities, defined by b, are not confined to the standard Dolev-Yao deductions, but 
also include the ability to run steps performed by protocol participants. In this 
model, the attacker can be seen as an oracle, who ‘plays the game’ in the hope 
of deducing a message intended as secret. (This idea of the attacker as an oracle 
informs the choice of process name, ORACLE m u , used in Chapter 1.)
Broadfoot and Roscoe’s internalisation is motivated by the limitations of state- 
exploration tools; the rank function technique does not suffer from such limitations. 
Nonetheless, by co-opting the syntax of internalisation we may hit upon a strategy 
for creating oracle-like protocol models; such models (like ORACLE m u )  are inher­
ently message-oriented.
5.2 An internalisation strategy for secrecy
In this section we show how, using the syntax of Broadfoot and Roscoe, we can 
devise an internalisation strategy for a rank function verification. Consider the 
Needham-Schroeder protocol from Chapter 2:
1. A ^  B : {A-riA}pK(B)
2. B —» A : {rtA-k}pK{A)
3 . A ^  B : {k}pK(B)
Following the notation of Section 2.2, Figure 5.1 describes a CSP model which is 
appropriate for reasoning about the secrecy of the session-key k. Specifically, we 
aim to prove that:
NET  sa t secret { k \ k e  Km]
for specific, but arbitrary, honest principals^ and B.
2In practice, of course, the situation is not so simple. The particular internalisation strategy that 
Broadfoot and Roscoe propound may introduce false attacks, and extra machinery is required to 
prevent this from occurring. This issue is important, but incidental to the aims of this chapter, and 
we postpone its consideration until future work.
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INITi(j,n) =
trans.i.j.{i ■ n}PK{j)
n t.KEYr e c A j - t i  ‘ n ■ * W )  
-> trans.i.j.{k}PK{j)
—> Stop
RESPj{i,k) =
a „ m N C E r e c -j-i - { i - n } ! ‘m  
-> trans.j.i.{j■ n • k}PK^
rec.j.i.{k}PK{j)
n-HONC
I N I T > =  \ \ \ r .u SER \ \ l . n t I N I T ^ n )
RESP>=\\\j:VSER\KRESP^ k)
NET =  J (| i:USER (INITj HI i^ESP,) |[{| trans,rec \}\\ENEMY
Ij\USER  III i
Figure 5.1: CSP model for secrecy in Needham-Schroeder-Lowe
5.2.1 Case analysis
In performing a rank function verification we are required to show that each of the 
user processes maintains the rank. In searching for a rank function, we can begin 
by decomposing NET with a view to deriving the individual cases. This step is 
useful, because the trace semantics of CSP tell us that, to prove that a process 111P,- 
maintains the rank, it is sufficient to show that each individual P,- maintains the 
rank.
-  Case 1: All initiators other than A:
TNITq =  | | | i:USER\{A}
j:USER
— Case 2: A as initiator, but not with B:
INITa o =  | | |
Ij:USER\{B} I 11 n:NjijJNITA(J,n)
-  Case 3: A as initiator with B :
INITa (B, n)INITab
-  Case 4: All responders other than B:
RESPo = | | | j:USER\{B}
i-.USER
k^ R E S pj(i,k)
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-  Case 5: B as responder but not with A:
RESPbo = 11I/jkser^} 11 \keKB.RESPB(a,k)
-  Case 6: B as responder wither
The intention is for:
|||tBSH(ZM7i|||MSP,)
INITo III INITao \1\INITab ||| RESPq ||| RESPbo ||| RESPba
We have not singled out a particular run, but all runs involving A as initiator and 
B as responder. To prove the secrecy result it is sufficient to show that each of the 
above processes maintains the rank.
5.2.2 Generating the proof obligations
It remains to show that each of the following processes maintain the rank:
1. INITj(j , n), for / ^  A , n £ N,y
2. INITa (/',«), for /  ^  B, n £
3. INITa {B,ti), for n £ N^g
4. RESPj(i, k), for B ,k e  K[p
5. R E S P B ( i , k ) ,  for i ^ A , k £  Kg,
6. RESPb {A, k) for k £ Kba
For each of these we need to show that, whenever a rank pub message is received, 
the next message to be sent also has a rank of pub. Typically, this condition— 
m ain ta in s  p—would be proven, independently, for each of the processes by appeal 
to the library of CSP proof rules given in Figure 2.4. Here, however, we convert 
each of the above processes into a series of b clauses, each representing a single 
rec-trans step for a single user. We call such a step a service. If a principal sends
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a message without having previously received a message then we call it a starting 
service. The syntax for a service is as follows:
S\~m
which means that, if all messages in S  are known then the message m with fresh 
variables t \ , . . . , t n can be produced. Note that, as a simplification of Broadfoot’s 
and Roscoe’s syntax, we consider the output m as a single message rather than a 
set.
5.2.3 Deduction clauses
We now consider how each of the above CSP processes can be realised using b:
-  Initiator (1)
INITj(j,n) =
trans.i.j.{n • i}PK(J)
n k:KEYreC-i-J-in ' k^K({)
—> trans.i.j.{k}PKfi
—> Stop
The transmission {n • i}pK(j) is not preceded by a rec event, marking it out as a 
starting service; a principal can send this message without any prior input. In this 
case, the fresh nonce n is produced. The second service involves the transmission 
of {k}px(j) given previous knowledge of both {n • z'} PK^  and (the received message) 
{n • k}pK^ . Note the use of pattern-matching to ensure that the nonce sent as a 
challenge in the first service matches the one received in the subsequent response. 
This results in the following deduction clauses:
(«),{} b {n -i}PKQ (for any i ^ A )  
{«■%*(/)} h {k)pK(j) (for any i ^  A)
Implicit in this definition is the fact that n e  N,y.
-  Initiator (2)
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INITA(j,n) =
trans.A.j.{n-A}pK^
~ * n k:KEYreC-A j-{ n ' k}pK(A)
-► trans.A.j.{k}PK{j)
—> Stop 
This results in:
(«> ,{} h { n - A } P K { j )  (for any B) 
( ) , { { n - A } p K { J ) , { n - k } p K {A ) }  h {fc}p*(/) (for any yY  5)
-  Initiator (3)
INITA{B,n) =
trans.A.B.{n •A}pxib)
—> .S'/op 
This results in:
(«),{} h {n-A}PK{B)
{ ) , { { ” ' A ]  PK{B),{n 'k}pK{A)}  1“ WPKCB)
-  Responder (4)
RESPj(i, k) =
a „Ji0NCEre c -j-i ^ n - i^ m
—> trans.j.i.{n • k}PK^
-»• rec.j.i.{k}PK{j)
—> S/op
This results in:
(£),{{«-aW(z,)} h {w^}pjc(a) (for any jV  5)
-  Responder (5)
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RESPB(i,k) =
D „.NONCEreC -B -i - i n - i ^ m  
—> trans.B.i.{n • k)PK^
rec.B.i.{k}pK{B)
—> Stop
This results in:
(£},{{« -i}pK{S)} I" {n-k}pK(i) (for any i ^  A)
-  Responder (6)
RESPB{A,k) =
^n-UONCEr e c 'B ‘^ ■ { n  - A } p k {E)
—► trans.B.A.{n-k}pK(A)
-> rec.B.A.{k}PK{B)
—► -S/op
This results in:
(£>,{{«-^}p*(2?)} I"
5.2.4 The oracle-based model
The case analysis of the previous section identified nine deductions necessary to 
represent the behaviour of honest protocol participants. If we extend b to include 
the attacker deductions of Figure 2.1 then we arrive at the following (message- 
oriented) oracle process:
ORACLEns = ORACLEns{IIK)
ORACLEns(S) = U m^ mtrans.m
—> ORACLENs(S\j{m })
To prove correctness, it will be sufficient to show that (i) the set IIK  only con­
tains messages of rank pub, (ii) each clause of b maintains the rank, (iii) the set KBj  
has rank sec.3 In this case we would expect the search for a suitable rank function
3Note that we have not stated a rank theorem for this model and, for brevity, we refrain from 
doing so. However, it should be clear that the three informally stated conditions are suffi cient to 
guarantee the secrecy of keys in Kba-
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p({w-£W (i))
p ( K 0 W ( / )
p(n)
p w
sec  ifw  G Ay'^-S 
pub otherwise 
sec  i f  k e Kba Ai=£A
pub otherwise 
sec  if k e Kba 
pub otherwise 
sec  ifnG N U #  
pub otherwise
sec  i f k e K B A A j ^ B  
pub otherwise
Figure 5.2: Needham-Schroeder protocol: candidate rank function for secrecy
to end in failure (since the Needham-Schroeder protocol is flawed), and indeed it 
does. The relevant fragment of a candidate rank function (which is sufficient to 
unearth the Lowe attack) is given in Figure 5.2.
Consider the following deduction:
(),{{« -A}pK(j),{n-k}PK{A)} {k}pK(j)
(for any j  ^  B). For this deduction we need to show that any message derivable 
from messages of rank pub should also have a rank of pub:
P ( K ^ W ( / ) )  =  pub A p ({«• k } p K ( A )) =  pub p({fc}P*(/)) =  pub 
But, if j  — E  (the attacker), n = N  G and k = K  G Kba we have: 
p({jV-^4}p£(£)) =  pub
P({iV--£}pj^)) =  Pub
P({-^}p^(C)) — sec
This failure of the candidate rank function leads us to the Lowe attack. Lowe’s fix 
to the protocol (the inclusion of f  s identity in message 2) results in a different set
but:
5.3 Discussion 115
of cases. In particular, for the initiator’s final service (message 3) we get:
(>5{R O p * (/)5{/-h-£W (/)} {k}pK(j)
{),{{n-A }pK(j) ,{/'•«• k}PK{A)} b {k}PK{j) ( j ^ B )
0  i { { n ' A } p K { B ) ) { B - n 'k}pK{A)}  ^  { k}pK(B)
It turns out that this adapted model can be verified using a rank function, en­
abling us to conclude the secrecy of all keys in the set Kba  •
5.3 Discussion
There is a difference in emphasis between the message-oriented model presented 
here, and the agent-oriented model of Chapter 2. Namely, the earlier approach 
requires an extra proof obligation on the rank function: that each agent preserves 
the rank. This proof obligation is the heart of the local reasoning required by that 
approach. The internal approach promoted in this chapter has no concept of an 
agent, and thus no need for a proof obligation on agent behaviour. This difference 
is more than cosmetic. The proof obligation on agent processes is typically proven 
on the CSP process itself, by appeal to a library of specialised proof rules (Figure 
2.4). In contrast, the proof obligation on the b clause requires no such knowledge 
of CSP. Whether this approach leads to a simpler proof is a matter of opinion.
In the classic approach, the CSP model of a protocol can be seen as an in­
termediary step whose purpose is to facilitate the derivation of proof obligations 
on a putative rank function. In the approach presented here we still use the agent- 
oriented CSP; in this case, as a platform from which to derive the message-oriented 
oracle process. This need not be the case. It is perfectly feasible for the clauses 
of the deduction relation, b, to be derived (under certain assumptions) from the in­
formal protocol description. Whilst we stop short of proposing such a mechanism 
here, we note that this would enable a protocol analyser to conduct a rank function 
verification without requiring him to comprehend the underlying CSP. This has 
interesting links with Heather’s rank algorithm.
5.3.1 Heather’s rank algorithm
Traditionally, the performance of a rank function verification consists of three 
phases: (i) express the protocol in CSP, (ii) define a candidate rank function, 
and (iii) verify that the rank function meets the conditions of the central theorem. 
Whilst the construction of a protocol model and the verification of a rank function
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are largely routine, the task offinding a suitable rank function can require some in­
genuity. Furthermore, it is not clear what conclusions can be drawn when a suitable 
rank function cannot be found. In response to these difficulties, Heather [58, 61] 
developed an algorithm which, for certain protocols, automates the construction of 
a rank function. A prototype implementation of this technique is found in the Rank- 
Analyser tool, which provides push-button verification of authentication properties 
for protocols expressed in a simple, high-level, notation.4
Unsurprisingly, Heather’s algorithm does not yield an arbitrary rank function, 
but a very specific one: p_, the minimal 1-set rank function. This rank function as­
signs a rank of pub only where absolutely necessary, and a rank of sec  everywhere 
else. The concept of a minimal function is based on the following observations:
1. Everything initially known to the attacker should have a rank of pub,
2. Any message generable from messages of rank pub should have rank pub,
3. The principals should only transmit messages of rank pub if  they only receive 
messages of rank pub.
4. All messages in the set T should have rank sec.
Conditions 1-3 define all messages that must have rank pub; all other messages 
may safely be assigned a rank of sec. If the first three conditions do not force 
anything in T  to have rank pub then p_ is a rank function. More importantly, 
however, if  we are compelled to assign a rank of pub to some t e  T, then we may 
conclude that no rank function exists, since p_ assigns a rank of pub only where 
absolutely necessary.
The minimal rank function is constructed by enumerating the set of messages 
that a protocol makes public. This is achieved by introducing a relation, —►, to 
represent the steps performed by protocol participants. We write S —>m(S leads to 
m) if one of the CSP processes representing a protocol participant can transmit m 
having taken inputs only from the set S. Furthermore, we write S ^  m (S gives m) 
if  either S  b m or S  —> m, and define a priming operation to represent the knowledge 
gained by performing deductions from a particular knowledge set:
& = S U {m \S ~ > m }
4RankAnalyser is described in [58], but, at the time of writing, does not appear to be publicly 
available.
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The minimal rank function is given as the characteristic function of the set X, 
defined as:
x  = ur=o^-
where:
X 0 = IIK
Xn+i =  X!n
Specifically, we have that p i 1 [{pub}] = X  (where p i 1 [{pub}] is the set of mes­
sages to which p_ assigns a rank of pub). Typically, the iterative process will 
not reach a fixed point, precluding this definition from being used to enumerate 
a rank function. However, Heather circumvents these problems, firstly by con­
sidering only those messages that could ever appear in the protocol (limiting, for 
instance, the length of concatenations), and secondly by renaming nonces and prin­
cipal identities to a finite set of normal forms. Both of these steps are guaranteed 
to (i) preserve the faults of the full protocol model, and (ii) not introduce any new 
faults. As noted by Evans [44], this normalisation procedure shares similarities 
with techniques related to data independence [101].
5.3.2 The link with internalisation
In this chapter, our interest in Heather’s approach lies primarily in the representa­
tion of protocol steps using the leads to relation, — In particular, we believe that 
—> can profitably be viewed as an internalisation relation.
Assume Xp is the enumeration (using the above approach) of messages made 
public in some protocol, P. Consider the representation of P  in terms of the ora­
cle process above; call it ORACLEp. In an intuitive sense Xp is a fixed point of 
ORACLEp, since, for any deduction Xp b m that the process ORACLEp(Xp) can 
perform, it will already be the case that m G Xp. As with the recursive definition 
of Xp, ORACLEp grows the set of messages made public by P. The use of leads 
to, as with the extension to the syntax of I- results in an internalisation of the agent 
roles. In both cases this leads us to a procedure which can enumerate the set of 
public messages. Whereas we have promoted a way of reasoning about a result­
ing knowledge set of (potentially) infinite size, Heather must restrict himself to a 
finite subset of the message-space. (Nonetheless, Heather’s Unitary restriction is
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guaranteed not to lose any attacks.)
Both Heather’s approach, and ours, can be viewed as internalisation strategies, 
and both offer the potential to conduct a rank function verification without recourse 
to CSP. To be sure, RankAnalyser offers full automation of the rank function gener­
ation, whereas our approach still requires ingenuity in constructing a suitable rank 
function. Since RankAnalyser deals only with the case of authentication, our strat­
egy can be seen as providing a similar treatment for secrecy. More importantly, our 
message-oriented view can remain in terms of a CSP oracle process, as is achieved 
by Broadfoot and Roscoe, who have extended the C asper compiler to support their 
internalisation strategy. This leads us to suggest that the two strands—Heather’s 
rank algorithm and the CSP internalisation strategy—might converge in a FDR- 
based technique for performing a rank function verification. This would require 
that the (safe) finitary restrictions of Heather’s approach be lifted to our model. 
However, the implementation of such a system would not appear to be technically 
demanding, and would provide a finite-state-exploration technique that allows us 
to conclude secrecy properties of an infinite-state system.
5.4 Conclusion
This discursive chapter has sought to establish the efficacy of message-oriented 
protocol models when considering secrecy properties. In particular, we have shown 
how an agent-oriented CSP protocol model can be re-oriented into the message- 
based view. We have also proposed that a scheme may be developed whereby 
a rank function verification can be carried out by someone with no knowledge of 
CSP. We have drawn parallels between our approach and Heather’s rank algorithm, 
and have speculated that the two approaches could converge in an implementation 
of the rank approach within the CSP model-checker FDR.
Chapter 6
On the meaning of a rank 
function
There are at least two ways in which the concept of a rank function may profitably be described. In one sense, a rank function specifies the parti­tion of a protocol’s message-space into sets of public and secret messages; 
secrecy is achieved if  the resulting sets are disjoint. In another sense, a rank func­
tion is the statement of an invariant which all protocol messages satisfy; as long 
as the ‘secret’ messages fail to satisfy this invariant, secrecy is preserved. In the 
context of protocol verification, rank functions were conceived in this latter con­
text [105], based on message invariants, a fact which attests to the original author’s 
grounding in formal methods. The alternative view arises from subsequent work 
by Heather [61], who saw rank functions as being defined by the enumeration of 
a single set of public messages. (In this approach the set of secrets is implicitly 
defined as the complement of the public set.)
These two views of rank functions are complementary, but experience suggests 
that a practitioner seeking to reason about a protocol’s correctness will approach 
the construction of a rank function with just one of these views in mind. We be­
lieve this apparent dichotomy to be no more than a matter of perception, and its 
consideration leads us to pose a fundamental question: what is a rankfunction?
In this chapter we aim to progress towards an answer by championing a view 
of rank functions that encourages us to disregard the false distinction between the 
invariant and enumerated-set views. Whilst this is carried out in the context of 
the MU-Puzzle of Chapter 1, it is important to note that, with some change in 
terminology, the arguments apply equally well to the case of security protocols.
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6.1 Minimality and maximality
In Chapter 1 we used the MU-Puzzle to introduce the concepts of a rank function 
and rank theorem. The MU-Puzzle talks about a start string (or axiom), (M,7), and 
a series of rewrite rules which can be used to derive the theorems of the system. The 
goal of the puzzle is to determine whether (M, U) is a theorem of the system, and 
we were able to show, using a rank function, that (M, U) is, in fact, a non-theorem.
Let Mm u  be the message-space of the MU-Puzzle (the set of sequences over 
the alphabet {M,I, U}) and fix some rank function p over Mm u - We then define 
Mjj^ to be the set of rank sec, and the set of rank pub, messages:
Definition 6.1.1
=  {m £ Mm7 I p H  =  sec} 
mM7 =  {m £ mmu | p H  =  pub}
The goal of a rank function is to partition a message-space into the sets of secret 
and public messages. In the context of the MU-Puzzle, the rank function should 
distinguish the theorems of the system from the non-theorems. We would then 
hope, for any well-formed rank function, that all theorems would be in and 
all non-theorems would be in M ^ . Interestingly, this is not generally true.
Example 6.1.2 Consider the rank function (from Section 1.5) used to prove the 
impossibility o f  the original MU-Puzzle:
This function assigns a rank o f  pub to all strings other than those containing a 
number o f  Is which is indivisible by 3. It assigns, fo r  example, p ((M ,/)) =  pub, 
correctly indicating that the axiom, (M:I), is a theorem o f the system. However, 
the rank function also labels as theorems some strings which are non-theorems, 
such as p((I,M)) = pub. (It is straightforward to show, via a rank function, that 
all theorems must begin with M.) ■
As mentioned in the previous chapter, we call a rank function minimal if  it assigns 
a rank of pub only where absolutely necessary [58]. Stated another way, a minimal
sec  iffaxs mod 3 =  0 
pub otherwise
6.1 Minimality and maximality 121
rank function would correctly characterise the strings that the MU-Puzzle makes 
public: the theorems of the system.
Define MsgP to be the set of all messages that a process P  could cause to appear 
on the network.
D efinition 6.1.3 MsgP =  traces(P) JJ- {| trans,rec |}
For the remainder of this chapter we fix P = ORACLE mu—the CSP process repre­
senting the MU-Puzzle—and drop the subscripted P. Then:
D efinition 6.1.4 (M inim ality ) A well-formed rank function p is minimal i f ' im e .  
Mm7-P(w) =  pub = >  m e  Msg
The rank function for the MU-Puzzle is non-minimal since it assumes p((7, M)) = 
pub even though (I, M) is actually a non-theorem.
L em m a 6.1.5 I fp  is a minimal rankfunction w.r.t some CSP process, then it is the 
only minimal rank function. □
Intuitively, if there exists some pi p then pi must either assign a rank of pub to 
more messages than p (in which case pi cannot be minimal) or it must assign a 
rank of pub to fewer messages than p (in which case pi cannot be a well-formed 
rank function).
A minimal rank function defines exactly the set of messages that a system 
makes public. However, as indicated by the example above, rank functions ex­
ist which are non-minimal, and assume as being public some messages that are 
actually kept secret.
In contrast, a rank function may assume as being secret some messages which 
can safely be made public.1
E xam ple  6.1.6 Consider the rank function for the original MU-Puzzle (above). 
This rankfunction assigns a rank o f  sec  to the string (I, I, I , M) even though knowl­
edge o f this string would not lead to a violation o f  the secrecy goal. ■
We call a function maximal if it assigns a rank of pub to the largest number of 
messages that may be assumed to be public for it to remain a well-formed rank 
function.
safe we mean that the message(s) can be made public consistently without violating the 
secrecy goal under consideration.
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Definition 6.1.7 (Maximality) A well-formed rank function p is maximal i f V M C  
p-1 [{sec}] .p ® {m i-» pub | m e M] is not a well-formed rank function.
(where p-1 [{sec}] is the set of messages to which p assigns a rank of sec). That is, 
a rank function is maximal if, whenever the set of public messages is increased, the 
resulting function is not a well-formed rank function. Since the MU-Puzzle rank 
function (needlessly) assumes that p{(1,1,1,M)) = sec, it is non-maximal.
A minimal rank function tells us the set of messages that a system makes pub­
lic. As long as this set is disjoint from a set of intended ‘secrets’ then secrecy is 
preserved. A maximal rank function presents us with the largest set of messages 
that can be assumed to be public for some set of intended ‘secrets’ to remain se­
cret. Stated another way, a maximal rank function assigns a rank of sec only where 
absolutely necessary. However, it turns out that, whilst a minimal rank function is 
unique in its minimality, the same is not generally true for a maximal rank function.
Example 6.1.8 Consider a system called Small with the message-space Msmall =  
{m \ , m2, m3} and a single deduction rule:
S\~m\  iS'hm2 
S\-m3
I f  we wish to prove that, given UK = {}, the set T  =  {m3} remains secret we can 
define a rank function pi as follows:
p(mi) = sec
p(m2) = pub
p(m3) = sec
We see that pi is maximal since it is impossible to increase the set o f  public mes­
sages without violating the secrecy condition. However, we can also define a sec­
ond rankfunction, p2, as follows:
p(mi) =  pub
p(m2) =  sec
p(m3) = sec
We note that P2  is also maximal. In general, maximality is not unique. ■
The non-uniqueness of maximality appears to be rooted in the asymmetry of the
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Figure 6.1: Minimal and maximal rank functions
deduction rules. A deduction of the form {m\, m2 } F mi says that a single message, 
mi, can be produced if the set of messages {m \, m{\ is known. When we construct 
a rank function using Heather’s algorithm (see Chapter 5) we are led to a unique 
minimal rank function since we can enumerate the set of all messages that are made 
public. In contrast, we can view a maximal rank function as being constructed by 
a consideration of the deduction rules in the opposite direction. If we want mi to 
remain secret then the set {mi, m2 } must be secret. However, this is not the same 
as saying that both mi and m2 must remain secret, since one can be safely known 
as long as the other remains secret.2
If a system permits unique minimal and maximal rank functions, denoted p_ 
and p+, respectively, then there exist some messages which the system does not 
make public but need not be secret. We term such messages safe secrets (to 
have a name). This is shown in Figure 6.1, where p i 1 [{pub}] and p+1[{Pu'3}] 
denote the sets of rank pub messages in a minimal and maximal rank function, 
respectively. The set of safe secrets is the difference between these two sets, 
P+MiPubJhp^Kpub}].
The properties of minimality and maximality encourage us to think of rank 
functions in terms of a partitioned set. (This is no coincidence, since the properties 
were first explored in this context [61,59]). We can see minimality and maximality 
as specifying the end-points of a range within which all (well-formed) rank func-
2One can envisage a more complex rank function, structured not as a set of messages, but as 
a set of sets of messages. Specifi cally, the domain of the rank function would be the power-set 
of the message-space. The domain of a function for the Small system in Example 6.1.8 would be
{ { M ^ lM 0 ^ } ,{m3 } , {mi,m3 },{m 2 ,m3 } , {mi,m2 } , {mi,m2 ,m3 }}, and the rank function would 
assign a rank of pub to all sets other than {m3 }, {mi,m2 }, and {mi,m2 ,m3 }. This rank function 
would be bought at the cost of simplicity.
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Figure 6.2: A rank function scale
tions are contained. Any function which assigns a rank of pub to fewer messages 
than the minimal rank function will not qualify as a rank function. Similarly, any 
function which assigns a rank of pub to more (or a rank of sec  to fewer) messages 
than a maximal rank function will not qualify as a rank function. This is illustrated 
in Figure 6.2. Since the rank function is being described via the (size of the) set of 
messages assigned a rank of public, the scale runs from the empty set to the entire 
message-space, with (in this case: distinct and unique) minimal and maximal rank 
functions marked between this scale. Points between the end-points denote those 
functions which are neither minimal nor maximal. Note that not all points between 
the minimal and maximal functions will represent well-formed rank functions.
A minimal or maximal rank function will not tend to be arrived at by chance, 
but by a systematic enumeration of the messages which must be public or secret. In 
practice, a human protocol analyser may not be searching for a function with such 
specific attributes: any well-formed rank function will suffice to prove the desired 
property. For this reason, when any rank function is sought, an analyser will tend 
to hit upon one that is neither minimal nor maximal. Given that such ad-hoc rank
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functions tend to be defined in terms of message invariants, it is interesting to 
consider how a rank function may be minimised or maximised.
6.2 Minimisation and maximisation
In the foregoing discussion we state a rank function in terms of a predicate (or 
invariant) Inv, possibly subscripted, such that strings satisfying Inv correspond to 
the messages of rank pub and strings failing to satisfy Inv correspond to those 
of rank sec. Stated in these terms, the rank function for the original MU-Puzzle 
becomes:
Inv(xs) <=> jj/xs mod 3 ^ 0
We have demonstrated that the rank function defined by this predicate is not 
minimal (since Inv( (I, M )) is true, but (I,M) is not a theorem). In the context 
of a partitioned set, we can minimise the rank function by removing (I,M) from 
the set of public messages. In fact, we can go further by restricting the original 
invariant to only those messages that do not end in M. This results in the following 
strengthened invariant:
Inv\ (xs) ({1/X5 mod 3 ^  0) A (last(xs) ^  M)
Note that (I, M) does not satisfy Invi and is therefore ranked as a non-theorem. 
Although we do not prove it here, Inv\ describes a well-formed rank function.
If Inv defines a point in Figure 6.2, then Invi defines a point further down the 
lattice.
Similarly, we have demonstrated that Inv is not maximal (since Inv( (/, I, I,M))  
is false, whereas it is safe to assume that it is public). We can then maximise the 
rank function defined by Inv by weakening the invariant to include all messages 
that end in M:
Invi{xs) <*=> (jj/xs mod 3 ^  0) V (last(xs) =  M)
Note, in particular, that Inv2 ( (1,1,1, M)) is true.
By continually strengthening or weakening the invariant on which a rank func­
tion is based we (respectively) minimise and maximise the rank function.3 Gener­
3Of course, strengthening or weakening the invariant of a well-formed rank function does not
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ally speaking, the minimal rank function (in the partitioned-set view) corresponds 
to the strongest predicate in the invariant-based view, and a maximal rank function 
corresponds to a weakest predicate. The end-points of the scale of Figure 6.2, 0 
and Mmu, correspond to the predicates false and true, respectively.
6.3 Perfection
Figure 6.2 shows minimal and maximal rank functions as denoting distinct points 
on the scale between 0 and Mmu- This is not generally true; a secrecy property 
may yield to verification with a rank function which is both minimal and maximal. 
Intuitively, a function which is both minimal and maximal assigns a rank of pub 
to, simultaneously, the smallest and largest set of messages that may be assumed 
to be public for the rank function to be well formed. We call such a rank function 
perfect:
D efinition 6.3.1 A rank function p is perfect i f  and only i f  p is both minimal and 
maximal.
L em m a 6.3.2 I f  a rank function p exists that is perfect, then it is the only perfect 
rankfunction. □
This is a consequence of Lemma 6.1.5. In fact, we can state a further property; if 
a perfect rank function p exists to prove a secrecy predicate of a system, then p is 
the only rank function for that particular combination of system and predicate:
T heorem  6.3.3 I f  a rankfunction p exists, and p is perfect, then p is the only rank 
function.
Proof. If there exists some function pi p, then either (a) 3m.p\{m) =  sec  A 
p(m) =  pub or, (b) 3m .p(m ) =  sec  A pi (m) =  pub. If (a), then the minimality of p 
tells us that pi cannot be a well-formed rank function. If (b), then the maximality 
of p tells us that pi cannot be a well-formed rank function.
□
The question then presents itself: do perfect rank functions exist? The answer 
to this question turns out to be that perfect rank functions do exist, at least in the 
laboratory. Consider, for example, a curious variant of the MU-Puzzle in which the
necessarily result in a well-formed rank function.
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original four rules can be used to generate theorems from a set of axioms. This set 
of axioms is captured by the set INIT:
INIT =  (xs £ Umu | foxs mod 3 ^ 0 }
That is, the set of axioms is precisely the set of strings over {M,I, U} in which 
the number of Is is not divisible by 3. The goal of the puzzle is then to determine 
whether any string in the set T  is obtainable from INIT using the four rewrite rules. 
The set T  is given by:
T  =  (xs 6 Mmu | tt/xs mod 3 =  0}
That is, T  is precisely the set of strings over {M,I, U} in which the number of 7s is 
divisible by 3. It turns out that this puzzle is not solvable, and this can be proven 
by appeal to the rank function, ppeJf ,  defined as follows:
This rank function (which is identical to the one used for the original MU-Puzzle) 
assigns a rank of pub to all strings other than those in which the number of Is is 
divisible by 3.
Theorem 6.3.4 pperf  is a perfect rank function.
Proof On the assumption that pperf  is a well-formed rank function, we can prove 
that pperf  is perfect by showing that it is both minimal and maximal. From Defini­
tion 6.1.4 we have that pperf  is minimal if every string assigned a rank of pub can 
appear on the network. From the definition of ORACLEmu in Chapter 1 we know 
that any message in the set INIT can be communicated on the channel trans. Since 
p*Perf is the characteristic function of INIT we can conclude that any rank pub mes­
sage can appear on trans and, therefore, pperf  is minimal. From Definition 6.1.7 we 
have that pperf  is maximal if the set of messages to which pperf  assigns rank pub 
cannot be increased. Recall the final condition of the central (MU-Puzzle) rank 
theorem of Chapter 1:
sec if jj/xs mod 3 =  0 
pub otherwise
C3. \/xs € r.p(x5) =  sec
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This condition says that everything in the set T must be assigned a rank of sec. 
Since pperf  assigns a rank of sec to precisely those messages which are in T, the 
set of rank pub messages cannot be increased without including some string from 
T. Since such a change would violate condition C3 and preclude ppeTf  from being 
a well-formed rank function, we can deduce that pperf  is maximal. Since pperf  is 
both minimal and maximal we can conclude that pperf  is perfect.
□
A perfect rank function, if  it exists for a combination of system and secrecy 
goal, is the only well-formed rank function for that combination. In particular, 
pperf is the only possible rank function for the MU-Puzzle variant just described. 
However, we have shown that the original MU-Puzzle is amenable to verification 
with at least three distinct rank functions—those based on the predicates Inv, Inv\ 
and Inv2 . We can therefore conclude that no perfect rank function exists for the 
original MU-Puzzle.
6.4 Concluding remarks
In this short chapter we have sought to mind and mend a perceived gap between two 
views of rank functions: one based on the enumeration of a set of public messages, 
and the other based on the idea of message invariants. The two views have been 
related by a consideration of the properties of minimality and maximality; we have 
seen how these properties manifest themselves in each view, and have shown how 
the processes of minimisation and maximisation relate to the strengthening and 
weakening of message invariants. Along the way we introduced the concept of a 
safe secret. We conclude by considering a possible use for such messages.
When seeking to verify a protocol, one is not usually concerned with whether 
or not the resulting rank function is minimal or maximal; for much of the time any 
rank function is sufficient. A minimal rank function gives a correct characterisation 
of the set of messages which a protocol may make public (the set p i 1 [{pub}]). 
The set of secrets is implicitly defined as the complement of this set. Conversely, 
a maximal rank function will define the largest set of messages which may be 
assumed to be public (the set p^1 [{pub}]) for some set T  of messages to remain 
secret. If p is a perfect rank function then we have the following equivalence:
p - 1 [{pub}] =  P+1 [{pub}] (if  p is perfect)
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If, however, p is not perfect, then we will have (for any maximal rank function p+):
p i 1 [{pub}] C P+1 [{pub}] (if p is not perfect)
We termed the messages given by the difference of these two sets as the set of safe 
secrets. These are the messages that a protocol keeps secret (since they are not in 
p i 1 [{pub}]) but whose secrecy is unnecessary for the protocol to remain secure 
(since they are in p+1[{pub}]). Together, then, the minimal and a maximal rank 
function may allow a protocol designer to locate redundant encryptions—since the 
encryption of a safe secret is unnecessary from a security viewpoint. Such insights 
may highlight areas in which performance can be improved (or a protocol merely 
simplified) by removing such encryptions.
However, whilst the construction of minimal rank function is well understood, 
no such procedure exists to compute a maximal rank function. This would be an 
interesting line for future research.
Note, finally, that the existence of a perfect rank function for some protocol 
enables the conclusion that the protocol keeps secret no more, and no less, than it 
needs to for some secrecy goal to hold. The existence of a perfect rank function 
may then be used as a metric to determine the efficiency of a protocol with respect 
to the amount of data which that protocol demands to be encrypted.
Chapter 7
Temporal rank functions for 
forward secrecy
A number of cryptographic protocols have appeared in the literature that claim to provide forward secrecy. The idea of forward secrecy is that, even if a long-term key is compromised, any session-keys that were pre­
viously established using the long-term key should remain secret. Forward secrecy 
is important in scenarios where session-keys need protection beyond the time-span 
during which they are used. These situations typically arise when session-keys 
are used for data encryption, rather than just authentication. There appears to be 
a disparity between the growing number of protocols that claim forward secrecy 
[12, 39, 84, 70, 10, 91, 69] and the work carried out on its formal analysis. In 
contrast to secrecy and authentication, the formal verification of forward secrecy 
has, with some exceptions [97, 20], received little attention in the literature. This 
chapter fills the gap for the rank function approach.1
In the standard approach, a rank function is used to partition the message- 
space of a protocol such that all messages which should remain secret are assigned 
a rank of sec  and all messages that might be public are assigned a rank of pub. 
The central rank theorem then gives the conditions under which it is reasonable 
to conclude that the sets of public and secret messages are disjoint. It turns out 
that this all-or-nothing view of secrecy is unable to capture properties of protocol 
models which include compromised keys. Since compromised keys become public 
after some initial period of secrecy they can be classified neither as entirely secret 
nor as entirely public, and the standard approach cannot model values that inhabit
1An earlier version of this work appeared as [36].
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this middle-ground. Since forward secrecy is dependent on the concept of com­
promised keys, protocols which provide forward secrecy are unverifiable using the 
standard approach. This incompleteness motivates us to propose the richer concept 
of a temporal rank which allows the expression of a finer-grained notion of secrecy. 
Our goal is not to introduce yet-another-verification-technique but to show how an 
existing technique can be generalised to permit reasoning about a wider class of 
security properties.
In the next section we describe how compromised keys can be modelled using 
CSP and show how forward secrecy can be formalised as a trace specification over 
such a protocol model. In Section 7.2 we introduce the idea of a temporal rank 
function and establish a central theorem that gives conditions under which we can 
conclude that a protocol guarantees forward secrecy. We demonstrate this approach 
on the running example of a protocol due to Colin Boyd and in Section 7.3 consider 
two further examples: the Cliques (A-GDH.2) group key agreement protocol and 
the EKE protocol of Bellovin and Merritt. Section 7.4 discusses why the original 
rank function approach fails in the presence of compromised keys and compares 
the temporal and standard rank theorems. Section 7.5 discusses related work and 
Section 7.6 concludes.
7.1 Formalising forward secrecy
The concept of forward secrecy was first introduced by Gunther [54] who used 
the term perfect forward secrecy. We follow the lead of other authors [67, 17] in 
dropping the word ‘perfect’ and avoiding confusion with the unrelated concept of 
perfect secrecy.
Forward secrecy is captured by the following definition:
Definition 7.1.1 A key establishment protocol provides forward secrecy i f  compro­
mise o f  the long-term keys o f  a set ofprincipals does not compromise the session- 
keys established in previous protocol runs involving those principals.
As a running example we use a protocol due to Boyd [17] that takes its cue from an 
earlier idea by Wiener [115]. The protocol allows a session-key k  to be established 
between two principals, A and B. As initiator,^ generates a fresh asymmetric key- 
pair (pk,sk) and sends the public half to B along with a fresh nonce, and the 
signature of p k  under a long-term signing key Sig{A). As responder, B uses the
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public-key to encrypt the session-key k  and sends it to A along with a signature 
containing a hash of the session-key:
1. A -» B : pk-nA -{pk-B }Sig{A)
2. B -> A : {k}Pk-{h{k)-A -nA}sig{B)
This protocol aims to meet the forward secrecy property of Definition 7.1.1 if A 
and B are honest and the long-term signing keys Sig(A) and Sig(B) are not com­
promised until after the protocol has ended. This can be argued informally in 
the following way. The keys Sig(A) and Sig(B) are used only to authenticate the 
session-key, and although their disclosure allows an attacker to masquerade as a 
or b in future protocol runs, it does not allow him to recover the past session-key. 
The session-key can only be recovered with the private-key, sk, which is freshly 
generated for each protocol run. Asymmetric key-pairs, such as (pk, sk), which are 
discarded after a single protocol run are termed ephemeral keys, and it is the use 
of ephemeral keys that enables the protocol to provide forward secrecy.
Boyd and Mathuria [17] call the property in Definition 7.1.1 fu ll  forward se­
crecy in distinction to the weaker property of partial forward secrecy:
Definition 7.1.2 A protocol provides partial forward secrecy i f  compromise o f the 
long-term keys o f  some subset o f  the principals does not compromise the session 
keys established in previous protocol runs involving those principals.
The difference between full and partial forward secrecy is rather subtle, and centres 
around the number of long-term keys that are compromised. For example, a pro­
tocol involving two honest parties, A and B, will provide full forward secrecy if a 
past session-key remains secure when both A ’s and B ’s long-term keys are compro­
mised. If this property is not met, however, the protocol may still provide partial 
forward secrecy if the compromise of just one long-term key (either yf’s or 5 ’s, but 
not both) does not allow the attacker to recover a past session-key. Full forward 
secrecy takes a pessimistic view by assuming the disclosure of all long-term keys, 
and for the purpose of protocol verification it will often be prudent to apply this 
stronger condition. For protocol analysis,2 however, it is often useful to consider 
partial forward secrecy since, if  the protocol does not meet the weaker goal, it will
2Recall that our distinction between protocol verifi cation and protocol analysis lies in the goal of 
the endeavour: the fi rst aims to prove correctness whilst the second attempts to discover attacks. In 
general, failure to fi nd an attack does not imply correctness.
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certainly not satisfy the stronger condition. For simplicity, the present work con­
centrates on the notion of partial secrecy, although this is by no means a limitation 
of our approach. In particular, we will show that Boyd’s protocol achieves partial 
forward secrecy with respect to the key Sig(A) for some (honest) initiator^.
Pereira makes an interesting distinction between what he terms complete for­
ward secrecy and individual forward secrecy [95]. In complete forward secrecy 
it is assumed that the past protocol runs were executed without any interference 
by the attacker, who is passive and merely records the messages that pass on the 
network. In contrast, individual forward secrecy assumes an attacker who has po­
tentially manipulated the messages of one or more principals in previous runs. The 
terms ‘complete’ and ‘individual’ are appropriate for Pereira’s focus on principals 
in group Diffie-Hellman protocols. Here, however, we will refer to them as passive 
and active forward secrecy, respectively, in recognition of the attacker’s role in past 
protocol runs. When we talk about forward secrecy in this chapter we are refer­
ring specifically to the notion of active forward secrecy. Clearly, a protocol that 
provides active forward secrecy also achieves the weaker goal of passive forward 
secrecy.
7.1.1 Compromised keys
As in Chapter 2 we model protocols in CSP where each principal, and an attacker, 
are represented by processes.
Forward secrecy becomes relevant in situations where long-term keys can be­
come compromised. We are not concerned with how the keys are leaked (as a result 
of cryptanalysis, for example), but only with the fact that they are. We develop an 
extension to the ENEMY process that represents an active Dolev-Yao style attacker 
with the additional ability to learn long-term keys that have been leaked.
The attacker process
The attacker can:
1. Hear any message on the network and add that message to his knowledge 
set,
2. Send to any principal any message generable under b,
3. Compromise any key in a set TS of temporary secrets and add it to his knowl­
edge set.
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These three capabilities (the first two of which are standard) are captured by the 
following process:
ENEMY{S) = transW.p.m -► ENEM Y(Su{m})
□
□  tu sE R  rec\i\j\m —> ENEMYiS)
j:USER J  v '
m\Srm
□
^m-TS^ea^ 'm * Enemy{S\J {w})
We instantiate the process by defining ENEMY = ENEMY(IIK) for some set UK 
of initial knowledge. The definition of ENEMY is not entirely general since we 
can adapt it to facilitate the compromise of different sets of keys. Doing so will 
be dependent on both the protocol under consideration and the precise forward 
secrecy goal that we intend to verify. To reason about full forward secrecy in 
Boyd’s protocol, for example, we would define TS = {Sig(i) | i £ USER}.
The principals
We model each principal that takes part in the protocol as a CSP process rep­
resenting the protocol steps performed by that principal. For example, consider 
INITj(j,pk,n) from Figure 7.1. This process models a principal i running Boyd’s 
protocol as initiator with j ,  where p k  is the ephemeral public-key and n is the nonce 
used in the run. Similarly, RESPj(i,k) is a principal j  running as responder, ap­
parently with i, using the session-key k. On receipt of the first protocol message, 
j  verifies the signature to satisfy himself that the message originated from i. The 
responder asserts his belief that k  will be a secret shared only with i by performing 
the signal event signal.j.i.k. The process USERf represents the entire behaviour of 
a principal i in both initiator and responder roles. In the initiator case a session 
variable p k  is chosen from the set PKy of public-keys that i will use in runs with a 
particular principal j .  The function nonce is an injective mapping from public-keys 
to nonces such that nonceipk) is the nonce that i will use in the run involving pk. 
Similarly, as a responder, the interleaving is indexed by the session-key k £ Kjj. 
The sets PKy and Ky of public- and session-key s are all pairwise disjoint.
We incorporate the ENEMY and user processes into a standard CSP protocol 
model, represented by NET, in which an arbitrary number of principals can engage 
in arbitrarily many instances of the protocol concurrently.
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INITi(J,pk,n) =
trans.i.j.(pk-n ■ {pk-j}Sig^ )
-> rec.i.f>({k}pk-{h(k) - i ■ «}5/g(/))
—> Stop
RESPj(i,k) =
rec.j.ilipk-n  ■ {pk-j}Sig^ )
—> signal.j.i.k
trans.j.i.({k}pk- {h(k) ■ i-n }Sig^ )
—> Stop
USERi =
1 1 1 / i H S E R  ( ( l  I \ph:PKllIN IT i(j’P le>nonce(p k )) )  I I I  ( |  | | t 6 K # / ! B S P , ( / , * ) ) )
N E T=  ( | | | , :taERUSER/) \[{\trans,rec\}]\ENEMY  
Figure 7.1: CSP model of Boyd’s protocol
7.1.2 Statement o f forward secrecy
Let msg(tr) denote the set of messages communicated in the trace tr:
Definition 7.1.3
msg{tr) =  {m | leak.m in  tr
V  3  i j  E USER.(itrans.i.j.m in  trVrec.i.j.m  in tr)}
We are already in a position to prove that any message that can be sent by ENEMY 
must be generable from the set UK together with the messages input on channels 
trans and leak.
Theorem 7.1.4
ENEMY sat
Xtr.(IIKUmsg(tr \ {| trans, leak |})) h msg(tr \ {| rec |})
Proof. We prove by a mutual recursion induction that Enemy(S) sat (SL)msg(tr \ 
{| trans,leak |})) b msg{tr \ {| rec |}) and the result follows from the fact that 
ENEMY = Enemy{IIK).
□
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We introduce the trace predicate St_precedes which states that, for disjoint 
sets R and T, any occurrence of an event t e T  in a trace will be strictly preceded 
by some occurrence of an event r e R :3
R St_precedes T  =
Xtr. tr \ T  () =>•
3 t r '< t r . t r ' \R ^ { ) A t r ' \T = { )
Consider the process NET from Figure 7.1. If a trace tr$ e  traces(NET) con­
tains the event leak.Sig{A) we know that the attacker has, at that point, learned 
the signing-key of principal A. Similarly, if  tr$ contains the event signal.B.A.K we 
can conclude that, at that point, B was willing to establish a key K  with a principal 
who B believed to be A. If leak.Sig(A) appears in the trace before signal.B.A.K 
then the ephemeral key used to encrypt K  may have come from the attacker, who 
invents a key-pair {PK', SK') and a nonce N'A and uses Sig(A) to masquerade as A:
1. E { A ) ^ B  :{PK ',B}Sig(A)
2. B ^ E { A )  :{K }PK,.{h{K),A,N'A}Sig[B)
(where E(A) denotes the attacker masquerading as A). If, on the other hand, 
signal.B.A.K occurs before leak.Sig{A) (that is, if  the predicate {signal.BA.K} 
St_precedes {leak.Sig(A)} holds) then the forward secrecy property tells us that 
the compromise of Sig(A) should not result in the compromise of the (previously 
established) session-key K. We can therefore state the claim secret {AT}: the at­
tacker never learns K.
This is the heart of our statement of forward secrecy: that all session-keys 
established between honest principals before the compromise of the long-term key 
should remain secret even after the long-term key has been leaked. If k  is a session- 
key established between two honest principals i and j  and Ik is a long-term key 
used to establish k, we define the trace specification fs that captures this notion of 
forward secrecy:
3 The defi nition SL precedes gives a fi ner-grained notion of precedence than the precedes pred­
icate of Chapter 2. That predicate only applies to entire processes (since it depends on the prefi x- 
closure of the trace-set) whereas the present defi nition deals with precedence in individual traces 
(albeit at the cost of conciseness and a certain degree of elegance).
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fs (k, Ik) =
X tr.{signal.b.a.k} St_precedes {leak.Ik] [tr)
^ sec re t (£}(/r)
For our running example, represented by the process NET, we can state the speci­
fication as:
NET satfs (K,Sig(A))
That is, if B is willing to establish the session-key K  e  Kba with A, before the key 
Sig(A) is compromised, then K  remains a secret known only to A and B. Note that, 
if B willingly engages in a run with a dishonest principal then neither secrecy nor 
forward secrecy of the resulting session-key can be expected.
7.1.3 Restricting the network
Let ko e Kji be a session-key established using a long-term key Iko between two 
honest principals i and j .  Our goal is to prove that NET sat fs (ko, Iko) for some 
protocol model NET. However, we can ease this task by first applying some simple 
CSP manipulation. Expanding the definition of fs for NET, we obtain the goal:
NET sat
Xtr.({signal.b.a.ko} St_precedes {leak.Iko](tr)
=>secret (£o}(fr))
Let TR be the set of traces of NET that satisfy the antecedent:
{signal.b.a.ko} St_precedes {leak.Iko}
Then:
Definition 7.1.5
TR = {tr e  traces (NET) \
{signal.b.a.ko} St_precedes {leak.Iko}(tr)}
As an immediate consequence of Definition 7.1.5 we have that:
Lemma 7.1.6 TR C traces(NET) □
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TR is both non-empty (since the empty trace () satisfies the antecedent) and prefix- 
closed (since, if s ^  t satisfies the antecedent then so will 5). The trace set TR can 
be seen as representing a restriction of the network described by NET. Since a CSP 
process is defined in terms of its traces we can (at least in this case) define a new 
process, NET', whose traces are precisely those in the set TR. Intuitively, NET' is 
the process whose traces are those of NET in which signal.b.a.ko always precedes 
leak.lk0 .
Let K be the set of session-keys from which ko is drawn and let LK be the set 
of long-term keys from which Ik0  is drawn. RES is a process that blocks the event 
leak.lk0 until such time as signal.b.a.ko has occurred:
RES = signallblalk  —>
if k = ko then RXJNx else RES 
□ le a m :( (L K \{ lk 0})-> R E S
where X  =  { | signal, leak |}
RUNx is a special process that is always willing to communicate any event in 
the se tX  Based on this we can define NET' as follows:
Definition 7.1.7 NET' = NET \ [X\ \ RES
NET' forces the synchronisation of all leak and signal events between NET  and 
RES, and we can demonstrate that NET' has as its traces precisely the set TR:
Theorem 7.1.8 traces(NET') = TR
Proof. Consider a trace tr E traces (NET'). By definition of NET':
tr E traces (NET | [ {| signal, leak |} ] | RES)
The semantics of CSP interface parallel then tell us that (i) tr E traces(NET) and 
tr \ {| signal, leak |} E traces (RES). By definition of RES we have that whenever 
leak.Iko appears in tr it is preceded by an event signal.j.i.ko for some i, j ,  and so 
(ii) {signal.a.b.ko} St_precedes {leak.lko}(tr). Finally from Definition 7.1.5, (i) 
and (ii) yield that tr E TR. The same argument works in the opposite direction to 
show that tr E TR=> tr E traces (NET').
□
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The assumption {signal.b.a.ko} St_precedes {leak.lk0 } on NET has been ab­
sorbed into NET' and this enables us to rewrite the fs trace specification to a simpler 
form:
NET' sat secret {£0 }
In doing so we have reduced a forward secrecy predicate over the whole network 
(NET) to a secrecy predicate over a restricted subset (NET1) of that network. If 
we can prove that NET' sat secret {ko} then we will have shown that NET sat 
fs (ko,lko). Applied to our running example, we are left to prove that NET' sat 
secret (AT) where K  £ K},• for some honest principals i and j.
7.2 Temporal rank functions
In this section we introduce a proof technique suitable for verifying whether the 
forward secrecy property of the previous section holds for a given protocol. In 
particular, we obtain a specialised theorem that applies to secrecy properties on the 
protocol network. This theorem is the core of the proof strategy presented in this 
chapter; it provides a sufficient list of conditions whose achievement guarantees 
that NET' sat secret T for a set T.
7.2.1 Time tags
Consider an instance of the Boyd protocol where the session-key K  is established 
between A and B using the long-term key Sig(A) and that Sig(A) is subsequently 
compromised at some time n. For simplicity we assume that B 's signing key, 
Sig(B), is not leaked, and so define the set TS of temporary secrets as TS =  (Szg^)}. 
The attacker’s capabilities increase at time n since from this point he can use Sig(A) 
to sign anything he knows and can send the resultant message to any principal will­
ing to accept it, whilst masquerading as A. The messages that the attacker can gen­
erate can be divided into several categories: (i) those he can generate before time 
n, (ii) those he can generate at or after time n, and (iii) those he can never gener­
ate. In fact, we can go further and tag each message m in the space of the protocol 
with a label t e  N°° representing the earliest time at which m can be assumed to be 
generable by the attacker without affecting the correctness of the protocol.
For example, since usernames are generally included in the attacker’s initial 
knowledge we would tag A and B with 0, denoting the fact that the attacker knows
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them at time 0. Similarly, since A makes the ephemeral public-key p k  available 
before Sig(A) is leaked we would tag it with a label in the range 0 <  t < n. Fur­
thermore, since Sig(A) becomes available at time n we would label it as such. 
Finally, messages (such as the session-key K) which should never be generable by 
the attacker would be tagged with infinity (°°) . It may be helpful to think of °° 
as denoting that the message is not generable in finite time, although for practical 
purposes it will only mean that it is computationally infeasible for the attacker to 
deduce the message.
Our verification approach is based on the interpretation of a time tag as a rank, 
and we will say that a message m has a rank t (written p(/w) =  t) if it is safe 
to assume that m is generable by the attacker at time t. We will wish to prove 
that, at time t, the attacker is incapable of generating any message with a rank 
greater than t. This will enable us to conclude that messages such as K  are actually 
not generable by the attacker until time «> and, therefore, remain secret. In the 
remainder of this section we formalise the notion of a temporal rank, introduce our 
central theorem, and show how we can use it to prove that Boyd’s protocol meets 
its forward secrecy goal.
7.2.2 Temporal ranks
A (temporal) rank function is a function from the space of messages MESSAGE to 
the set of natural numbers with infinity: N°°.
Definition 7.2.1 Let MESSAGE be the message-space o f  a protocol. Then define 
p to be a function p : MESSAGE —»N°°.
Our intention is to define a rank function over the message-space of NET' (rather 
than the message-space of NET) such that the rank of a message respects the time at 
which it becomes available to the attacker. Messages known initially to the attacker 
(m £ IIK) will have p(m) =  0. If, on the other hand, m should be unavailable to the 
attacker we will typically assign it a rank of «=. Messages that become available 
to the attacker during the course of the protocol will be assigned some (possibly 
non-zero) finite rank. A rank function effectively partitions the message-space into 
the set of messages that the attacker can know (those with finite ranks) and those 
that should remain secret (those with rank °o). Rank functions operate on messages 
communicated as events in the traces of a CSP process. We lift ranks to events in 
the sense that p (trans.a.b.m) = p (rec.a.b.m) = p{leak.m) =  p(m) and to sets by 
defining p(iS') to be the rank of the highest ranked message in S.
7.2 Temporal rank functions 141
Generally speaking, the traces of a CSP process do not have any concept of 
time. However, we can impose a sense of discrete time onto traces by taking the 
time of an event to be its position in a trace. We define the leak-time of a key k  in 
a trace tr (written x(k, tr)) to be the position in the sequence tr at which leak.k first 
occurs. If leak.k does not occur in tr then x(k, tr) =  o°.
Definition 7.2.2 Assuming that k  £ IIK, i f  -i(,leak.k in tr) then %(k, tr) = °o else let 
tr — tr* ^  (leak.k) ^  tr" such that ->{leak.k in  tr'), then %(k, tr) = #tr, +  1.
The following examples will help to clarify this:
1. If fro =  (leak.k) then x(k, fro) = 1.
2. I f /n  =  (trans.a.b.m,rec.b.a.m,signal.a.b.k,leak.k) theni(k,tri) = 4.
3. I f  tr2 = (trans.a.b.m\,rec.b.a.m\,trans.a.b.mf) then x(&, =  00 •
Note that, since leak.k is not preceded by the corresponding signal event in fro, 
tro £ traces (NET').
As discussed earlier, the rank of a message may be dependent on the leak-time 
of some long-term key. Furthermore, the leak-time will not generally be fixed but 
will occur at different times for different traces of NET'. Rather than define a 
distinct rank function for each possible scenario we use the concept of a family 
of rank functions p, parameterised by n, such that the rank function p„ will apply 
precisely when the leak-time of k  in some trace of traces(NET') is n. When n is 
understood we may omit the subscript and simply write p.
Let T  be a set of values that should not appear in any trace of NET'. T  will 
usually contain the session-key k, but may also include long-term secrets that we 
disallow the attacker from compromising. We are now in a position to give a list 
of conditions that, if  satisfied, guarantee that no member of T can be discovered by 
the attacker in NET'. Following the statement of the central theorem, we discuss 
each condition in turn.
Theorem 7.2.3 Let T be a set o f messages, TS be a set o f  temporary secrets, and 
UK be the attacker’s initial knowledge. I f  there exists a family o f rankfunctions, p, 
such that each member p„ satisfies:
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Cl. p n(IIK) =  0
C2. MS C MESSAGE,m G M ESSAGEShroAp„(S') =  / =» p„(m) < f
C3. Mm G T.p„(w) =  oo
Vw G U \  {jE1}, /r G traces(NET').
tr \ {| trans.u, rec.u, signal.u\} holds p„
C5. Mm G TS.pn(leak.m) <  
then NET' sat secret 7
where holds p„ is defined as follows:
Definition 7.2.4 
holds p„
p„(tr J]. rec) 7  ^0 0  =4> p«(/r JJ. /raws) ^
Proof. This proof closely follows the proof of the two-valued rank theorem [105]. 
To prove that NET' sat secret T we need to show that:
Mtr G traces {NET'), secret T{tr)
We prove, for an arbitrary trace tro, that the existence of a rank function p„ is 
sufficient to conclude secret T(tr) when x(k, tr) = n.
For a contradiction assume that C1-C5 hold, but also that -^(secret T(tro)). 
Then there exists an occurrence in tro of some message t G T. Since C3 tells us 
that p„(/) =  0 0  for any / G T  we have that there are some messages with a rank 
of 0 0 . Let tr\ be the prefix of fro whose last message is the first message of tro 
with rank 0°. tr\ is the trace up to the point where the first rank «> message occurs. 
The prefix-closure of traces in processes tells us that tr\ G traces{NET'). The last 
message of tr\ is either of the form leak.m, trans.u.v.m or rec.u.v.m for some u, v 
and m, where p„(m) =  o o #
Case leak.m'. The protocol model guarantees that only elements from TS can 
appear on the channel leak and only the attacker can perform events on this channel. 
Therefore, from C5, we have that p„(leak.m) < forcing a contradiction.
Case rec.u.v.m: We have that tr\ is a trace of ENEMY', by Theorem 7.1.4 we 
have that (IIKU(tr {trans, leak})) h tr J). rec', and so {IIK\j{tr\ JJ. {trans, leak})) h 
m. But, by definition of tr\ we have that pn{tr\ JJ. {trans, leak}) since all mes­
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sages in tr\ apart from the last have a finite rank. Therefore Cl and C2 yield that 
p„(m) 7  ^oo, forcing a contradiction.
Case trans.u.v.m: Let tru = tr\ f {trans.u,rec.u}. This is the portion of tr\ in 
which USERU participates, so tru e  traces(USERu). Hence, by C4 we have that 
holds p„(tru). Expanding the definition we have that:
Pn{tru ^  rec) ^  =*. p„ (tru JJ. trans) ^  oo
from which it follows that p„{tru 4  rec) p„(m) ^  However, by definition
of tro and hence tru we have that p n{m) = °° forcing a contradiction. In either case 
we find a contradiction, which establishes the theorem. □
C l
Condition Cl essentially amounts to an assumption on the initial information avail­
able to the attacker. The requirement that p „(IIK) = 0 states that, at the start of the 
protocol, the attacker does not know any secret or compromisable keys.
C2
The second condition:
VS C MESSAGE, m e  MESSAGES b m A p„(S) =  t =* pn(m) < t
is a requirement on the generates relation, K  It says that, if  the attacker knows a set 
of messages S  with rank t, any message m generated from S  under h should have 
a rank no greater than t. Stated another way: at any time, the attacker can only 
generate messages which are safe for him to know at that time. Since, from Cl, 
we have that the attacker begins by only knowing messages of rank 0, C2 allows 
us to conclude that the attacker cannot send a message of rank °o unless he has 
previously received (from some other principal or via leak) a message with infinite 
rank.
C3
This is a statement about the contents of the set T. Since T should contain the 
messages that we wish to keep secret we must ensure that each of these messages 
has a rank of ©°. C3 allows us to conclude that this is indeed the case.
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C5
The final condition is a straightforward obligation on the set of leakable secrets, 
namely, that they are assigned a finite rank.
G4
This condition is essentially an obligation on the users of the system: that no hon­
est principal can send a message of infinite rank unless it has previously received a 
message of infinite rank. By showing that C4 holds we rule out the possibility that 
any of the honest principals introduces a message of infinite rank, and if  the net­
work admits such a message it must therefore have been introduced by the attacker. 
(Since C l, C2 and C5 tell us that the attacker cannot introduce such a message ei­
ther, the combination of C l, C2, C4 and C5 tells us that no infinite rank message 
can pass through the system. Since all messages in T have rank (C3) we can 
conclude that all elements of T  remain secret.) Curiously, the stronger, and more 
obvious, definition of ‘holding the rank’—where the rank of emitted messages is 
not greater than the rank of received messages—appears unnecessary.
Note that C4 is a condition upon the traces of events communicated by each 
principal and it is worthwhile to consider how the traces of a process USER,• in 
NET are related to the traces involving i in NET'. Consider an arbitrary trace 
tro £ traces(NET') restricted to the events in which a principal A takes part:
trA = tro \ {| trans. A,rec. A, signal A  |}
NET', recall, is the parallel composition:
N E T ) [ {| signal, leak |} ] | RES
which blocks the performance of the event leak. Ik until signal.i.j.khas been com­
municated. leak events originate at the ENEMY and not with user processes, so 
trA £ traces{USERji). Put another way, any behaviour possible by A in NET' will 
be exhibited by USERA in NET. When we come to prove C4 for a given rank 
function it will be convenient, and sufficient, to do so by inspection of the pro­
cesses USERi together with the assumption that, whenever leak.Sig{A) occurs then 
signal.i.j.K must have previously been communicated.
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7.2.3 Proving Boyd’s protocol correct
We now conclude our running example by showing how the above strategy can 
be used to prove that Boyd’s protocol provides partial forward secrecy on an un­
bounded network:
1. A -> B : pk-nA -{pk-B}Sjg^
2. B ' A : {k}pk-{h(k)-A -nA}Sig^
The forward secrecy goal that we wish to establish corresponds to the following 
predicate (for some session-key K  e  Kr a  where A and B are honest):
NET sat fs (K,Sig(A))
We consider the CSP model of Figure 7.1 and look at a particular, but arbitrarily 
chosen, run in which A acts as initiator and attempts to establish a session-key with 
B. Similarly, B acts as responder and attempts to establish the session-key K  with A. 
We tailor the ENEMY process to permit the compromise of a single key: the long­
term signing key Sig(A). Our goal is to construct a family of rank functions that 
satisfy conditions C1-C5 by characterising the times at which messages become 
known to the attacker. We define T = {AT} to be the set of values that must remain 
secret. We assume that Sig(A) becomes available to the attacker via the channel 
leak'.
Assumption 7.2.1 Sig(A) is unknown to the attacker until it appears on channel 
leak.
Some care is needed in stating this assumption since it presumes the attacker can­
not manipulate earlier protocol messages in a way that will cause Sig(A) to be 
revealed. In this case the assumption can be justified by applying Guttman’s con­
cept of immediate safety [56]: Sig(A) is immediately safe since it is not known 
initially to the attacker and is not sent as a component of any message. Under the 
perfect encryption assumption, Sig(A) remains secret until it appears on channel 
leak.
We now present a suitable rank function and argue as to why C1-C5 hold. In 
particular, we show how the restriction of NET to NET' is fundamental to the proof 
strategy.
We begin by defining the rank of usernames and nonces, which in both cases
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we set to be 0:
Usernames p„(«) =  0 
Nonces p =  0
We assume that the attacker has all usernames in his initial knowledge. Since the 
protocol uses public nonces we must assign them a finite rank. However, it turns 
out that the protocol is still secure if  we assume, as we do here, that they are known 
to the attacker initially (by assigning a rank of 0). The idea of assigning a lower 
rank to a message than is strictly necessary is a useful trick that can help to reduce 
the complexity of a rank function. It is sound since it assumes the worst-case: if 
we can prove security in this context then the security goal will still hold if  we later 
decide to assign the message a higher rank.
Hashes p = p „(m)
Pairs pn{mi-m2) = max(pn{mi),pn{m2))
We define the rank of a hashed message to be the same as the rank of that mes­
sage, since the attacker can deduce h(m) as soon as he learns m. The rank of a 
concatenation m\ - mi is the greatest rank of its components.
Ephemeral keys pnipk)
P n(pk~l )
Signing keys p„ (Sig(u))
P»0%-1(w))
Session-keys p„(£)
When assigning a rank to keys, we assign a rank oi u unless it is aosoiuteiy neces­
sary to do otherwise. The intention is to state the secrecy of just those values re­
quired to meet the security goal. So we assume, for example, that all session-keys 
apart from K  are known initially to the attacker. Note that the rank of signing-keys 
respects the fact that Sig(B) is never leaked and Sig(A) is leaked at time n > 0. We
0
1 ~ if p k e  PKAB
1 0 otherwise
( ”
oqIIs«4H
1 ”
if u = A
0 otherwise
0
r oo if k = K
1 o otherwise
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assume that all other signing-keys are known to the attacker from the start.
The rank of encryptions follows from our assumption about the secrecy of session- 
keys. The attacker should never learn K  and should never learn an encryption of K  
with any key other than those used by A to initiate to B.
The most subtle aspect of this rank function is its treatment of signatures. 
Sig(B) is never leaked and, therefore, the only messages signed using Sig(B) will 
be those matching the pattern of the protocol messages. For each principal u these 
messages are captured by S{u):
S{u) = { p k -v \p k e  PKm,vG U}
U {h{k)-v-na  | k €  Ku,v G \J,na £ N}
where PKU =  Uveu PKUV. We define the rank of signed messages as follows:
The interesting case involves the key Sig(A). Before time n the only messages 
signed with Sig{A) are those that the protocol designer intended: the messages in 
the set S(A). We can safely assume that such messages are available to the attacker 
initially, and so assign them a rank of 0. After n, however, the attacker can sign any 
message m he knows using Sig(A). In this case, the rank of the resultant message 
is the greater of the two ranks p „{m) and n.
We lift the rank function to the channels trans, rec and leak in the obvious
Encryptions pn{{k}Pk)
oo i f pk^PKAB  
A k  = K  
0  otherwise
Decryptions
°° m = {m'}pk 
Apk  G PKab 
pM(/w) otherwise
Signatures p«({w}flg(jB)) 
0 if/MG5(5)
p „{m) otherwise
0 if  m G S(A) 
Pn({m}sig(A)) = max(p n{m),n)
otherwise
P«((WW(U)) = PBW {u£{A,B})
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way, p„(trans.a.b.m) = pn(rec.a.b.m) =  p„(leak.m) =  p„{m), and to sets such that 
p(S') =  p(s) where s €  S and Vs' € <S\ {s}.p(s') ^  p(s). Since the attacker cannot 
engage in events on the signal channel, we let pn(signal.a.b.k) =
Informally, the set UK can be constructed to conform to condition C l: that all 
messages in UK have a rank of 0. C3: that every message in T  has a rank of oo5 
trivially holds since we have defined T to be the singleton set {£■} and pn(K) =
C2 may be proven by considering each of the clauses defining I- in turn. For 
example, if we consider the rule for hashing then we need to prove that p„(m) = 
t=>P n{h{m)) < t. From the definition of the rank of hashes we see that pn(h(m)) =  
pn(m) so the implication holds. The remaining cases are addressed in Appendix 
B.2.
C4 must be proven for all USERj processes. If we proceed by a case analysis 
we find we must show that each of the following processes hold the rank:
1. INITi(J,pk,n) for i ^ A
2. INITa (j,p k , n) for j  ±  B
3. INITA{B,pk,n)
4. RESP(j, i, k) for j ^ B
5. RESP(B,i,k) for i ^ A
6. RESP(B,A,k)
The first five cases are straightforward to prove. The final case, RESPB(A,k), 
is more interesting:
RESPB(A,k) =
rec.B.A'Kpk •n -{p k ■ 5 } ^ ) )
—>■ signal.B.A.k
-> trans.B.A.({k}pk-{h(k) -A • «}%(£))
—> Stop
According to the definition of C4 we are required to show that, if p (pk • n • {pk • 
£ W (J))  ¥=00 * en  p ( { ^ j f  {h(k) •A • w }s^)) 7^  °°-
From the rank fimctionwe can immediately deduce that p({/z(&) -A-n}Sig^ )  =  
0. By the rank of concatenation it remains to show that p ({£};>*) 7^  °°- By as­
sumption p (pk-n ■ {pk-B}sig(A)) 7  ^o°. An examination of the rank function shows 
that there are two cases to consider, either (i) p dp fc-U Js^ )) =  0  or (ii) p ({pk- 
B}sig{A))=-n.
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(i) If p {{pk ■ B ]sig^) = 0, then we can deduce that p k  e PKab resulting in
P d ^W ) =  0*
(ii) If p({pk-B}sig(A)) = n> then p k  £ PKab- From the rank of {pk-B}sjg(j) we 
can deduce that Sig{A) must have been compromised, and from Assumption 7.2.1 
we can deduce that leak.Sig(A) has occurred. However, since:
NET' sat {signal.A.B.K} St_precedes {leak.Sig(A)}
K  must already have been established as a session-key and therefore k ^ K  in {k}pk. 
Finally, the rank function tells us that k=£K => p({k}^) =  0, and so the condition 
holds.
Finally, it is clear that C5 holds, since only messages from TS can appear on 
the channel leak, TS=  (5'zg-(^)} and p(Szg-(yf)) =  n.
Since C1-C5 hold of p we can conclude that NET' guarantees the secrecy of K  
and, by implication, we can conclude that the forward secrecy goal:
NET satfs (K,Sig(A))
is also met. Establishing this result only allows us to conclude partial forward 
secrecy with respect to Sig(A). To establish full forward secrecy we would also 
need to consider the compromise of 5 ’s long-term key. By taking the pessimistic 
view—that both keys become available as soon as the first is compromised—such 
a proof is straightforward to construct.
7.3 Further examples
7.3.1 The Cliques protocol
Recall the Cliques protocols from Chapter 3. We again consider a particular proto­
col from the Cliques suite, A-GDH.2, which is used to establish a Diflie-Hellman 
key between a group of principals of arbitrary size, such that each principal con­
tributes to the key. We can use a temporal rank function to reason about the forward 
secrecy of this protocol.
We use the notation of Chapter 3 and take an abstract view of the Diffie- 
Hellman operation in which every value is an exponentiation of the generator g  
by some product of random numbers and long-term keys. We write DH(x,y) to 
represent the exponentiation^ modp  and write D H (g,x-y) as a shorthand for
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DH(DH(g,x),y). We make use of the ingredients function i  that returns the mul­
tiset of components that make up a message. For example, \(D H(g,x • x  • z)) = 
We also extend the model of the attacker to enable him to perform expo­
nentiation and to compute the multiplicative inverse of a value:
DH Inverse
S \ - d  S ^ d Q S \ - d
S\~D H (d,d0) S \-d ~ l
Since computation takes place in an abelian group we must also address the al­
gebraic properties of such computation. In particular, we need to take into account 
the commutativity of exponentiation (since g ^  =  gyx) and the cancellation of mul­
tiplicative inverses (since =  gy). In Chapter 3 we captured the equivalence 
of such messages using a term rewriting system. Here it will suffice to introduce 
three algebraic equivalences onto the message space:
D H (x,y-z) =  D H (x,z-y)
D H (x,y-l) = DH(x,y)
D H {x,X -w -Y-w ~l -Z) =  DH(x,X- Y -Z)
(where any of X, Y  and Z may be the identity element 1). These equations result in 
a further proof obligation on the rank function; namely, that whenever two Diffie- 
Hellman messages are equivalent (according to the above equations) we assign 
them the same rank.
We consider (partial) forward secrecy from the point of view of a principal 
u \ — A who contributes r\ = rA to compute the key K  in a run of the protocol
in which un = C is the group controller and K \n = KAc  is the long-term key. As
before, the protocol is modelled by a CSP process NET, and the security condition 
is:
NET sat fs (K,Kac)
where the process representing^ performs the signal event on receipt of the broad­
cast message (3), and leak.Kjc signals that KAc has been compromised. In this 
instance we adapt our attacker process ENEMY so that no key other than KAc  can 
be leaked.
As before, we consider the restricted process NET' which satisfies the con­
dition that, in any trace of NET', any occurrence of Ieak.KAc  is preceded by an
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occurrence of signaLA.C.K. n = x(KacJ v) represents the time at which the key 
Kac is compromised. Our goal is to construct a family of rank functions, param- 
eterised by n, that characterises the messages that can occur before, at, and after 
time n.
We assign a rank of n  to the compromised long-term key K a c '-
P»(*) =  <
n i f  k  = Kac
°° i f k = Kuc A u ^ E  
0 otherwise
Assigning a rank to Difiie-Hellman values is non-trivial, but we can make use of 
the fact that the group controller, C, only ever transmits messages to which he has 
added both a long-term secret and an ephemeral secret. Other principals will only 
transmit messages to which they have added an ephemeral secret. Let cs(d) be the 
number of C’s ephemeral secrets and lt{d) the number of long-term secrets in a 
Diflie-Hellman value d. Formally, if LK is the set of all long-term secrets shared 
by honest principals and Sc is the set of ephemeral secrets known to the controller 
C, define:
cs(d) =  tl(i(rf)nsc ) 
i t ( d )  = tt(vWnLK)
Based on this, we define the rank of a Diffie-Hellman value d  as:
0 if (cs(d) + lt(d)) mod 2 =  0
p {d) =
oo otherwise
Unfortunately, we find that this function4 does not satisfy condition C2 of Theorem 
7.2.3: the attacker is able to produce a message of rank > n from messages with 
rank < n. Consider the case where the attacker uses the message DH(g, r j)  (rank 0) 
and the key K a c  (rank n) to produce the message DH(g , r j  • K a c )  ■ Since DH(g, rA • 
K a c ) contains one long-term secret and none of the controller’s ephemeral secrets 
it receives a rank of °° and so C2 fails.
Generally speaking, we cannot conclude protocol insecurity from the failure
4This rank function is identical to the one we used in Chapter 3 to prove that a restricted version 
of A-GDH.2 meets its secrecy goal. Please refer to that chapter (Section 3.2.1, in particular) for a 
description of the notation used here.
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of a rank function since a different rank function may exist which is sufficient to 
prove protocol correctness. In this case, however, the failure leads us to deduce the 
following attack (described for a group of size 3):
1. A ^ B { g , f A}
2. B C
3a. C —»■ E(A) grBrC^AC
3b. C —> B gTArcKBC
3d E { C ) ^ A sTB
In the attack, the attacker observes the first two protocol messages (noting the 
value g ArB in message 2), intercepts A ’s component of the broadcast message from 
C (3a) and replaces it with grB(3d). On receipt of the broadcast, A computes the 
key gr^ KAc rA _ At a later stage Kac becomes available to the attacker who then 
deduces K^cI and uses the value gfArB (remembered from earlier) to compute the 
key ^ aTbKac . The attacker now shares a key with A, marking the failure of forward 
secrecy.
This attack is a simpler version of one proposed by Pereira and Quisquater [97] 
who demonstrated attacks on each of the main security goals of the Cliques proto­
cols. The same authors have more recently shown that any protocols built using the 
rationale of Cliques are irreparably flawed, at least in situations where the group 
contains four or more principals [98]. Interestingly, the Cliques protocols motivate 
the study of active (as opposed to passive) forward secrecy (Section 7.1) since, 
whilst the A-GDH.2 protocol fails to provide forward secrecy in the active sense, it 
does satisfy the property in a passive context [95]. Furthermore, the weaker notion 
of passive forward secrecy appears amenable to verification using two-valued rank 
functions. In this case, the attacker is passive in runs preceding the compromise of 
the long-term key, and it will be sufficient to furnish him with the network traffic 
from some arbitrary number of previous such runs via the set UK.
7.3.2 Encrypted Key Exchange (EKE)
Bellovin and Merritt have proposed the Encrypted Key Exchange (EKE) key- 
establishment protocol [12] which makes use of a password P(A,B), shared be-
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tween A and B:
1. A —>B 4,{pk}p(Af)
2. B - -+A {{k}pk}p(Af)
3. A ^ B {nA}k
4. B -+ A {nA,nB}k
5. A - + B {nB}k
The key p k  is an ephemeral asymmetric key that the initiator .4 generates at the start 
of each protocol run. k  is the symmetric session-key. The protocol provides full 
forward secrecy, since, even if the long-term password P(A,B) is compromised, the 
attacker can only use this to recover the public-key p k  and not the session-key k. 
We can formalise this notion using temporal rank functions. For clarity we consider 
a simplified version of EKE by discarding messages 3, 4 and 5 and concentrating 
on the key exchange of the first two messages. As before, we consider a particular 
run, involving A and B, in which A issues the ephemeral key PK  in the hope of 
establishing a session-key with B. Similarly, B responds with the session-key K.
The rank function is similar in spirit to that used in the proof of Boyd’s proto­
col in Section 7.2.3, and we refrain from a full explication here. Instead, we just 
consider the rank of session-keys and public-key encryptions:
°o i f  k  = K
0 otherwise
P n(k) —
n ifp k  =  PK Am —K
max(w,p„(wi)) ifp k  =  PK Am =£K
max(p „{pk),
p n(m)) otherwise 
Briefly, the rank of public-key encryptions is as follows: the attacker can learn 
the message {K}px at time n, when P(A,B ) is compromised. At or after time n 
the attacker can encrypt any message m that he knows using the passwordP(A,B), 
and the rank of this message depends on when m becomes available. Lastly, the 
attacker can also encrypt m with any password other than P(A,B), and again his 
ability to do this is restricted by the availability of m. It turns out that this rank 
function is sufficient to prove that the protocol meets its forward secrecy goal. 
However, rather than demonstrate that the rank function is correct it is instruc­
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tive to consider the necessity that p k  is an asymmetric key.5 If p k  is symmetric, 
then, at time n the attacker, who discovers P{A,B) (p(P(A,B)) = n) can use it to 
extract PK  from the encryption { P K } p ^ )  • Furthermore, he can also use P{A,B) 
to extract { K } p k  from the message { { K } p k } p (a $ ) '  { K } p k , recall, has a rank of n, 
and we are also compelled to give PK  a rank of n. However, the attacker can now 
use these two finite-ranked messages to obtain K, which has a rank of This be­
haviour is in violation of condition C2, which states that the attacker should never 
be able to use messages of rank n to deduce messages with a greater rank than n. 
This failure of the rank function is instructive, since it motivates the need for PK  
to be the key for an asymmetric encryption algorithm.
7.4 Discussion
7.4.1 Rank function malfunction
As promised, we now discuss why the standard (two-valued) rank function ap­
proach is incapable of verifying (active) forward secrecy properties.
In the original rank function approach [105] positive ranks were used to denote 
public messages and non-positive ranks were assigned to secret messages. It was 
soon discovered [61] that this is equivalent to using just two ranks, pub for public 
and sec for secret messages. This binary view of secrecy allows us to make all-or- 
nothing assertions about the secrecy of messages: a message m is either completely 
secret (p(m) =  sec) or completely public (p(m) =  pub). In fact, it turns out that 
setting p(w) =  pub is equivalent to saying that it should be safe for the attacker 
to know m at the start of the protocol. This can be stated another way. Consider 
some protocol P, and a (two-valued) rank function p that is sufficient to prove that 
P  meets some secrecy goal with respect to the attacker’s initial knowledge: IIK°. If 
there exists a message m £ IIK° with p(m) =  pub then p is also sufficient to show 
that P  meets the same secrecy goal with respect to the initial knowledge UK1 =  
IIK° U {w}. Recall that, for a security goal expressed as a trace specification, 
the existence of a rank function allows us to conclude that the protocol meets the 
security goal.
Theorem 7.4.1 Let p be a rankfunction with respect to the attacker’s initial knowl­
edge IIK°. I f  there exists some m IIK° satisfying p(m) =  pub then p is a rank 
function with respect to UK1 =  IIK° U {mi].
5Lowe [78] considers a similar scenario in the context of password guessing attacks.
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Proof. The two-valued central rank theorem (Chapter 2) gives four healthiness 
conditions that a rank function must satisfy. It is straightforward to show that, for 
each of these, if p satisfies the condition w.r.t IIK° then p must also satisfy the 
condition w.r.t UK1.
□
This goes against intuition. A message m may become available to the attacker 
at some point in a protocol run, but this does certainly not mean that the mes­
sage should be known to the attacker initially. In fact, Heather [59] has given an 
example of a (contrived) protocol that contains a temporary secret—a value that 
must remain secret for a protocol to reach its secrecy goal but may then be safely 
leaked—and has shown that such protocols, even if  correct, are unverifiable using 
two-valued rank functions. Arguing pragmatically, this incompleteness is only of 
theoretical interest unless it can be shown to hamper our ability to reason about 
real (i.e., uncontrived) protocols. However, since compromised keys are tempo­
rary secrets, we are faced with the conclusion that forward secrecy properties are 
unverifiable using the standard approach.
We can illustrate this with an example. Consider an instance of the Boyd pro­
tocol, modified so that A makes Sig{A) public after the key exchange has taken 
place:
1. A -> B : pk-nA -{pk-B}Sig{A)
2. B -> A : {k}pk-{h(k)-A -nA}Sig{B)
3. A -»• B : Sig(A)
The results of the previous section allow us to conclude that a run of the protocol 
should provide forward secrecy; that, even after Sig(A) is leaked, the session-key k  
remains secret. To see why a two-valued rank function cannot be used to prove this 
property we can attempt to create one. We assume that the usernames of principals 
are public; in particular, p(A) =  pub. Since Sig(A) is sent in the clear we are 
forced to set p(Sig(A)) =  pub. For any ephemeral key-pair (PK', SK') invented by 
the attacker we have p (PK') = p (SK') = pub, and since the attacker can use these 
facts to construct the message {PK' -B}sig(A) we are compelled to set p ({PK' • 
B}sig(A)) =  Puh. Now, the central rank theorem tells us that each principal should 
maintain the rank; that is, if it only receives messages of rank pub it should only 
send messages of rank pub. However, if  the attacker, masquerading as A, sends the 
messagejP^7 • B]sjg(A) to B, B will respond with {k)pK> and the attacker can use 
SK' to deduce the session-key k. We are therefore forced to set p(£) =  pub, whereas
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our hope was for k  to remain secret. Some thought leads us to conclude that this 
attack will not work: Sig(A) is not made public until after k  has been accepted 
by A. However, Theorem 7.4.1 tells us that rank functions cannot distinguish a 
message that is made public at the end of a protocol from a message that is public 
at the start of the protocol. Therefore, using a two-valued rank function means that 
setting p (Sig(A)) = pub is the same as saying that Sig(A) e IIK. If Sig(A) is known 
to the attacker at the start then the protocol clearly cannot guarantee the secrecy of 
the session-key.
A rank function is an abstraction technique that allows us to prove trace spec­
ifications of CSP processes without requiring us to directly consider the traces. A 
trace records one possible history of a process. In the above example, if  the event:
trans.A.B.Sig(A) 
appears in a trace, it will always be preceded by the event:
rec.A.B.{k}PK>-{h{k)-A-nA}Sig(B)
This represents the fact that A accepts the session-key before Sig(A) is leaked. 
Thus, a trace does not simply convey information about which messages appear, 
but also when they appear. A two-valued rank function abstracts away all of the 
temporal information present in the trace and just tells us what messages can occur. 
However, for protocols containing temporary secrets, this temporal information is 
vital if we are to prove their correctness. In such cases two-valued rank functions 
abstract away too much.
Temporal ranks overcome this problem by lifting state information from the 
trace into the rank function. A temporal rank function for the example above would 
say that the password is leaked at some time n and set p(Sig(A)) = n. The ranks 
of other messages pivot around n in the sense that a message made public before n 
is assigned some rank 0 <  r < n and a message available at or after n is assigned a 
rank in the range n < r <  <*>. Crucially, the offending message {PK' • B}sig^)  would 
be assigned a rank of and the message {k}px would be assigned a rank less than n, 
representing the fact that A ’s reception of the session-key precedes the compromise 
of the password. At time n, A is therefore unwilling to accept the attacker’s faked 
message and so the forward secrecy property holds.
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7.4.2 On the relationship between the standard and tem poral rank  
theorems
To what extent can the temporal rank theorem be viewed as a generalisation of the 
original approach? In answering this question it is interesting to consider how a 
protocol requiring just two ranks can be reasoned about using the temporal theo­
rem.
Assume a security protocol model, represented by a CSP process NET, which 
contains no leakable keys. The security property that we wish to verify of NET  is 
secret {AT} for some session-key K. The absence of temporary secrets means that 
we define TS=  {}. In constructing NET' we find that, since ENEMY cannot com­
municate any events on the channel leak, every trace of NET vacuously satisfies the 
condition {signal.a.b.K} St_precedes {leak.lk}. So we have that NET = NETf. 
More generally, then:
Proposition 7.4.2 TS =  {} => NET = NET | [{| signal, leak |}] | RES = N E T
where RES follows the definition of Section 7.1. We can rewrite the four conditions 
of the central theorem in the context of this equivalence:
C l’. pn{IIK) = 0
C2’. VS C MESSAGE,m G MESSAGE.SY m Ap„(S) =t=>  p„(m) <  t
C 3\ Mm G T.pn{m) = °°
Vw G U \  {E},tr  G traces (NET).
tr \ {| trans.u, rec.u, signal.U |) holds p„
C5’. Mm G TS.pn(leak.m) <  °°
The absence of temporary secrets suggests that a two-rank approach, using 0 
and oo, will be sufficient to prove the secrecy predicate. The rank function param­
eter, n, is used to denote the leak-time of the compromisable keys. In this case, 
keys are not compromised (alternatively, they are compromised at time «>). The 
‘family’ of rank functions therefore has a single member: poo. In the remainder of 
this discussion we will omit the subscript.
Let us compare the resulting proof obligations with those set forth in the stan­
dard rank theorem of Chapter 2:
Cl’
The first condition, p (IIK) =  0, is present in both theorems.
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C2’
The condition on the attacker, C2, is subtly different in the standard theorem:
V.S' C M ,w G M.iSb m  Ap(S') ^  p ( m )  ^  °o
However, the condition in the temporal theorem is simply a generalisation of the 
above. Note that t can either be 0 or °o. If / =  0 then the temporal condition:
p(.S) =  0 => p(m ) < 0
is equivalent to saying p(S') ^  OO =» p H  ±  O O , If, on the other hand, t —  OO^ then 
we see that p(S') =  °° => p H  < will always be true.
C3’
This condition, on the set of secrets, is similar in both theorems.
C4’
Of the first four conditions, the fourth is the most obviously different between the 
two theorems. In the standard theorem we have:6
Mi G USER.USERj maintains p
where the temporal theorem has the rather more verbose:
Mu G U \{£ } ,/rG  traces (NET).tr \ {| trans.u,rec.u, signal.u\} holds p„
The first is a condition on the isolated user processes of the network, whereas 
the second appeals directly to the traces of each user in the context of the network. 
This difference is important. When we consider the user processes in isolation, the 
input to each process is not constrained in any way. When we consider the traces of 
a user in the system we need only consider those inputs that are made possible by 
the outputs of the attacker and other users. Thus, the temporal theorem places a suf­
ficient, but weaker, condition on the rank function. The advantage of the standard 
condition lies in ease of proof: a library of proof rules exist to determine whether
^Although the condition in the standard theorem makes use of the predicate maintains, it ex­
presses the same condition as holds and for ease of comparison we write it here in terms of the latter 
notation.
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a process maintains the rank. The statement of the temporal condition is neces­
sary because, in cases where NET ^  NET', it gives a sharper definition of what it 
means for a user process to be well behaved. However, since the standard condi­
tion implies the temporal condition, it will often be possible to conclude the latter 
by establishing the former. Beyond this, however, the sufficiency of the (weaker) 
temporal condition raises an interesting issue, discussed below.
C 5’
The standard theorem has no fifth condition. Note, however, that in the absence of 
temporary secrets (i.e., TS = {}), the condition is vacuously true for any protocol.
The sufficiency o f th e  tem p o ra l ra n k  theorem
The fact that the temporal condition C4 is sufficient, but weaker, than its dual in the 
standard theorem, leads us to wonder whether there are situations in which there 
exist correct protocol models for which the standard condition fails to apply. Doing 
so would require us to find a protocol model in which some user process, USERU, 
does not hold the rank when viewed in isolation, but does so when viewed in the 
context of the rest of the network. It turns out that such protocol models do exist, 
at least in the laboratory.
Recall the standard definition of ENEMY (compromisable keys are irrelevant 
here):
ENEMY(S) = transWp.m -»■ ENEMY(SU {m})
□ □  ijeusER rec.i.j.m —> ENEMY(S)
Shm
The users are typically modelled as an interleaving of all user processes, and the 
semantics of interleaving tell us that any sequence of events communicable by a 
user in isolation will still be communicable by a user in the context of this inter­
leaving. In contrast ENEMY is composed in parallel with all user processes and 
the synchronisation on all trans and rec events therefore has the potential to con­
strain the behaviour of one or more users. It is not difficult to see that the standard 
definition of ENEMY does not constrain any of the users (specifically, it is trace 
refined by every user process), and for any attacker model constructed in this way 
it will be possible to prove whether a user process does, or does not, hold the rank.
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However, if we consider a modified attacker:
ENEMY' (S) =  □  ieUSER  , trans.i.j.m —> ENEMY'(SU {m})
v  '  jeU SER\{B}
mEMESSAGE
□ DyewER rec.i.j.m —> ENEMY’{S)
Srm
this result no longer holds. In this model, ENEMY' is unwilling to communicate 
events of the form trans. i.B.m. Now consider a user process modelling a principal 
A  which, after establishing a session-key K  with C proceeds to perform the event 
trans.A.B.K—sending K  in the clear to B. Viewed in isolation (as is done in the 
standard theorem) this process cannot maintain the rank, since we intend for K  to 
be assigned a rank of «> but are compelled to assign it a rank of 0 since it can be 
sent by A after receiving inputs of rank 0. However, if the behaviour of this user is 
considered in the context of the whole network (as with the temporal theorem) then 
the attacker’s unwillingness to communicate the offending event means that the 
user process will deadlock before sending it. In this context the process will hold 
the rank. Note, also, that ENEMY1 (S) is not refined by the user process described 
above.
This example is rather disingenuous to the standard theorem which, after all, 
did not claim to apply in the context of a general attacker, but only to ones built 
by modifying the b clause of ENEMY. However, it suggests a bound on the types 
of attacker to which the standard theorem applies, namely, those which do not 
constrain the behaviour of any users and are therefore trace refined by all user 
processes.
7.5 Related work
7.5.1 Combined rank functions
We presented an earlier solution to the temporary secrets problem in [34]. This 
work did not address the property of forward secrecy, but simply the confidentiality 
of the session-key in a protocol due to Heather [59]. This pathological protocol 
(an adaptation of Needham-Schroeder-Lowe [88, 73]) was designed specifically to 
highlight the temporary secrets incompleteness described in Section 7.4 , and does
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so by leaking the initiator’s nonce, ua, after the session-key k  has been established:
1. A - -* B {A.nA}pK(B)
2. B - -> A {B.TlA'k}pK(A)
3. A --* B {m}k-*A
(where m is a piece of secret plaintext). The argument of Section 7.4 can be used 
to establish that no (standard) rank function can exist to prove that this protocol 
maintains the secrecy of k. In the earlier work we side-stepped the issue by showing 
that, under certain conditions, a CSP protocol model NET can be divided into two 
sub-protocol models, NETo and NET\, such that the entire protocol is given by the 
sequential composition jVETo; NET\. For Heather’s protocol, NETq corresponded 
to messages 1 and 2 and NET\ represented the final message. The salient point to 
note here is that, whilst ua is a secret in NETq, it is safe to assume that it is public 
in NET\ . We therefore gave a result which enabled the secrecy of k  in NET to be 
concluded by establishing (separately) that k  is secret in NETq and NET\ .
By dividing the protocol model (along the point at which nj is leaked) we were 
able to construct separate rank functions to establish the secrecy of k  in each of 
the sub-protocols. Intuitively, the rank function po for NETq gave nj a rank of sec 
and the rank function pi for NET\ assigned ua a rank of pub. An interesting side- 
condition on the combination of po and pi stated that no value assigned a rank of 
pub by po could have a rank of sec in pi; intuitively, a secret can become public 
but, once public, it is always public.
The idea of combined rank functions circumvented the problem of a temporary 
secret by effectively removing it. In addition, it only allowed the verification of a 
single protocol run and it is unclear how the work could be extended to deal with a 
larger network in an elegant fashion. This shortcoming prompted the present work, 
which does not remove the temporary secret but deals with it in situ by assigning 
it an appropriate temporal rank. It is interesting to note that the point of protocol 
division in the combined rank function approach corresponds to the leak point in 
the present work. Also, the number of required temporal ranks increases with 
the number of distinct leak points; in a similar way, the number of sub-protocols 
required in the earlier work increases with the number of temporary secrets.
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7.5.2 Low e’s completeness result
Lowe’s completeness result was designed to support the model-checking of pro­
tocols with the Casper compiler [76] and the CSP model-checker FDR [48]. In 
recognition of a fundamental limitation of state-exploration approaches, Lowe’s 
completeness result shows that, if a protocol satisfies certain conditions, and is se­
cure when run on a small network, then it is also secure when run on an unbounded 
network. One of these conditions states that the protocol must not contain any 
temporary secrets. To see why, consider the following protocol from [77]:
1. a -* b : {a -k -n }PK(by { { a -n } PK(b)}sK(a)
2. b —> a : n
The goal of the protocol is to establish k  as a secret shared between a and b. The 
nonce n is sent encrypted and returned as plaintext7: it is a temporary secret. Whilst 
the protocol is secure on a small system that allows a single protocol run, it is in­
secure when run on a network where b can run the protocol twice, as demonstrated 
by the following attack:
a l . A -> B {A.K.N}pK{By{{A.N}pK^}sK[A)
a2. B -+ A N
(31. 1(A) -> B {A .K' .N}PK(B). { {A-N}pK(B)}SK(A)
(32. B -  m N
By observing the first run the attacker is able to learn N. He then uses N  to construct 
the message {A.K'.N } p k (b) which he sends to B whilst masquerading as A. B 
accepts the key K' as being shared with A .8 The problem here is that the temporary 
secret enables an attack to exist that does not manifest itself on a small network. 
Since Lowe’s result aims to show that small system security implies large system 
security temporary secrets must be eradicated.
Lowe’s need for the absence of temporary secrets does not appear to be related 
to the difficulties that they cause to the rank approach. Lowe’s result shows the con­
ditions under which the correctness of a single protocol run implies the correctness 
of the protocol on an unbounded network. Casper can be used to verify a single
7Gordon and Jeffrey [52] call this a SOPH nonce—secret out, public home—other possibilities 
being SOSH, POPH and POSH. These acronyms allude to a fanciful etymology of the word posh.
8In this case, fi xing the protocol appears straightforward—the digital signature must be extended 
to include the session key. So message 1 would become: {A JCN}px(By{{A.KJf}pK(B)}SK(Ay
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run of a protocol that uses temporary secrets, since it considers actual executions of 
the protocol and keeps track of the order in which events are communicated. The 
standard rank function approach, however, cannot even achieve this. Nonetheless, 
it is intriguing to note that the temporary secrets problem is not restricted to the 
rank approach.
7.6 Conclusion
In this chapter we have shown how forward secrecy properties of crypto-protocols 
can be expressed and reasoned about using rank functions. We have introduced the 
concept of a temporal rank function that not only allows us to reason about what 
messages an attacker can deduce, but when in the protocol he can deduce them. We 
have applied the approach to two examples, establishing a proof of correctness in 
one case and rediscovering an attack in the other. Both of these examples consid­
ered a protocol running on an unbounded network that allows principals to engage 
in arbitrarily many protocol runs concurrently. We also described the motivation 
for using temporal ranks by demonstrating that some protocols may be unverifiable 
when using techniques that classify values as simply public or secret.
The present work can be seen as contributing to a growing body of research 
that aims to move beyond the familiar realms of perfect encryption, authentication, 
and secrecy, by relaxing the restrictions on the attacker and considering the wider 
class of security properties that become relevant as a result.
It is interesting to note that all of the rank functions given in this chapter are 
three valued: 0, n and «> and, in fact, it would have been sufficient to fix n at 
some arbitrary finite, non-zero, value. In general, a temporal rank function will 
be three-valued if all compromised values are assumed to be leaked at the same 
time. In the worst case, a temporal rank function with x  separate leak points will 
have x + 2 distinct ranks. It is not clear whether, in practice, more than three ranks 
will ever be required. If three ranks are indeed sufficient, then the theory presented 
above should almost certainly be refined to reflect this fact. In seeking to present 
a general theory we have had to introduce some concepts (such as the idea of a 
family of functions) which would be redundant in a three-rank theory.
A temporal rank function can be viewed as establishing a hierarchy of secrecy, 
where a message m\ is less secret than a message m2 if p(wi) <  p{mi). One 
message is therefore more secret than another if it must remain secret for longer. 
Such a fine-grained notion of secrecy has proven useful in the present work, and it
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would be interesting to consider whether temporal ranks can be applied in a more 
general setting.
At a higher level of abstraction, our treatment of forward secrecy allows us 
to form a rather natural hierarchy of secrecy specifications, since, in our model, 
secrecy is implied by the presence of partial forward secrecy and, in turn, partial 
forward secrecy is implied by the presence of full forward secrecy. This invites 
us to verify security protocols in a similarly hierarchical way; either by working 
upwards from secrecy or downwards from some stronger condition. The top-down 
approach (starting with, say, full forward secrecy) would tend to involve a more 
difficult proof but would have the pleasing side-effect of guaranteeing all weaker 
secrecy goals by implication. Developing useful notions of secrecy that extend this 
hierarchy, in either direction, seems an interesting research challenge.
Chapter 8 
Conclusion
“...for formal methods persons looking to get involved with security, I 
do not recommend Dolev-Yao crypto protocol verification. There are 
already good tools, more tools producers than consumers, and most of 
the low-lying fruit has been picked.”
-  Ernie Cohen (Dec 2002)
This thesis has sought to develop several aspects of secrecy within the rank function framework. In this final chapter we summarise our findings, plac­ing them in the context of wider issues surrounding the field of protocol 
verification. Although further work has been suggested in earlier chapters, we re­
iterate those proposals here, recasting them in light of the whole thesis.
Ernie Cohen’s quote, above, originates in a paper [31] delivered one month 
before the research presented in this thesis was started, and has lurked at the back 
of this author’s mind ever since. To conclude the conclusion, we consider its truth, 
and its implications for the future of protocol analysis research.
8.1 Summary
The rank function approach was originally conceived to reason about authentica­
tion properties of cryptographic protocols. Despite the observation (by Heather 
[58]) that the rank approach could be used to reason about secrecy, subsequent 
work [106, 108, 61, 59, 44] did not fully investigate the possibility. This thesis 
has aimed to fill this gap by examining several aspects of secrecy in the area of 
protocol verification. In particular, we have shown how rank functions can be used
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to uncover attacks (and prove correctness) in authenticated group key agreement 
protocols, and have proposed a related approach for the faithful verification of 
Diffie-Hellman protocols. We have also extended the rank approach (via the no­
tion of a temporal rank) to enable a finer-grained notion of secrecy to be stated, and 
have presented the first general framework for reasoning about forward secrecy.
The field of security protocol verification has seen significant growth over the 
past twenty years; analysis techniques are now mature and many traditional proto­
cols are well understood. Nonetheless there is still some considerable disparity be­
tween two views of cryptography. Traditionally, the symbolic approach—as taken 
in this thesis—has treated encryption as a primitive, whereas the analytical ap­
proach considers issues of probability and computational complexity. Recent years 
have seen a growing trend in work that aims to reduce the gap between these views, 
either by easing the intellectual burden of analytical proofs, or by providing a com­
putational justification for the assumptions of symbolic encryption [8, 57, 63, 62]. 
Much of the work presented in this thesis can be viewed as contributing to this 
wider goal, by weakening some of the traditional assumptions of symbolic analy­
sis. In Chapter 3, for example, we saw how a more faithful abstraction of Diffie- 
Hellman key agreement could be achieved by introducing some low-level prop­
erties of the cryptosystem as algebraic equivalences on the message-space. This 
idea was carried further in Chapter 4 where we presented a modelling and verifica­
tion approach that appeals more directly to the algebra upon which Diffie-Hellman 
operates. Traditionally, analysis techniques have assumed the inability of an at­
tacker to compromise the keys of honest principals. Chapter 7 looked at security 
properties which become relevant when this assumption is dropped. For interest­
ing reasons, the property that we examined—forward secrecy—necessitated that 
we talk about secrecy in richer terms than ‘public’ or ‘secret’, focusing instead on 
when certain messages become publicly known.
The original rank approach is based on a CSP protocol model in which each 
principal, and the attacker, are modelled as processes. This agent-oriented view 
is particularly useful for reasoning about authentication since it leads the anal­
yser to consider where particular messages originated. Authentication can be use­
fully checked by reasoning locally and separately about each of these processes. 
Secrecy, being about the impossibility that certain messages can be broadcast, is 
more usefully reasoned about as a global property over the entire network. Another 
theme of this thesis has been to champion the message-oriented view as a viable 
model for secrecy. In this view (used in Chapters 1, 4 and 5) the protocol model
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places emphasis on what messages can be generated, and not who can generate 
them. We believe that the message-oriented view leads to cleaner protocol models 
in situations where properties can be stated without recourse to signal events.
As a whole, this thesis can be seen as an effort to widen the rank approach, by 
extending the range of protocols and security goals that can be usefully reasoned 
about. This effort has been framed by a desire to not invent new approaches, but to 
advance in a way that is sympathetic to the spirit of rank functions.
8.2 Future work
There appears to be significant scope for broadening the range of algebraic proper­
ties that can be considered in a protocol analysis. Since the completion of the work 
in Chapter 3 there has been considerable progress in this area, notably by Abadi and 
Cortier [4, 5], who consider the equational theories of blind signatures, homomor­
phic encryption and exclusive-or. The progress of this work underlines the fact that 
such equational theories may be incorporated into a number of general techniques. 
In contrast, our approach to the verification of the MTI protocols, in Chapter 4, 
is focused very much on a particular cryptographic primitive: Diffie-Hellman key 
agreement. Future work in this area must revolve around the extension of the ap­
proach to handle more complex terms, and richer sets of attacker capabilities. As 
a long-term goal, a computational justification of our abstraction of exponentiation 
would lend weight to the level of proof achieved in the model. Such a justification 
appears non-trivial.
In Chapter 5 we viewed Heather’s rank algorithm as an internalisation strat­
egy, and suggested that it would be possible to encode such an approach using the 
model-checker FDR. Carrying forward this work—the compilation of a high-level 
protocol description into a CSP script amenable to rank analysis in FDR—seems 
achievable. However, it is not clear, given the large number of currently available 
tools, whether such work could be considered important.
The idea of a temporal rank was introduced in the context of forward secrecy 
(Chapter 7), and we gave no justification that temporal ranks are generally useful. 
It would be interesting to consider whether there are further situations in which a 
binary view of secrecy is inadequate; certainly, the central idea of multiple secrecy 
levels is interesting. One possible use lies in the area of access control, where, 
for example, data may be assigned (partially ordered) security levels such as un­
classified, restricted, confidential, secret and top secret. Each principal is assigned
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a clearance level and may only access data whose level is not greater than their 
clearance level. In this context, we might represent each principal, A, by a CSP 
process, and the proof obligation would revolve around A ’s inability to learn data 
with a higher security level (or rank) than her clearance level allows. As a further 
goal it would be interesting to consider how the idea of multi-valued ranks can be 
applied in domains where security levels are not partially ordered.
More generally, there are other open problems in the field of protocol analysis. 
New protocols are frequently proposed and there is great value in the protocol 
analyser working alongside the designer in a mutually beneficent relationship: the 
proposer is provided with assurance that the protocol’s design is sound, and the 
disposer gains the motivation to develop analysis techniques.
There is also a slow-growing body of work which aims to formalise the re­
lationship between various analysis techniques [59, 3, 13, 29]. As mentioned in 
Chapter 2, for example, there appears to be intriguing links between the rank ap­
proach and approaches based on type-checking [2, 52, 53]. Achieving a formal 
link between these two approaches seems a feasible and interesting goal for future 
research. A boolean answer to the question, is approach A equivalent to approach 
B may sound rather uninspiring, but such comparisons can serve to highlight defi­
ciencies in one or more of the techniques under investigation; can suggest metrics 
for determining which technique is most suitable in a given situation; and enable 
the results from one formalism to be interpreted in another. The achievement of a 
unifying theory of protocol analysis should be considered a long-term goal.
8.3 Wider issues
It is difficult to quantitatively assess the truth of Cohen’s claim that there are, “more 
tools producers than consumers”. However, the underlying sentiment—that there 
exist many tools for protocol analysis—does stand up to scrutiny.
The number of formal techniques proposed for reasoning about the correct­
ness of security protocols is large, and still growing. This variety of approaches 
seems rather less symptomatic of a fundamental need than an expression of the 
diverse backgrounds of the people who propose them. As evidence of this one 
need only consider the number of Yet-Another-Proof-Of-Needham-Schroeder pa­
pers that have appeared in the literature. The Needham-Schroeder protocol is use­
ful as a motivating example, but can stand as no more than a proof of concept. A 
technique’s utility is not evidenced by its ability to find the Lowe attack any more
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than a programming language is judged by its amenability to the expression of Hel- 
loWorld. We now have a diverse range of techniques based on theorem-proving, 
type-checking, model-checking, linear logic, logic programming and graph theory 
(and further subclasses within each of these). These techniques do differ, but in 
many cases the underlying assumptions—such as bounds on the capabilities of an 
attacker—are similar. Indeed, it will often be feasible to reason about a protocol 
using any one of a handful of methods, and the results obtained from each will be 
broadly similar. In the end the choice of which technique to use will be guided by 
the previous experience of the protocol analyser.
However, this is not the whole story.
New computer application domains bring new security challenges, and prompt 
the development of new protocols. Such protocols may challenge contemporary 
analysis techniques on several fronts. Firstly, the scale and complexity of new 
protocols (such as the electronic commerce protocol, SET1), has stretched the ca­
pabilities of the techniques used to reason about them ([94]). The research effort 
required to verify such protocols is considerable. Secondly, novel protocols may 
employ new cryptographic primitives (such as blind signatures or hash chains), or 
be based on new architectures (such as Trusted Computing), which are inexpress­
ible using current techniques, prompting extensions to deal with such cases.
A third, and—in this author’s opinion—more important, front lies at the deli­
cate balance between the tractability of a security proof and the foundations upon 
which that proof stands. The evolution of protocol analysis is a tale of the fluid­
ity of assumptions. The assumption that all protocol participants are honest, for 
instance, underpins the BAN logic [26] proof of the correctness of the Needham- 
Schroeder protocol. It was only when this assumption was finally dropped that 
Lowe discovered his attack. Such assumptions may be made implicitly—given a 
vague understanding of the world into which a protocol is bom—and it would be 
disingenuous to impose our later knowledge by passing judgement on assumptions 
made under a fundamentally different world-view.
However, analysis assumptions are just as likely to be made for a different rea­
son: to render a security proof manageable. History teaches us that, as techniques 
mature, we should continually seek to weaken the assumptions on which our cor­
rectness proofs are based, since, by doing so, new attacks may be unearthed. Ryan 
and Schneider’s attack [102] on a recursive authentication protocol [24], for in­
stance, was not picked up by a prior analysis conducted by Paulson [92], The ear-
!http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/Research/Security/resources/SET/intro.html
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lier proof made an assumption of perfect encryption, and did not take into account 
the low-level cryptographic properties upon which the attack depended. More re­
cently, attacks [55] were discovered against the Zhou-Gollmann non-repudiation 
protocol [117] which were missed by previous analyses [ 118,11,106]; in this case 
the earlier analyses made stronger assumptions about the behaviour of the protocol 
participants. Perhaps this tale cannot justify the number of analysis tools in exis­
tence, but it can be used to motivate their continued development; improvement (in 
efficiency, completeness, expressiveness, and so forth) permits the continued weak­
ening of assumptions—enabling protocols to be modelled at levels of abstraction 
which are closer to reality.
Cohen’s last comment, that “most of the low-lying fruit has been picked” may 
well be true. The advent of tools like Casper enabled a considerable library of 
protocols to be analysed in a short space of time [41]; it is likely that most attacks 
were unearthed in this nascent period. Attack discovery establishes careers, but 
a tool’s effectiveness should not be measured simply as a function of the number 
of new attacks found, but by its ability to prove strong results about a transparent 
representation of the protocol. That the low-lying Suit has been harvested should 
not cause us to seek new orchards. Rather, we should seat ourselves upon the lower 
limbs and reach for fruit on higher branches.
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Appendix A
A CSPm model of the MU-Puzzle
_ _  ******************************************************** 
-- CSP implementation of Hofstadter's MU-Puzzle 
-- 3rd August 2004 
—  * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
datatype ELEMS = M | I | U 
channel input,output : Seq(ELEMS)
ORACLEMU = OracleMU({<M,I>})
OracleMU(S) =
[]s : S @ 
input.s -> (
head(s) == M & output.(sAtail(s)) ->
OracleMU(union(S,{sAtail(s)}))
[] foot(s) == I & output. (sA<U>) ->
OracleMU(union(S,{sA<U>}))
[] ([] i: {l. .#s} @ subseqat(<I,I,I>,s,i) & 
output.(take(i-1,s)A<U>Adrop(i+2,s)) ->
OracleMU(union(S,{take(i-1,s)A<U>Adrop(i+2,s)}))) 
[ ]  ( [ ]  i: {l..#s} @ subseqat(<U,U>,s,i) Sc 
output.(take(i-l,s)Adrop(i+l,s)) ->
OracleMU(union(S, {take(i-1,s)Adrop(i+l,s)})))
)
-- Auxiliary Haskell-style functions for sequences 
foot(S) = nth(S,#S)
nth(ms,n) = if n==l then head(ms) else nth(tail(ms), n - 1)
subseqat(S,T,n) = prefix(S,drop (n-1,T))
prefix(<>,T) = true
prefix (S,<>) = false
prefix(S,T) =
183
if head(S) == head(T) 
then prefix(tail(S),tail(T)) 
else false 
take(0,S) = <> 
take(n,<>) = <>
take(n,S) = <head(S)>Atake(n-lftail
drop(0,S) = S
drop(n;<>) = <>
drop(n,S) = drop(n-1,tail(S))
Appendix B
Postponed proofs
B.l Proof of Theorem 1.4.1
To dispatch this theorem we require the following lemma:
Lemma B.1.1 ORACLEmu sat (INIT U (tr JJ. output)) h tr ij. input
This lemma1 is proven by a simple mutual recursion induction to show that:
ORACLEmu(S) sat SU (tr output)) b tr Ij. input
The result follows from the fact that ORACLEmu = ORACLEmu{INIT).
To prove the main theorem we assume, for a contradiction, that C 1-C3 hold, 
and also that ->{ORACLEmu sat no(T)). Then there is some trace tr where tr e  
traces(ORACLEMU) for which tr \ T ^  (). Since C3 tells us that p(xs) =  sec for 
any xs £ T, we have that there are some words in tr of rank sec.
Let tro be the prefix of tr whose last message is the first message of tr with rank 
sec. From the prefix-closure of traces we know that tro £ traces (ORACLEm u )-  
Now consider the last message of tro, which is either of the form output.xs or 
input.xs where p(xs) =  sec.
Case input.xs: By Lemma B.1.1 we have that all messages passed on input 
must be generable from the initial set INIT together with the words passed on 
output. But, by definition of tro we have that p(tr output) =  pub since all mes­
sages in tro apart from the last one are of rank pub. So Cl and C2 yield that 
p(xs) =  pub, forcing a contradiction.
^ o te  that there is some notational abuse in the union of a set (INIT) with a sequence (tr JJ. output). 
A less succinct, but more accurate, notation is given in Chapter 7, Section 7.1.2.
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Case output.xs\ Let tro =  tr\ ^  {output.xs) where (from the definition of the 
process ORACLEmu(S)) we have that the last element of tr\ is of the form input.ys 
where p(ys) =  pub. Furthermore, there must exist some deduction of the form 
ys h xs. However, C2 yields that p(xs) =  pub whenever p(ys) =  pub Ays b xs, 
giving a contradiction.
In either case we find a contradiction which establishes the theorem.
B.2 Proof of C2 for Boyd’s protocol
For each intruder deduction S h m we need to prove condition 2 of the temporal 
rank function theorem:
p(iS) =  t ASK  m p(m) <  t 
We consider each clause in turn.
Encryption
p {{m,pk}) = t ^ p ( { m } pk) < t
There are two cases to consider: (i) t = °o (ii) / ^  © o. (i) is trivial. For (ii), we 
have that p{{m,pk}) ^  °o and, from the definition of rank over sets we have that 
p {{m ,pk} )^  oo =* p H  ^  °°. From the rank fimction we deduce that m ^ Kba and 
therefore that p({w}^) =  0, satisfying the condition for any t ^
Decryption
P{{™}pk,pk~l) = t ^ p { m )  < t
Again, the case t = is trivial. For / ^  we have from the rank function that
p H -1 ) 7  ^ °°=> p H )  =  0 and that p ({w }p*-i) =  p H -
Signing
?({™,Sig(u)}) = t=>p{{m}SIg{u)) < t
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Again, the case t =  is trivial. For p (Sig(u)) ^  oo there are three cases to consider, 
(i) u = A, (ii) u = B, (iii) u £ {A,B}. For (i) we have that p d w } ^ ^ ) )  =  0 if 
m e S(A)  (satisfying the condition), and p ^ m } ^ ^ ) )  =  max(p(/w),«) otherwise. 
In this second sub-case, p (m) < t and n < t so max(p(w), n) < t. For (ii) we have 
that p({jw}s7g(5)) =  0 if m G S{B),  and p({w}sfe(5 )) =  p (m) otherwise (satisfying 
the condition). Finally, for (iii) we have that p({m, Sig(u)}) = p (m), satisfying the 
condition.
Un-signing
p({wJS'ig-_1(«)})- =  * ^ P ( M Slg-i(u)) < t
We know that p(Sig~l (u)) =  0 for all u so p(w) =  t. From the rank function we 
then have that p({w}5/g-i(u)) =  p (m) = t.
Others
The remaining cases: pairing, unpairing, membership and hashing are trivial.
